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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis draws a picture of Kurdish diaspora politics, focusing on the 
community in London. Political activities carried out by the Kurds are 
contextualised within the framework of diasporas as transnational non-state 
actors, through their strong physical and psycho-social ties to their homeland, 
while they live in their ‘hostland.’ This work is in pursuit of understanding the 
attempts and strategies of the Kurds from Turkey in the UK to advance their 
interests as an ethno-national diaspora, and the extent to which these strategies 
and mechanisms provide the diaspora Kurds with necessary means to survive as a 
politically active group. 
The security concerns of the Kurdish activists have productive and 
destructive results for the Kurdish diaspora. The main negative outcome is the 
deepening of the already existing fear of politics that has been prevalent in 
Turkish society, including the Kurds, seemingly the most politicised segment of 
society since the 1980 military coup. The pressure of order-building through legal 
political activity and civic engagement pushed the Kurds into the pursuit of rights 
in various aspects of life that were conventionally seen as part of low politics; 
issues of secondary importance vis-a-vis national liberation, including gender 
equality, ecologism, social welfare, education, socialisation and cultural 
development, rather than issues of high politics, such as the PKK’s status, 
disarmament, political recognition, or autonomy.  
Local politics of the UK are perceived as positive, while its higher level 
policies and foreign policy are seen as mostly negative and "not Kurds-friendly". 
The diaspora Kurds emphasise negative dimensions of British state in relation to 
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world politics and international relations. I argue that as a response to this 
negativity, the British Kurds pursue a survival strategy to beat “structure” with 
their "creative proactive agency" in the diasporan sphere, especially in local politics 
to which they attach more value and hope. 
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GLOSSARY 
Apo: Popularly used shortened version of the first name of the imprisoned PKK  
leader, Abdullah Öcalan 
bakur: Kurdish word for "north", referring to Turkish Kurdistan as northern   
Kurdistan 
başur: Kurdish word for "south", referring to Iraqi Kurdistan as southern  
Kurdistan 
cemevi: Alevis' place of worship where religious and cultural rituals called "cem"  
are carried out 
govend/halay: Kurdish/Anatolian folk dance traditionally done by forming circles  
heval: Kurdish word for "friend", referring to a "comrade", usually a Kurdish  
comrade fighting for or supporting the Kurdish ethno-national movement 
jin: Kurdish word for "woman" 
kesk u sor u zer: Kurdish words for "green, red and yellow" symbolising the  
Kurdish national movement as colours forming the Kurdish flag  
Newroz: Kurdish spring festival c o m p r i s i n g  cultural and political elements  
of Kurdish nationalism 
rojava: Kurdish word for "west", referring to Syrian Kurdistan as western Kurdistan   
rojhelat/rojhilat: Kurdish word for "east", referring to Iranian Kurdistan as eastern  
Kurdistan  
serok: Kurdish word for "chief" or "leader", usually referring to Abdullah Öcalan as  
"Kurdish national leader" 
ülke/welat: Turkish and Kurdish words denoting "country" or "homeland"  
Türkleşme (Turkification): assimilation into Turkishness 
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Türkiyelileşme (Turkey-fication): broadly-based agenda of the Kurdish political  
movement towards a voluntary integration of the Kurds into the socio-
political structure of Turkey, while preserving a distinct ethno-national 
identity, in this case, the Kurdish identity.  
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AKP  Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) 
BDP  Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi) 
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CUP  Committee of Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti) 
Day-Mer Turkish and Kurdish Community Centre (Türk ve K ürt Toplumu 
Dayanışma Merkezi) 
DTK  Democratic Society Congress (Demokratik Toplum Kongresi) 
DTP  Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi) 
El-Com Elbistan Community Centre (Elbistan Toplum Merkezi) 
FED-BIR Kurdish Federation in the UK (Britanya Kürt Dernekleri Federasyonu) 
GCSE  General Certificate of Secondary Education in England and Wales 
Gik-Der Refugee Workers Cultural Association (Göçmen İşçiler Kültür Derneği) 
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HDP  Peoples' Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi) 
HUDA-PAR Free Cause Party (Hür Dava Partisi) 
KCC  Kurdish Community Centre  
KOMKAR Kurdish Advice Centre 
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PSK   Kurdistan Socialist Party (Partîya Sosyalîsta Kurdistan) 
PYD  Democratic Union Party (Partîya Yekîtîya Demokrat) 
TBMM Turkish Grand National Assembly (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi) 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
A) Research Question 
This work attempts to draw an overall picture of the Kurdish diaspora politics with 
particular focus on the community level in London. In so doing, the political activities 
carried out by the Kurds from Turkey is contextualised within the framework of 
diasporas as non-state actors in transnational politics, through their strong physical 
and psycho-social ties to their homeland, while living in a ‘new homeland.’ Hence, 
this work is in pursuit of possible means to understand the following question: 
“What are the attempts and strategies resorted to by the Kurds from Turkey in the 
UK to advance their interests as an ethno- national diaspora and to what extent have 
these strategies and mechanisms provided them with the necessary means to survive 
as a politically active group?” 
 
B) Rationale, Aims and Objectives: Why Kurdish Diaspora Politics Matters 
This thesis proposes to examine the Kurdish question from the perspective of 
diaspora. One might question the validity of evaluating the Kurdish question based 
on diaspora as a unit of analysis. Does diaspora mean a lot for the Kurdish question? 
If we consider that those who are settled in their homelands constitute the majority 
of the Kurds, would it not be more accurate to base the solution of this ethno-
national problem on the 'native' Kurds who live in the mainland, Kurdistan? Is it not 
fallacious to look at this subject from the point of view of those who live outside the 
mainland, for one reason or another? 
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However legitimate or meaningful these questions may be, they fail to notice 
an important point in understanding how the aforementioned century-long ethno- 
national issue, namely the Kurdish question, has evolved over the years and come to 
the state it is in today: the role and nature of diaspora. Here a viewpoint comes to the 
fore as one of the common mistakes which limits the concept of diaspora to the 
Kurds who migrated, or were forced to immigrate, out of Turkey to foreign countries. 
In the technically narrow reading of diaspora, it can be said that what comes to mind 
is a Kurd who lives outside Turkey, for instance, a Kurdish refugee from Diyarbakir 
who lives in Germany, or a Kurd who lives outside Iraq, for example, a Kurdish 
asylum seeker from Sulaymaniyah who lives in Sweden. However, whether by state-
led forced migration or by different economic, societal, political factors-based 
voluntary or involuntary migration, large numbers of Kurds –despite not moving 
away from the nation-states in which they resided– have experienced minoritisation1 
away from the villages, towns or cities in which they were born. Iraqi Kurds, as a 
result of a late 1980s campaign aiming to displace and massacre the Kurds, which 
the Saddam regime named Anfal, had to migrate to cities of Iraq without a sizable 
Kurdish population.2 A state-led purge forced the Kurds to abandon their villages in 
Eastern and South-eastern Anatolia regions during the period from 1984 to 1999, 
                                                        
1 Barzoo Eliassi, “National conflict reflected in diasporas: the quest for recognition among Kurdish 
youth in Sweden,” Open Democracy, 21 December 2011, accessed on 10 January 2015 via 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/barzoo-eliassi/national-conflict-reflected-in-
diasporas-quest-for-recognition-among-kur Eliassi's take on the minoritisation experiences of the 
Kurdish youth in the diaspora discusses their double or even triple-layered obstacles compared to 
experiences of migrant groups that are dominant ethnicities in their home towns i.e. Turks, Persians, 
Arabs: "What makes Kurds different from Persian, Turkish and non- Palestinian Arab migrants in the 
West is that the Kurds come from a minoritized position in the Middle-East into a new minoritized 
position as Muslims, Middle Easterners and “wogs” in an ethnically divided Swedish society. While 
scholars have mainly focused on the structural and patterned inequalities that have privileged 
Persians, Arabs and Turks and marginalized the Kurds, few have accorded attention to how everyday 
interactions between these dominant groups and the Kurds reproduce and perpetuate these 
inequalities through individual actions and strategies." 
2 Human Rights Watch, "Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds," Middle East Watch 
Report (1993): 36-37. 
 
 
3 
when the conflict between The Turkish Armed Forces and PKK was very intense. 
Vast numbers of Turkish  Kurds,  estimated to be millions,  had  to  migrate to  cities 
such  as Istanbul and Izmir in Western Turkey, inhabited mostly by Turks.3 In 
general, in this period of time under the influence of economic instability and 
political securitisation, it would not be incorrect to state that the political 
atmosphere was even more overwhelmingly dark for the Kurds –those who were 
displaced as well as those who remained in their homeland. Studies examining –in 
the frame of the concepts4 such as social exclusion and new urban poverty in 
particular– the societal, cultural and class-related aspects of the spiral of problems 
caused by the aforementioned phenomenon of internal displacement5  contain 
perhaps unwittingly the nucleus of the idea and experience of diaspora. 
Territoriality6 plays a central role in nation-state nationalism and the majority of 
counter-nationalist uprisings, or in other words the struggles faced in the process of 
legitimising the authority over territory by equating the nation or the ethnic group 
with the territory. It results in the "triumph" of the stronger object (usually the 
                                                        
3 Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies, "Turkey Migration and Internally Displaced 
Persons 
Survey" (2006). See also Middle East Report, "Forced Evictions and Destruction of Villages in Turkish 
Kurdistan," April-June 1996 and Ayse Betul Celik, "I Miss My Village!: Forced Kurdish Migrants in 
İstanbul and Their Representation in Association,” New Perspectives on Turkey, 32 (2005): 137-163. 
4 Alp Kanzık, “The Kurdish Migrants in Yenibosna: ‘Social Exclusion,’ Class and Politics,” MA thesis 
(Bogazici University, 2010). 
5 “Internally Displaced People,” The UN Refugee Agency, accessed on 14 November 2014 via  
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c146.html. The term was used with reference to ‘Internally 
Displaced People’ (IDP)’ in accordance with the terminology accepted by the UN refugee Agency's 
(UNHCR). UNHCR states that internally displaced people are among the world's most vulnerable people 
due to the fact that they have not crossed international borders to find sanctuary and instead remained 
in their home countries, having to endure severe violation of rights. Furthermore, UNHCR points out 
that at the end of 2011 the number of internally displaced people was estimated to be 26.4 million 
around the world. 
6 For an interesting analysis from the perspective of psycho-politics (political psychology/psychiatry) 
of the role of the concept of territorialisation in ethnic/national conflict, the seminal work of Prof Vamık 
Volkan from Virginia University is quite enlightening. In his political psychiatry approach Volkan 
explained the roots and the logic of ethno-national conflict from the standpoint of human evolutionary 
development and the existential relation established between human being and territory. See Vamık D. 
Volkan, Cyprus: War and Adaptation: A Psychoanalytic History of Two Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Virginia: 
University Press of Virginia, 1979). 
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dominant nation-state) displacing/removing the relatively weaker object or the 
ethno-regional community from that territory. Accordingly, various practices 
including forced migration, ethnic cleansing, assimilation and genocide usually give 
birth to the formation of ethno-national diasporas most of which are politically 
active. Here the problem of defining or describing almost all ethno-national 
diasporas is certainly valid in the case of the Kurdish who are considered to be one 
of the largest stateless nations7 in the world. In this context, while there are those 
who place the birth of the Kurdish diaspora and emergence of its early members 
around the end of the nineteenth century8; there are others who, without relating 
this displacement to a nationalist interpretation in the modern sense, link it to the 
migration of Kurdish people from their traditional region, namely Kurdistan, to 
different parts of the Empire. The centuries-long presence of the dense Kurdish 
population around the Cihanbeyli and Haymana plateaux in the Central Anatolia 
Region in a way indicates the characteristics of the Kurdish diaspora as a historical 
diaspora9. 
It is possible to understand diaspora as a journey in accordance with all these 
historical and geographical transitions and ruptures. What is meant here is certainly 
                                                        
7 Gerard Chaliand, ed.,  A People Without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan (London: Zed Books, 1993). 
Also see Bahar Baser and Ashok Swain, “Stateless Diaspora Groups and their Repertoires of Nationalist 
Activism in Host Countries,” Journal of International Relations 8, no.1 (2010): 37-60. 
8 Influential Kurdish intellectuals such as Ahmet Riza who attended the Young Turk Congress in Paris as 
well as others with the experience of Egypt are noteworthy. Also the fact that the first Kurdish 
magazine Kürdistan was published by young Kurdish intellectuals in Cairo gives us the opportunity to 
compare the political and intellectual functions of early modern Kurdish diaspora with today's. 
Gülseren Duman, “The Formations of the Kurdish Movement(s) 1908-1914: Exploring the Footprints of 
Kurdish Nationalism,” MA thesis (Bogazici University, 2010): 40-42. 
9 Khalid Khayati, interview by Salam Saadi, “Expert Discusses Kurdish Diaspora In Europe,” Rudaw, 
accessed on 5 March 2012 via http://www.rudaw.net/english/interview/4494.html. In the interview, 
Kurdish diaspora expert Khayati discusses policies of exile and settlement throughout history whereby 
the Kurdish population was banished from their territory by the conflicting Iranian Safavid and 
Ottoman Empires. According to this viewpoint, the fact that large Kurdish communities lived for 
example in Khorasan region, far away from Iranian Kurdistan which is situated in Western Iran or in 
Konya, far away from Turkish Kurdistan is a reflection of this long- established history of diaspora. 
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not a physical journey in order to leave the homeland. The communities trying to 
become a nation in diaspora circles also take a journey of identities. Indeed, diaspora 
is the result and product of migration; however, on a deeper level it is also the 
very journey itself. From another angle, it is the embodiment of the inner journey 
of the self. It is the adventure of seeing, or being forced to see, through recreating, 
oneself from the outside. While this situation is, for many, a painful experience, whilst 
it is being lived, it serves as an important school given its contributions. In a world  
where  one  is  let  outside the mother's  womb  and  forced to  join  the  world  of 
"fathers", it can be said that the concept of diaspora10, with its meanings of "to be 
spread across", "to be forced to leave" or at least "to go involuntarily", is the 
concrete state of one of the world's most natural laws in the language of social 
science. This concept enables the migrant to reproduce his/her homeland which is 
left behind as a vulnerable land, either burning or under possible threats whenever 
that particular homeland is recalled. The Kurdish diaspora presents examples of a 
political activism that catches fire from these sparks and grows by joining other fires 
in its perimeter. 
 
C) Diaspora as a Significant Unit of Analysis 
Historically, diasporas were groups of people who fled or migrated from their 
country involuntarily, mostly due to political reasons including ethnic and religious 
oppression faced in the sending country.11 However, recent decades have witnessed a 
change in the definition of diaspora, due to the increase in the number of 
                                                        
10 Robin Cohen, Global Diasporas: An Introduction (London: Routledge, 2008): 21; Gabriel Sheffer, 
Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009): 9. 
11 Cohen (2008): 21; Osten Wahlbeck, Kurdish Diasporas: A Comparative Study of Kurdish Refugee 
Communities (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999). 
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international migrants, including massive groups leaving their countries for 
economic and other reasons.12 Yet they have also become part of the "diasporic 
public sphere" which is regarded as a "transnational space" that enables diasporic 
groups to have a certain influence on the politics of the sending and host countries, 
as well as the new transnational politics operating with the facilities of global 
communication via online and satellite broadcasting means. 13  These new 
mechanisms of communication and joint action also create new values, ideas, and 
economic and political power resources for the diasporic circles themselves. 
Therefore, the scope of political science and international relations, both in theory 
and practice, requires a broader framework, including non-state actors, namely 
ethnic and religious communities, lobby groups, non-governmental organizations 
and, in our case, diasporas. That will likely bring about a complementary reading of 
world politics, since global means of communication and networking no longer 
permit nation-states to be as ‘sovereign’ as they used to be about a century ago. In 
that respect, the Kurdish case is a recent and striking example of the effectiveness of 
diasporas in both sending and receiving countries’ policies, via a politics of 
recognition, as they struggle to have their ethno-national identity recognised. 
Formation of TV channels, local community centres based in the sending country, as 
well as networking and operating globally in various areas ranging from political 
rights to linguistic studies, culture to charity, are among the activities of diasporas. 
                                                        
12 Sheffer, 9. 
13 Martin van Bruinessen, Transnational aspects of the Kurdish question, working paper Robert 
Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (Florence: European University Institute, 2000); Menderes 
Candan and Uwe Hunger, “Nation Building Online: A Case Study of Kurdish Migrants in Germany,” 
German Policy Studies 4, no. 4 (2008): 125-153; Amir Hassanpour, “Satellite Footprints as national 
borders: Med-TV and the extraterritoriality of state sovereignty,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 18, 
no.1 (1998): 53-72; Kira Kosnick, “Exit and Voice Revisited: the Challenge of Migrant Media” (working 
paper, Goethe University, 2008); David Romano, “Modern Communications Technology in Ethnic 
Nationalist Hands: The Case of the Kurds,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 35, no.1 (2002): 127-
149. 
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All these fields and the transnational sphere through which the Kurdish diaspora 
operates has strong political implications, both for the sending countries like Turkey 
and Iraq, and receiving ones like Britain and Germany. In addition, the issues of 
political and cultural rights of Kurds that is heavily sought by the Kurdish diaspora 
may have certain influence not only on the policies of any one single receiving 
nation-state, but also on the European Union which promote the above-mentioned 
rights of the Kurdish minority of Turkey through its institutional texts, like progress 
reports on the candidate country and other suggestions by the EU commissioners, 
and bodies like the European Parliament. Turkey, as a candidate to be a full member 
of the Union, has amended a good number of its laws and constitution in line with 
these ethnic demands proposed both by Kurds in Turkey and in the diaspora. 
Therefore, the Kurdish question in Turkey is now also an issue of transnational 
politics that also relate to the diaspora which, in this sense, stands as a significant 
actor in contemporary international relations. 
 
D) The Contribution of this Work: Thematic Dimension: ‘Identity’ versus 
‘Power’ 
In general, the scholarly literature on the Kurdish diaspora differs from that on the 
Kurdish question, which generally concentrates on the conflictual relations between 
states and sub-state actors. This difference occurs in three ways: by the volume of the 
works, the disciplinary backgrounds and major themes of these works, and the 
methodologies they use. 
Most of the literature on the Kurdish question relies on “meta-narratives” that 
focus on the power relations among ‘big actors’ of the problem, including nation-
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states vis- à-vis militant groups and international organisations that exert sanctions 
on the former forces. In this vein, societal dynamics underlying the problem and 
issues that relate to such aspects as culture, identity, class and the like are not given 
enough attention in several major reference books.14 
As for the Kurdish diaspora literature, a good deal of it builds on the very 
‘grassroots’ of the problem. It sheds light on the formation and operation of 
diasporan communities along with the processes of ethnic and cultural identity 
construction, political participation and ideological shifts.15 Moreover, this literature 
is rich in evaluating new forms, strategies and spheres of nation/community   
building   via   global   mechanisms   summarised   under   the   title of 
‘transnationalism’.16 The transnational activities and networking of the Kurdish 
diaspora have also been studied in relation to how this transnationalism operates. In 
this respect, the emphasis is usually put on media activities, especially those in ‘cyber 
space’.17 
Nevertheless, there is a common flaw in the literature. That is to say, power 
relations that are manifest in the multiple layers of diasporic politics in the Kurdish 
case are understudied, if not totally ignored. This is more so especially when the 
                                                        
14 Kemal Kirisci and Gareth M. Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of a Trans-state 
Ethnic Conflict (London: Frank Cass, 1997); Henry J. Barkey, Preventing Conflict over Kurdistan 
(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009). 
15 Mustafa Akcinar, “Re-Invention of Identity: The Case of Dersim Community Association in Berlin” 
(Master’s dissertation, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, 2010); Minoo Alinia, “Spaces of 
Diasporas: Kurdish Identities, experiences of otherness and politics of belonging,” PhD thesis (Goteborg 
University, 2004); Ann-Catrin Emanuelsson, “Diaspora global politics: Kurdish transnational networks 
and accommodation of nationalism,” PhD thesis (Goteborg University, 2005); Khalid Khayati, “From 
Victim Diaspora To Transborder?: Diaspora formation and transnational relations among Kurds in 
France and Sweden,” PhD thesis (Linkoping University, 2008); Judith B. Peralta, “The Kurds in Canada: 
A Question of Ethnic Identity,” MA dissertation (Carleton University, 1997). 
16 Wahlbeck, “Transnationalism and Diasporas: The Kurdish Example,” paper presented at the 
International Sociological Association XIV World Congress of Sociology, Montreal, July 26 - August 1, 
1998; Wahlbeck, “The Concept of Diaspora as an Analytical Tool in the Study of Refugee Communities,” 
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 28, no.2 (2002): 221-238; Khayati (2008); Kosnick (2008). 
17 Candan and Hunger (2008); Hassanpour (1998); Kosnick (2008); Romano (2002).  
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volumes of the works on the Kurdish diaspora are considered. Whereas those works 
on the identity dimension of the diasporan Kurds are abundant, each numbering 
hundreds of pages and being substantial studies; other studies regarding the power 
relations among different actors through various groups and levels overall comprise 
a few dozens pages, usually based on descriptive or argumentative accounts.18 
This differentiation can also be made with regard to the disciplinary aspects 
of the literature on the Kurdish diaspora. The dissertations and other large academic 
works are mostly created within the frameworks of sociology and the humanities 
that use qualitative social science methodologies with references to such fields as 
anthropology, ethnography, oral history and the history of memories. On the other 
hand, those short works on the Kurdish diaspora which focus on internal power 
relations are mainly in fields such as political science, international relations and 
security studies. Despite the fact that both categories make use of qualitative 
methodology, the latter falls short of extensive field researches and thus culminates 
in short papers. To make it clear, these essays prefer a supposedly easy and short-cut 
route to reflect upon the Kurdish diaspora’s role in international politics; basically, 
they introduce a historical reading of the causes that gave birth to the Kurdish 
diaspora and depict its current situation in the international arena.  
A rare example of a comprehensive book on the Kurdish diaspora in Britain is 
“Kurdish Refugee Communities: the Diaspora in Finland and England” written by the 
Finnish sociologist Osten Wahlbeck 19, based on the findings of his doctoral 
                                                        
18 Andreas Blatte, “The Kurdish Movement Ethnic Mobilization and Europeanization,” paper presented 
at the EUSA 8th International Biennial Conference, Tennessee, 27-29 March 2003; Vera Eccarius-Kelly, 
“Political Movements and Leverage Points: Kurdish Activism in the European Diaspora,” Journal of 
Muslim Minority Affairs 22, no.1 (2002): 91-118; Michael M. Gunter, “Transnational Sources of Support 
for the Kurdish Insurgency in Turkey,” Journal of Conflict Studies 11, no.2 (1991): 7-29, accessed on 16 
September 2011 via http://journals.hil.unb.ca/index.php/JCS/article/viewFile/14947/16016. 
19 Wahlbeck (1999) 
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dissertation.20  Yet it is preoccupied with the sociological aspects of diasporic identity 
and the internal organisation of the Kurds. Their role in power relations in 
transnational politics is missing. Moreover, his work builds on a comparative study 
of the Kurds in England and Finland that makes it hard to focus on the British case. 
He also attempts to cover the Kurds from different countries of origin (Iraq, Turkey 
and Iran), whereas a special emphasis on those diaspora Kurds originating from 
Turkey is missing. This would enable us to have a wider insight into the political 
context and prospects of Turkey’s Kurdish question, which definitely has different 
characteristics from those experiences of the Iraqi, Iranian or Syrian cases. The 
conceptual framework Wahlbeck deploys is quite beneficial, especially his use of 
such notions as the “transnationalism” and “deterritorialisation” of the Kurdish 
diaspora. However, this work and his other related articles construct the very 
concept of diaspora as a tool to analyse “refugee” communities,21 which remains too 
restrictive to understand the complexity of the Kurdish diaspora community with a 
variety of legal and social situations in which its members live.  
Another extensive and valuable research on the Kurds in Britain was carried 
out by Sarah Keeler.22 Based on a fieldwork with Kurdish migrants and refugees in a 
multi-ethnic London community, Keeler discusses diasporic identity relying on her 
observations on Kurdish food culture in London. “In particular, [she] explores the 
ways in which food becomes a marker of ethnic difference and a means of imagining 
                                                        
20 Osten Wahlbeck, “Kurdish Refugee Communities: the Diaspora in Finland and England,” PhD thesis 
(University of Warwick: 1997). 
21 Wahlbeck (1997; 1999; 2002). 
22 Sarah Keeler, “Hackney’s “Ethnic Economy” Revisited: Local Food Culture, “Purity,” and Politico-
Historical Articulation of Kurdish Identity,” in Traveling Cultures and Plants: The Ethnobiology and 
Ethnopharmacy of Human Migrations, edited by Andrea Pieroni and Ina Vandebroek (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2007a); Keeler, “‘There has been enough crying and now I want to dance!’: Belonging, 
Cosmopolitanism and Resistance in London’s Kurdish Diasporic Spaces,” PhD thesis (University of 
Kent, 2007b). 
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and maintaining identity boundaries within the Kurdish diaspora.”23 She suggests 
that for Kurds, particularly at the individual level, both positive and negative aspects 
of the migratory experience can co-exist.24 In doing so, Keeler stands against 
positioning Kurds as passive victims of persecution and a victim diaspora. Similarly, 
in her PhD thesis Keeler argues that younger generations of Kurds reared mostly in 
diaspora are not merely victims of geopolitical forces beyond their control, they are 
active actors in diverse social, cultural and political situations.25 She reveals that 
young Kurds are affected daily by contesting forces of individualism and collectivity 
and express a desire for western liberal ideals of hybridity and cosmopolitanism.26 
While I do not underestimate the role of cosmopolitan identities in the everyday lives 
of individuals in the diaspora, it is not the main focus of my thesis. In this regard, my 
work differs in the unit of analysis where I take leading community centres as main 
policy makers of the Kurdish diaspora. It is particularly because this is a politics 
thesis where political activism is evaluated in relation to the major narratives of the 
Kurdish ethno-national problem and issues pertaining to it within the diasporan 
space. 
A political science perspective requires an attempt to understand the political 
significance of the Kurdish diaspora and its validity as an actor through a wider level 
of conceptualisation, which includes the broader Kurdish community with some sort 
of ‘diasporan political consciousness.’ Obviously there are ethical and moral 
dilemmas and problems that arise from setting such an approach, especially when 
writing a thesis of politics and international relations based on the consequences of 
mostly bitter experiences of an ethno-national community. However, it is very 
                                                        
23 Keeler (2007a): 166. 
24 Ibid., 182. 
25 Keeler (2007b): 3-5. 
26 Ibid. 
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difficult to avoid such handicaps as a researcher, regardless of disciplinary 
background, due to the nature of the topic which cannot ignore painful aspects 
concerning the processes of the making of a diaspora. 
Taking time and political context into consideration, it should be noted that 
Wahlbeck’s research was conducted at a time when the influx of the Kurdish 
refugees to Europe was at its peak. My research is conducted at the beginning of the 
second decade of the twenty-first century, in an environment in which Kurdish 
identity has already become relatively free in Turkey, as a prerequisite for its 
longstanding EU membership.27 After the arrest of Abdullah Ocalan, the Kurdish 
militant leader, in 1999, the Kurdish question started to be discussed in terms of 
democracy and human rights within the framework of the EU process, rather than 
Kurds’ secession from Turkey.28 On the other hand, this important development had 
a strong impact on diaspora activism. Accordingly, post-1999 Kurdish diaspora 
deserves a closer look. Hassanpour and Mojab explains it as follows:  
[Following Ocalan’s arrest] Within hours, the diaspora reacted with massive 
demonstrations attacking the embassies and consulates of Turkey and states 
that were were thought to have helped the abduction. The immediacy of the 
response, its organised nature, and its scope (Kurds from all countries), range 
/from Sydney and Vladivostok to Vancouver), and militancy (occupation of 
embassies and self-immolation) stunned observers (Kutschera, 1999; Millot 
and Semo, 1999). The new diaspora of the Kurds seemed to be much more 
powerful than its actual size and dispersion would indicate.29 
                                                        
27 Bilgin Ayata and Deniz Yukseker, “İnkar  Siyasetinden  “İdare”  Politikasına:  Kürtlerin Zorunlu 
Göçü,” Birikim, no.213 (2007): 42; V. Firat Bozcali, “Türkiye’nin Kürt Sorunu: 1999-2007,” Birikim.,no 
225 (2008): 13; Seref Kavak, “The Democratic Society Party as a ‘Party for Turkey’: Official and 
Grassroots Politics of a Changing Identity (2005-2009),” MA thesis (Bogazici University, 2010): 10; 
Bahar Sahin, “Türkiye’nin AB Uyum Süreci Bağlamında Kürt Sorunu: Açılımlar ve Sınırlar,” in 
Türkiye’de Çoğunluk ve Azınlık Politikaları: AB Sürecinde Yurttaşlık Tartışmaları, ed. Ayhan Kaya and 
Turgut Tarhanlı (Istanbul: TESEV, 2005); Mesut Yegen, “Müstakbel-Türkten Sözde Vatandaşa: 
Cumhuriyet ve Kürtler,” lecture at Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi, Istanbul, 23 May 2009, 
accessed on 13 September 2011 via http://www.obarsiv.com/pdf/MesutYegen.pdf.  
28 Michael Gunter, “The Continuing Kurdish Problem in Turkey after Ocalan’s capture,” Third World 
Quarterly 21, no.5 (2000): 854. 
29 Amir Hassanpour and Shahrzad Mojab, “Kurdish Diaspora,” in Encyclopedia of Diasporas: Immigrant 
and Refugee Cultures around the World, Volume I, ed. Melvin Ember et al. (New York: Springer, 2005), 
221. 
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In this period, the problem turned from being one of bloodshed to a legal-political 
debate. This change implied a certain transformation within the Turkish state and 
Turkish society. Here the effect of the 1999 Helsinki European Council, which 
declared Turkey a ‘candidate country’, is also crucial. Henceforth, the main dynamic 
of Turkish politics turned out to be EU membership as a state-policy. A huge 
legislative effort was made, including comprehensive constitutional amendments in 
2001 and 2004, new Civil and Penal Codes and eight reform packages and breaks in 
taboos, like the abolition of capital punishment, the learning of local languages and 
dialects, broadcasting in these languages, the dismissal of Martial Law, etc. On the 
other hand, this adoption and implementation of major political reforms has come 
to a halt in recent years, and the armed conflict with the PKK has flared up. 
Accordingly, the EU Commission’s annual Progress Report on Turkey as a candidate 
country lists a long chain of flaws and backlashes relating to this issue30. One should 
also note the possible effects of the regional developments in the Middle East known 
as the Arab Spring, which revived the idea of Kurdish autonomy for the other 
three parts of Kurdistan, rather than only that of Iraq, which had already become a 
Kurdish autonomous region. In this setting, the stances of the Kurdish diaspora 
towards politics and their political agenda normally differ today from those of the 
1990s and even early 2000s. All these factors can be seen as major motives for new 
research in this field.  
In the course of this thesis, my emphasis is mainly on what the Kurdish 
diaspora does, rather than what the Kurdish diaspora is. Since this is a political study, 
                                                        
30 “Turkey Progress Report 2012,” European Commission, accessed on 2 November 2012 via 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2012/package/tr_rapport_2012_en.pdf.  
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I am not focusing on the intra-group structure of the diaspora from a sociological 
perspective, covering dimensions relating to class, gender, age etc. Yet this study can 
potentially contribute to the gap in the diaspora literature where it can intersect with 
the literature on community politics, social movements, and interest group 
mobilisation in a multi-level setting as part of the wider Europeanization literature on 
contextualising the political strategy of diaspora.31 
 
E) The Kurdish Diaspora in the Process of Formation and Flourishing 
The Kurdish diaspora acquired its first significant grass roots in the 1960s from 
among the Turkish nationals who migrated to Western Europe, to fill gaps in the 
labour market. Afterwards, in the aftermath of the 1980 coup d'état in Turkey which 
intensified the political upheaval concerning the Kurds and the Turkish Left in 
particular, the Kurds did not hesitate to carry their activism to the West.32 This 
process was accelerated by means of asylum seeking and illegal immigration and 
lasted from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s.33 Throughout the 2000s, when the 
Kurdish question started to be recognised increasingly by the Turkish, Middle 
Eastern and other world governments, the Kurdish diaspora had already become one 
of the world's biggest ethno-national diasporas34. The Kurdish diaspora became a 
                                                        
31 Bahar Baser, “Kurdish Diaspora Political Activism in Europe with a Particular Focus on Great 
Britain,” Diaspora Dialogues for Development and Peace Project, (Berlin: Berghof Peace Support, 2011); 
David Romano, The Kurdish Nationalist Movements; Opportunity, Mobilization, and Identity (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006); Nicole F. Watts, Activist in Office: Kurdish Politics and Protest in 
Turkey (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2010); Kerim Yildiz, The Kurds in Turkey: EU Accession 
and Human Rights (London: Pluto Press, 2005). 
32 Bilgin Ayata, “The Politics of Displacement: A Transnational Analysis of the Forced Migration of 
Kurds in Turkey and Europe,” PhD thesis (John Hopkins University, 2011): 141-45. 
33 Baser (2011): 7-10. 
34 Hassanpour and Mojab (2005): 214-223; Cohen (2008) 5; Wahlbeck (1999); Sheffer (2009): 1, 110. 
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more widely discussed topic during this period of time,35 during which it was 
believed that the Kurdish question came closest to being solved. 
In relation to its role in the Kurdish movement, the significant current position 
of the Kurdish diaspora certainly did not occur overnight. As an outcome of the 
experiences of leaving the homeland, particularly in the last thirty years, Kurdish 
political and cultural activism achieved a virtual Renaissance through and among the 
diaspora groups in the West. In many European cities such as Paris, Stockholm and 
London, the rise of prominent artists, experts and practitioners in Kurdish language, 
literature, history and music, as well as their attaining of the opportunities to let their 
voices be heard, allowed these Kurdish intellectuals to overcome the obstacles they 
had to face in their homeland and revive various components of their Kurdish 
identity. Subsequently, the Kurds, through the diaspora, started to reach a wider 
audience not only in their homeland but also across the world. They succeeded in 
drawing the attention of politicians and civil societies both in the countries where 
they settled and in third countries36. 
When we look at the cultural field broadly, what made the diaspora important 
was two-fold: first, to be able to encounter Kurds and the Kurdish language in various 
artistic forms, from novels to poetry, folk music to rap, and second, to support in this 
matter their kin who remained in the homeland (for instance Turkey or Iraq) with 
inspiration and motivation, as well as man-made materials and artefacts. 
Experiencing 'Kurdishness' as a right in Western European countries was 
                                                        
35 There are many intellectuals with conservative, centre-right and especially liberal tendencies who argue that in spite of its risks and hardships and 
compared to the earlier times in Turkey, generally, the potentiality of solving the Kurdish question are greater given the state of internal politics and the 
regional factors. For a good example of this, see Gokhan Bacik, “Turkey’s Negotiations with the PKK: Contents, Dynamics, Risks, and Possible Outcomes,” The 
German Marshall Fund of the United States, March 28, 2013. For a relevant work of the same author, see Gokhan Bacik, “The Rise of Identity Politics 
in Turkey,” UNISCI Discussion Papers, no.23 (2010): 47-59. 
36 From this angle, at the levels of the state and the civil society we can say that the Kurdish diaspora circles carry out stateless nation diplomacy as a lobbying 
activity. 
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fundamental to this. In addition, promise of a certain level of welfare for migrant 
communities made by governments in these countries, as well as these governments' 
efforts to try to include these communities in society, was also important. 
Additionally, Western European mainstream multiculturalism regarding migrant 
groups and especially ethnic minorities meant having a supportive, facilitative and 
motivating effect on the Kurdish diaspora, just as on other migrant communities. 
Like the cultural field, for the Kurdish diaspora, Western European countries 
were also at the forefront in carrying out activities linked to political organisation and 
identity politics. They enabled setting up associations, working for recognition of 
language and identity and changing perceptions about appeals for asylum seekers 
who were wrongly detained or charged in antidemocratic ways.37 This convinced the 
Kurds of the potential of diaspora politics and, accordingly, a substantial amount of 
work began in this field. The first Kurdish television channels were set up in Europe 
when they were banned in Turkey. One of the first of these was the London-based 
MED-TV.38 This time within European borders, a non-state type of lobbying similar to 
that of 'government in exile' enabled the activities of the Kurdish political movement 
to expand and deepen.  
'Government in exile' is a term which refers to "a temporary government 
moved to or formed in a foreign land by exiles who hope to rule when their country is 
liberated".39 Similar to the concept of 'government in exile', the Kurdish Parliament in 
Exile [Parlamana Kurdistane Li Derveyi Welat (PKDW)] was founded in The Hague in 
1995 by the PKK and other leading Kurdish bodies and individuals close to the PKK-
                                                        
37 Hassanpour and Mojab (2005): 219. 
38 Alinia (2004): 91-2. Also see Hassanpour (1998).  
39 “Government-in-exile”, Princeton University WordNet, accessed on 9 April 2016 via 
http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=government-in-exile. 
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oriented Kurdish movement.40 This 'parliament in exile' was an important step 
towards creating a political wing of the Kurdish national struggle trying to operate in 
the European transnational space.41 Gurbey states that:  
On 23 January 1995, the PKK handed a declaration to the International Red 
Cross and the Foreign Ministry of Switzerland, in which it stated that the 
International Red Cross is granted entry into the war regions to be able to 
monitor that the Geneva treaty and its supplemental protocols are being 
adhered to by the PKK. With this diplomatic step, the PKK intends to be 
internationally recognized as a warring party and demands that Turkey abide 
by the Geneva Convention.42  
 
Therefore, the founding of the Kurdish Parliament in Exile marked a turning point in 
the development of the Kurdish national struggle.43 In this context diaspora politics 
reflects important elements of ethno-national conflicts taking place in the homeland. 
The Kurdish Parliament in Exile experience shows the role of the diaspora 
institutions in promulgating political agenda items imported from the homeland. 
Large meetings, demonstrations and festivals with national/political themes 
or motivations attended by tens of thousands of people took place in European 
metropolises.44 All of these activities drew the attention of the European public 
towards the Kurdish community which, by that time, was beginning to attain a 
relatively noticeable population and influence within European borders.45 In the 
securitised Europe of the post-September 11 period, the Kurds, who had been seen as 
'an ethnic vote' earlier – mainly   during   elections, especially   local   elections –
                                                        
40 Michael Gunter, The A to Z of the Kurds (Plymouth: Scarecrow Press, 2009), 112-3. 
41 Gulistan Gurbey, "The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in Turkey Since the 1980s," in The Kurdish 
Nationalist Movement in the 1990s: Its Impact on Turkey and the Middle East, ed. Robert W. Olson 
(Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 1996). 
42 Ibid., 25. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Hassanpour and Mojab, 221. 
45 Ibid. 
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started  to  be approached in the context of preserving the public order and security 
within some European countries. This can be seen, for instance, in how much 
government authorities worry about some protests turning into inter-ethnic tension 
among the Kurds and Turks in European countries, especially when the Kurdish 
conflict intensifies in Turkey and the Middle East. Baser examines the conflicts 
between Turkish and Kurdish diaspora communities and gives Sweden as one of the 
exceptional cases where pervasive conflict between the two sides is not observed, 
whereas in most other countries these two groups have had some violent conflicts:  
Due to the lack of violent encounters, the relationship between Turks and 
Kurds in Sweden has received little academic or media attention. Moreover, it 
has not attracted the attention of hostland policy makers, as it is not 
considered a threat to domestic security. In other countries, such as Germany, 
the spill-over of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict has been seen as a threat to 
public order due to clashes between the two groups, including violent 
demonstrations that have led to altercations with the police, arson attacks, and 
attempts at lynching.46  
This situation ran parallel to the period of shutting down of Kurdish television 
channels one after another, or enforcing restrictions on them due to their 'relations 
with terrorist organisations'. Directing the demonstrations specifically at the Kurds, 
and in contrast to previous terms, trying to inhibit as elements of crime the use of 
flags and posters bearing the PKK logo or pictures of its leader, Abdullah Ocalan, 
increased dramatically following the USA and the EU's decision to recognise the PKK 
as a terrorist organisation. In the meantime, the Kurdish diaspora abandoned47 its 
'Kurdish parliament in exile' formula and instead adopted the roof organisation 
system,48 the confederation of civil society organisations.49 This way, as opposed to 
                                                        
46 Bahar Baser, "Diasporas and Imported Conflicts: Turkish and Kurdish Second-Generation Diasporas 
in Sweden," Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security 3, no.2 (2013a): 106. 
47 Bahar Baser, The Kurdish Diaspora in Europe: Identity Formation and Political Activism (Istanbul: 
Bogazici University, 2013b): 23. 
48 “The Confederation of Kurdish Associations in Europe,” accessed on 14 November 2013 via 
http://www.kon-kurd.org. 
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the old formula, it may be that the Kurdish diaspora organisations preferred to act 
seemingly as a less political and more cultural confederation. It is possible to notice in 
the sources that support this study the influence of the community centres and 
platforms50 related to and working with FED-BIR (Kurdish Federation in the UK), the 
British representative of this umbrella organisation across Europe. That is largely due 
to the fact that the activities of these community centres and platforms dominate 
Kurdish diaspora politics. FED-BIR is one of the constituents of KON-KURD (The 
Confederation of Kurdish Associations in Europe), which has ten federations and one 
hundred seventy-five unions affiliated to it.51 These organisations address the specific 
needs of Kurdish communities, encouraging their cultural, social and diasporic 
identity.52 Ugurlu’s study on “Identity Formation and Community Organization 
among Kurdish Diaspora in London” suggests that Kurdish community organisations 
are places for socialisation, friendship settings, an exercise in ethnic identity 
awareness and counselling, strengthening their users’ social networks, all of which 
also help support the Kurdish cause transnationally, as previous studies indicate.53 
Despite all of its transnational mobilisation ability and potentialities, the 
Kurdish diaspora has also experienced, in recent times, the problem of being a 
stateless nation diaspora. In this new era of struggle with state and supra-state 
                                                                                                                                                                        
49 Baser (2013b): 34-45. In addition to its new functions in mobilising diasporic communities, Baser 
discusses in detail KON-KURD's (The Confederation of Kurdish Associations in Europe) – the Belgium-
based umbrella organisation of European PKK-leaning Kurdish associations that have become 
dominant in (especially Turkish) Kurdish diaspora politics – lobbying activities directed at EU 
institutions and governments. 
50 Kurdish Community Centre and Halkevi - Kurdish and Turkish Community Centre, Roj Women's 
Association - Kurdish & Turkish Women's Centre and Ozgur Roni Youth Platform are the most 
prominent of the aforementioned communities and platforms. 
51 “The Confederation of Kurdish Associations KON-KURD calling Kurds to 8 September festival,” Ekurd 
Daily, accessed on 5 July 2015 via http://ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2012/9/turkey4132.htm. 
 
52 Omer Ugurlu, "Identity Formation and Community Organization among Kurdish Diaspora in 
London," Journal of Ethnic and Cultural Studies 1, no. 1 (2014): 22. 
 
53 Ibid., 22, 24, 27. 
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actors, where power is prioritised, it can be argued that there is a relative decline in 
the agency of the Kurdish diaspora in terms of its effectiveness. However, when we 
take into account the span of the intellectual and organisational space of the diaspora, 
together with its flexible legal positioning, it should be noted that the diaspora still 
has an important role in the Kurdish movement's transformation and effectiveness. 
Therefore, as far as the solution of the Kurdish question is concerned, I find it 
necessary to analyse diaspora as a unit that should not be overlooked. Therefore, I 
explore the subject of 'Kurdishness' and its politics through the experience of 
diaspora based upon the rarely analysed example of the Kurds in the UK which is a 
part of the Kurdish diaspora in Europe. 
 
F) Time and Political Context 
Key features of the Kurdish question in the last decade shape the context of my study 
of this problem. I argue that this context has two fundamental dynamics: 
Turkeyfication and Kurdistanisation, both of which refer to re-imagination, 
reproduction, and realisation of the political geography of the Kurds from Turkey. 
These two tendencies, rather than sharply narrating the zeitgeist of two different 
periods, belong to the same timeframe, even though one of these dynamics 
occasionally becomes more prominent than the other, and can be traced 
simultaneously in relation to the same actors. 
In the period following the imprisonment of Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the 
PKK, the mainstream Kurdish movement in Turkey, rather than in terms of Kurdish 
separatism, the Kurdish question started to be discussed more than ever within the 
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framework of democracy, human rights advocacy and Turkey's European Union 
candidacy.54 In this period, political violence was abandoned as a political discussion 
ground, and this made significant contributions to the transformation of the Turkish 
state and public’s attitude. Also important in this transformation was the fact that 
Turkey was given the status of a 'candidate country' by the European Union in the 
1999 Helsinki European Council meeting. Because, as seen later, European Union 
candidacy was the main driving force behind Turkey's political reformation, it would 
shape state policies and discussions in the following ten years. Developments such as 
key constitutional changes, i.e. the abolition of the death penalty, regulations 
concerning civil law and penal law, various regulations regarding education and 
broadcasting in languages other than Turkish, and the annulment of the state of 
emergency in Kurdish cities, all took place in this new period. At the same time, 
political reforms and their practical effects were disrupted in recent times, while 
military action against the PKK and the securitising of state policies started to come 
to the forefront.55 However, when discussing the character of the Kurdish question 
today it is also necessary to consider the reshaping of the Middle East following the 
'Arab Spring'. It should not be disregarded how in the three other parts of the 
Kurdistani geography outside of Iraq this process strengthened the idea of 
autonomous or empowered Kurdish administrative regions. In this context, we can 
say that the political agenda of the Kurdish diaspora – just as in the Kurdish 
movements in the homeland – continues in a different tone and with different 
contents, compared to those of the 1990s and even the 2000s. I should also add that, 
                                                        
54 Gunter (2000). 
 
55 European Union Commission’s “Turkey Progress Report 2012” discusses shortcomings concerning 
this. 
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while I was analysing the Kurdish diaspora politics in London, I always had the 
aforementioned regional-political conjuncture at the back of my mind, with its spatial 
and temporal dimensions.  
To conclude my introduction, I would like to present briefly the content of the 
subsequent chapters of the thesis. Chapter I, the introduction, covered the main 
research questions, rationale, aims and objectives of this research, and demonstrated 
why Kurdish diaspora politics matters.  
Chapter II is the literature review. It delves deeper into diaspora as a concept 
and its use for the Kurds, and discusses the agency of diasporas as non-state actors in 
international relations. Chapter III explains the methodology adopted in this research.  
Chapter IV introduces a brief historical background of the Kurdish Question 
and the Kurdish migration that has given birth to the Kurdish diaspora and affected 
the state of its dynamic politics. This chapter comprises a periodisation of the Kurdish 
question and Kurdish migration from the Ottoman Empire to the Early Republican 
Era of Turkey, followed by Contemporary Turkish and Kurdish migration waves to 
Europe from 1950s to 1970s. Then comes the period between 1980 and 2000s, 
namely the post-military coup era to the rise of armed conflict between the Kurdish 
militia and the Turkish army.  
The following three chapters reflect the findings of my field research in 
London. Chapter V is about diaspora agency and national/transnational politics, 
creative agency building and struggles for legitimacy. This chapter takes a closer look 
at the agency of the Kurdish diaspora’s grassroots and the strategies to survive 
institutionally in the British/European public sphere. In this chapter, I also suggest 
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that there is a need for cross-disciplinary approaches, in particular, anthropology of 
international relations in the study of diaspora politics. 
Chapter VI evaluates the role of the Kurdish diaspora community in London 
and tries to understand its engagement in local politics in the host country. Kurdish 
political activism with a diverse agenda is introduced in this chapter. A balance of 
tendencies between trans-border, intra-Kurdish and pro-Turkeyfication dynamics is 
discussed. The religious identity of the Alevi minority, very common among the Kurds 
in London, and Kurdish women’s activism in London’s diasporic space are paid 
particular attention, as they are both strong grassroots motives. 
Chapter VII focuses on priorities of the Kurdish diaspora’s agenda in the UK. In 
this regard, the question of (in)visibility of the Kurds and alliances they form with 
other communities. The interconnectedness of local and transnational observed in 
Kurdish diaspora politics, especially in the recent struggle for autonomy by Syrian 
Kurds, is one of the major findings of this chapter. This chapter also looks at Kurdish 
mobilisation for national struggle reinforced by the strong motive of Apoism, which 
implies the predominance and unity in the prioritisation of national political 
leadership around imprisoned Kurdish militant leader Abdullah Ocalan. Civic 
participation as a defensive strategy in a securitised Europe is another major finding 
of this chapter. 
Chapter VIII includes the conclusion and suggestions for further research 
concerning various aspects of the Kurdish diaspora politics and the future of the 
Kurdish Question. 
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
  
 
A) Spatio-Temporal Dimension: The Concept of Diaspora and its Use for the 
Kurds 
 
 
Diaspora has been used instrumentally to refer to various ethnic groups attempting 
to lobby the governments and civil societies of the countries that they migrated to, 
in terms of their group interests and demands, especially relating to their countries 
of origin. Kurds have also been regarded as a diaspora group due to their experience 
of oppression and denial in their hometown(s). As we have seen, like their 
counterparts in Iraq, Iran and Syria, Kurds from Turkey have experienced 
devastating migration movements, especially for the last three decades, due to two 
major events in t h e  modern Turkish Republic: the military coup of 12 September  
1980 and the  ongoing  armed  conflict  between  the  PKK (the outlawed Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party) and the Turkish army. This process of “low-intensity conflict” left 
the Kurdish population of eastern Turkey caught in the crossfire. The state, having 
already denied Kurdish identity as a result of its nation building strategy, lost its 
trust in relation to its Kurdish minority with oppressive policies directed at them by 
the military regime. The situation was exacerbated by the militarisation of the 
predominantly Kurdish regions in the 1990s’ conflictual atmosphere. As we saw, 
more than 3000 villages were depopulated by the state authorities and hundreds of 
thousands of Kurdish villagers had to flock into the suburban areas of metropolises 
like Istanbul, Izmir, Adana, Mersin etc.56 Some others migrated to Europe seeking 
political asylum. Both in the 1980s and 1 9 90s, the waves of Kurdish migrations 
                                                        
56 Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies, "Turkey Migration and Internally Displaced 
Persons 
Survey" (2006). 
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from Turkey were mostly towards major Western European countries, such as 
Germany, France, the Netherlands and the UK. The migration to the UK is the focus 
of this work. Before looking at the situation of the Kurdish diasporan community in 
the UK, it would be beneficial to revisit the term ‘diaspora’ as an analytical tool, to 
explain the situation of various migrant groups including Kurds, through the 
changing usage of the word in different phases and contexts.  
 
 The word diaspora originates in the Greek translation of the Bible and has 
two major meanings; "to sow"57 and "to spread"58. It has been used predominantly  
to  refer to  the  exile  of  the  Jews  from ancient  Babylon  until recently.59 
However, its use as an academic term and theoretical concept has evolved to a 
great extent, especially with the diversification of the studies of social phenomena 
such as migration, asylum-seekers and multiculturalism, through various 
disciplines including sociology, labour economics, political science, international 
relations and anthropology. 
 
Considering the diaspora literature in general, the time dimension stands in tandem 
with macro-political trends in the social sciences. In this respect, until the late 1980s 
- even in some rare cases in 1990s - relevant works have been produced within the 
conceptual framework of international migration and with a heavy stress on the 
labour and economic development aspects of migration, in tandem with the zeitgeist 
of the 1960s and 1 9 7 0 s.60 Then studies with the ‘diaspora’ title and/or related 
                                                        
57 Sheffer (2009): 9. 
58 Cohen (2008): 21. 
59 Ibid., 1. 
60 Melech Epstein, Jewish labor in USA: an industrial, political and cultural history of the 
Jewish labor movement (New York: Ktav, 1969); James Hammerton, Emigrant Gentlewomen: Genteel 
poverty and female emigration, 1830-1914 (London: Croom Helm, 1979); Arthur W. Helweg, Sikhs in 
England: The Development of a Migrant Community (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1979). 
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terminology started to be written and this rising curve accelerated and indeed 
boomed in the 1990s61, seemingly foreshadowed by the introduction of Diaspora: A 
Journal of Transnational Studies (first published in 1991). This was a brand new 
interdisciplinary journal concentrating on the theory and practice of diasporas. This 
period was marked by the end of the Cold War and the flourishing of debates on the 
rights of ethnic, religious minority groups and identity politics, especially in the 
multicultural societies of Europe and North America.62 Therefore, the study of 
ethnic groups living in receiving countries other than their home country was often 
defined under the diaspora category. Some researchers have gone even further in 
defining various groups of people as diasporas, despite the fact that they did not 
forcibly leave their hometown, including labour/proletarian diasporas like 
Indentured Indians, Chinese, Turks, and Italians, ‘imperial diasporas’   like the 
British, ‘trade   diasporas’   like   Lebanese,   Chinese, and Venetians, and 
‘deterritorialized diasporas’ like Caribbean peoples, Parsis, and Roma.63 However, 
in many of the later works produced on diasporas, especially in the late 1990s and 
then 2000s, the concept ‘diaspora’ has often been used in the sense named by Cohen 
as ‘victim diasporas’64, giving examples like Jews, Africans and Armenians, and 
                                                        
61 Stuart Hall, ‘Cultural identity and diaspora’, in Jonathan Rutherford (ed) Identity: community, culture, 
difference (London: Lawrence &Wishart, 1990): 222-37; William Safran, ‘Diasporas  in  modern  
societies:  myths  of  homeland  and  return’, Diaspora 1, no. 1 (1991): 83-99; Ronald Segal, The Black 
Diaspora (London: Faber & Faber, 1995); Darshan Singh Tatla, The Sikh Diaspora: the search for 
statehood (London: UCL Press, 1999); Nicholas van Hear, New diasporas: the mass exodus, dispersal and 
regrouping of migrant communities (London: UCL Press, 1998); Steven Vertovec and Robin Cohen 
(eds), Migration, diasporas and Transnationalism (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1999). 
62 Michael Keating and John McGarry, ‘Introduction’ in Minority Nationalism and the Changing 
International Order, Michael Keating and John McGarry (eds.) (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2001). 
63 Cohen (2008): 18. 
64 Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal, ‘Citizenship and identity: living in diasporas in post-war Europe?’ Ethnic 
and Racial Studies 23, no. 1 (2000): 1-15; William Safran, ‘The Jewish diaspora in a comparative and 
theoretical perspective’, Israel Studies 10, no. 1 (2005): 37-60; Helena Lindholm Schultz, The 
Palestinian diaspora: formation of identities and politics of homeland (London: Routledge, 2003); 
Khachig Tololyan, Redefining diasporas: old approaches, new identities: the Armenian diaspora in an 
international context, Occasional paper (London: Armenian Institute, 2002); Wahlbeck (2002); UNHCR 
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suggesting that such groups as Irish and Palestinians be included, with the premise 
that “Many contemporary refugee groups are incipient victim diasporas but time has 
to pass to see whether they return to their homelands, assimilate in their host lands, 
creolize or mobilize as a diaspora."65 
As for the spatial dimension of the diaspora literature, we should bear in mind that 
there can arise the question of a researcher’s subjective relationship with a 
diaspora. This relationship can be divided roughly in two categories:  
a) Authors sharing the ethnic origin of a certain diaspora: Diaspora 
researchers with Jewish descent: Cohen, Safran, Sheffer, Schnapper; Kurdish 
descent: Khayati, Kavak; Armenian descent: Tololyan; Sikh descent: Singh, 
Tatla; Hindu descent: Parekh; Arab descent: Hourani; Caribbean descent: Hall, 
Gilroy etc. 
b)  Authors that do not have the same ethnic origin with that of the 
diaspora they study: Wahlbeck and Ostergaard-Nielsen on Kurds; Chailand on 
Armenians; Harold, Hinnells and Williams on South Asians; Werbner on 
Pakistanis. 
 
In line with the conception of victim diasporas mentioned above, it can be argued 
that the Kurdish diaspora fits well in the category of incipient victim diaspora, 
due to the fact that huge numbers of Kurds have left their homeland involuntarily 
and their diasporic history is relatively recent. On the other hand, it should also 
be noted that, unlike many other diasporas, Kurds have left their country of origin 
but without an official state of their own, which has caused them to be referred as a 
                                                                                                                                                                        
Global Trends 2006, Geneva: United Nations High Commission for Refugees, accessed on 15 September 
2011 via http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/STATISTICS/4676a71d4.pdf     
  
65 Cohen (2008): 18. 
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"stateless nation" or “people without state.”66 Overall, I am using the term ‘Kurdish 
diaspora’ in its least restrictive sense, which Sheffer calls ethno-national diaspora, 
exemplified by numerous groups, from Koreans in Los Angeles to Turks in Berlin, 
Russians in Estonia to many other scattered groups like Chinese, Jews, Palestinians, 
Africans, Romanians, Poles, Kurds, Armenians. As Sheffer states, these groups 
“reside outside of their countries of origin, but maintain contacts with people back 
in their old homelands."67 Sheffer clarifies the conception of ‘ethno-national 
diaspora’ in his broad definition:  
An ethno-national diaspora is a social-political formation, created as a result 
of either voluntary or forced migration, whose members regard themselves as 
of the same ethno-national origin and who permanently reside as minorities 
in one or several host countries. Members of such entities maintain regular or 
occasional contacts with what they regard as their homeland and with 
individuals and groups of the same background residing in other host 
countries. Based on aggregate decisions to settle permanently in host 
countries, but to maintain a common identity, diasporans identify as such, 
showing solidarity with their group and their entire nation, and they organize 
and are active in the cultural, social, economic, and political spheres. Among 
their various activities, members of such diasporas establish trans-state 
networks that reflect complex relationships among the diasporas, their host 
countries, their homelands, and international actors. 68 
 
The rationale behind this detailed description of the term ‘ethno-national diaspora’ 
will be prevalent in the course of this study to evaluate the Kurdish case. 
 
B) Agency of Diasporas as Non-State Actors in Transnational Politics 
 
 
The strengths and limits of the agency of diasporas as actors of transnational 
politics and hence international relations vary according to different academic 
traditions that reflect upon certain macro-geographically divided political 
                                                        
66 Chaliand (1993); Kirisci and Winrow (1997): 3. 
67 Sheffer (2009): 1. 
68 Ibid., 9-10.  
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differences. Both theoretical and practical evaluations of diaspora as a political 
actor have been positively evaluated in the North American tradition of political 
science and statecraft. On the other hand, the overall Western European evaluation 
of diasporas' political roles and functions has been primarily within the boundaries 
of domestic political participation, particularly in relation to yardsticks of  social 
cohesion that  imply socio-economic  integration  into  migrants' new  
homelands. 69  Mainly, we talk about academic scholarly traditions, but the 
interactions between state policies and academic traditions are usually very 
obvious, especially in the case of social-political issues concerning migrants, 
integration and multiculturalism. After making this distinction between American 
and European political and academic perceptions of diasporas’ political agendas, 
Ostergaard-Nielsen emphasises the European multiculturalist approach to keep the 
diasporas hosted by them as ‘immigrants’ that should potentially incorporate 
themselves into the host land's political objectives, rather than emerge as ethnic 
lobbies with agendas of homeland politics, as in the case of the US.70 One should 
note that Ostergaard-Nielsen’s observations mostly rely on Continental Europe 
and Scandinavian countries, and she acknowledges that, even there, each country 
has certain contextual features that makes it different from others in the same 
continent. However, it would not be too far-fetched to build categories based on 
certain common characteristics in political and academic streams across 
geographies. My research on the case of the UK has quite interesting features that 
link and intertwine with both the North American/Anglo-Saxon t r a d i t i o n  a n d  
E u r o p e a n  p r a c t i c e s  a n d  n o r m s .  That’s w h y , f o r  instance, diaspora 
                                                        
69 Eva Ostergaard-Nielsen, “Diasporas in Global Politics” in William Wallace and Daphne Josselin (eds.) 
Non- State Actors in Global Politics (London: Palgrave, 2001): 231-232. 
70 Ibid., 232.  
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communities are more active in official political lobbying in British state circles 
than in several Continental European examples, while being less powerful and 
less explicit compared to their counterparts’ lobbying practices in the US Congress, 
Senate and political parties. Although political activities of diaspora communities 
usually go beyond national boundaries and create their own spaces, institutional 
context of the host country affects these activities. Ishkanian states: 
Civil society is no longer confined to the borders of the territorial nation-state. 
Mary Kaldor argues, the end of the Cold War and increasing global 
interconnectedness have provided like-minded groups in different parts of 
the world opportunities for addressing demands not just to their respective 
states, but to global institutions and other states.71  
 
 
Taking this whole picture into consideration, it would not be too hasty to conclude 
that the academic traditions looking into diasporas directly reflect the above-
mentioned difference in perspective and disciplinary adjustments. Whereas diaspora 
has widely been evaluated within the ‘softer’ social sciences of sociology, 
anthropology and geography in the European academic literature, it has also been 
studied with the lenses of political science and international relations in the 
American academia, with strong emphasis on certain aspects pertaining to foreign 
policy ethnic lobbying towards governments72, in addition to the ‘low politics’ issues 
that are also examined in the European tradition. As discussed earlier, this inter-
continental academic divergence may be a result of differences in the understanding 
and design of politics and society and t h e  juxtaposition of the two. In the same 
vein, diasporas and diaspora politics remain part of societal dynamics for one 
stream, the European tradition, and of international relations and foreign policy for 
                                                        
71 Armine Ishkanian, "Diaspora and Global Civil Society: The Impact of Transnational Diasporic 
Activism on Armenia's Post-Soviet Transition" in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Transnationalism and 
Diaspora (eds.) by T. Atabaki and S. Mehendale (London: Routledge, 2005): 6.  
 
72 Yossi Shain and Aharon Barth, "Diasporas and International Relations Theory," International 
Organization 57, No.3 (2003): 449-479. 
 
 
31 
the other, the American tradition, which is a significant difference to keep in mind 
when theorising the agency of diaspora in international relations and transnational 
political spheres that encompass our daily lives. Shain and Barth make an important 
contribution to the study of diasporas and international relations by incorporating 
the former into the latter. They benefit from different theoretical approaches of 
international relations by focusing on diasporas as independent actors who actively 
influence their homeland (kin-state) foreign policies. Shain and Barth argue that 
diasporic influences can best be understood by situating them in the 'theoretical 
space' shared by constructivist and liberal streams of international relations theory; 
both of which emphasise the impact of identity and domestic politics on international 
behaviour.  
 
C ) T h e  Particularity of the UK Case: A Hybrid Approach to Diaspora 
Agency? 
 
 
The UK's House of Commons formally recognised the Anfal Campaign and 
Halabja Massacre as genocide against the Kurds committed by the Baath regime 
in Iraq and agreed to encourage governments, the UN and the EU to officially 
recognise it. Would the UK Parliament be so concerned as to particularly gather 
at a session for the recognition of the Halabja Massacre as Genocide of the Iraqi 
Kurds under the Saddam Regime in Iraq in 198873, if the Iraqi Kurdish regional 
government did not have a say on the oil produced and 
infrastructure/construction sectors taking place in Iraq where British 
companies have (and would strive to) a major presence? The UK government 
                                                        
73 The Kurdish Genocide: Achieving Justice through EU recognition, UNPO (Unrepresented Nations and 
Peoples Organization), accessed on 12 June 2017 via  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/d-
iq/dv/03_kurdishgenocidesofanfalandhalabja_/03_kurdishgenocidesofanfalandhalabja_en.pdf  
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and parliament have not been as vocal on the plight of the Kurds in Syria or 
Turkey, for instance, which do not possess such natural resources or potential 
market opportunities.  
At the parliamentary debate on the recognition of the Kurdish genocide in Iraq, 
Jeremy Corbyn MP for Islington North, a constituency of London with a large 
number of Kurds mostly from Turkey, stated:   
One hopes that we will be able to draw attention to what happened in Iraq 
in 1988. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Cynon Valley (Ann Clwyd) 
pointed out, she and I were both Members of this House at that time and 
we both frequently raised the issue, including in the British media. 
Although the lack of knowledge among much of the public is 
understandable because of how the media failed to report things, we must 
be honest that it took a long time for most of the media and the political 
establishment in this country to cotton on to what was happening to the 
Kurdish people in Iraq. To be honest, a lot of British Government policy 
was blindsided by their obsession with supporting Iraq against Iran in the 
dreadful Iran-Iraq war and Britain’s considerable economic interests in 
Iraq at the time, not least in oil exploration and exploitation and so on. We 
must have a sense of deep self-criticism about the process.74 
 
 
The British context seems to demonstrate certain properties of the American 
approach to diaspora political lobbying in the sense of economic pragmatism 
wherever possible. In this vein, understanding the agency of diaspora in politics 
may require us to search for a hybrid approach to agency in international 
politics. This hybrid approach to diaspora agency is influenced by three main 
components: host-state agency, home-state agency and institutions.  
Home-state agency is the agency of the sending country of a particular diaspora. 
In many cases of ethno-national diasporas, the policies of the home-state may 
function as a detrimental factor to the interests of the diasporic group that fled 
                                                        
74 Resolution date 28 February 2013, UK House of Commons, accessed on 12 June 2017 via 
https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmhansrd/cm130228/debtext/130228-
0003.htm  
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that country. In that case, the role of home-state agency in the formation of 
diaspora agency can be a negative one. However, this may be counterproductive 
to the expectations of the sending country, as the foreign policy of the home-
state against a diaspora may further motivate that particular diaspora to make 
greater attempts to survive those policies and make counter moves in the form 
of diaspora political activism in the host-country. The Turkish state's 
engagement with ethno-national diasporas like the Kurdish and Armenian 
diasporas can be given as examples for this. When theorising diaspora 
transnational political activism, Low writes: 
Within the context of political transnationalism (Bauböck 2003, 720), the 
diaspora engages with transnational practices, such as raising funds for 
their home country electoral candidates, forming alliances with their home 
country political associations, active involvement in political campaigns, 
and creating their own hometown civic committees.75 
 
Host-state agency is the political agency of the receiving country. Host-state and 
society both influence and are influenced by the diaspora that they are hosting. 
Diasporas that constitute large populations are seen as voting blocs by 
politicians during election campaigns, not only for the elections in home 
countries, but also host countries. The debates on multiculturalism, integration, 
social security, education and well-being often have references to immigrants 
and diasporans in receiving countries. Political trends and social dynamics of 
the host country shape the identity and politics of the diasporan individuals 
living there. Moreover, foreign policy priorities and its conduct by the host-state 
may have direct outcomes determining its policies towards a particular 
diaspora it hosts and towards the foreign country that particular diaspora 
                                                        
75 Choo Chin Low, "Malaysian diaspora philanthropy: transnational activism, mobilization and 
resistance, Diaspora Studies (2017): 3.  
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originates. Therefore, the political agency of host state is significantly influential 
on the shape and depth of diaspora agency, and diasporas may have some 
influence on the foreign policy of their host state.    
Finally, the third component shaping diaspora agency in international 
politics is institutions that comprise regimes, norms and customs, as well as 
tangible entities including intergovernmental organisations/supranational 
bodies, transnational communities and long-term cooperations. I am borrowing 
the term "institutions" from neo-liberal institutionalism, which is a theory of 
international relations alternative to neo-realist theory of inter-state political 
setting.76 I should note that, in this context, I do not use the buzzword "neo-
liberal" in the sense of a mode of production or economic ideology. In his article 
on neoliberal instutionalist theory of international relations, Stein 
problematises the use of the word "neoliberalism" as a label rather than an 
analytical tool; yet he still cannot avoid using it, as it constitutes the core of a 
dominant mainstream theory of international relations scholarly field, as well 
as in the domain of policy. 77  
In international relations theory, neoliberal institutionalist theory is used 
rather to emphasise the role of non-state institutions in international politics as 
a response to neo-realist theory, which sees states as the only actor in 
international relations by claiming that states act as independent actors with 
                                                        
76 Arthur A. Stein, "Neoliberal Institutionalism" in The Oxford Handbook on International Relations, 
(eds) Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008): 201-202. 
77 Stein states that "The moniker of neoliberal institutionalism is a product of scholarly branding and 
product differentiation... Just as everyone uses a computer but typically not for computing, and even as 
we talk about game theory though it is not a theory of games, so this chapter will talk of neoliberal 
institutionalism. Ironically, those who use the label never address whether the "liberal" qualification 
means that there is an "illiberal institutionalism," or whether it is possible to talk of institutions and 
not be a liberal. Unfortunately, scholarly literature in the field revolves around labels and "isms," and 
so this chapter will use the common parlance of international relations even though it is essentially 
about institutions in international politics." Ibid., 202.    
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full autonomy.78 Regarding diaspora agency, neoliberal institutions basically 
constitute the entirety of tools, norms, international organisations, and 
regimes based on patterns of international law, institutions and customs that 
regulate the negotiations relating to conflicts, collaborations and several other 
sorts of interactions among diasporas, host-state's and home-state's agencies in 
the conduct of foreign policy in a transnational context.  
Although neo-liberal institutionalism attributes agency to non-state actors, 
hence diasporas, it is still a state-centric approach to international relations and 
focuses mainly on the state system as the primary unit of analysis. It uses "game 
theory" to suggest that institutions can provide mutually profitable outcomes, 
in other words institutions can facilitate a win-win situation for the actors 
which are mainly states but also non-state ones.79 The earlier focus of this 
theory was on international organisations, especially regarding the post-World 
War II era which gave birth to concrete entities with a physical presence. These 
organisations were defined as "a formal arrangement transcending national 
boundaries that provides for the establishment of institutional machinery to 
facilitate cooperation among members in the security, economic, social, or 
related fields."80 Theorists of international relations have broadened the 
conceptualisation of institutions by emphasising the role of international 
regimes that are defined as "principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area."81 
                                                        
78 Ibid., 201. 
79 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). 
80 Jack C. Plano and Roy Olton, The International Relations Dictionary (Kalamazoo: New Issues Press, 
Western Michigan University: 1979): 288.    
81 Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables, 
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This can include anything from international free trade regimes to international 
environmental regimes, human rights regimes to immigration and refugee 
regimes that are closely related to diaspora agency. At this point, the high level 
of interactions between domestic politics and international politics should be 
noted. As international relations has domestic roots and domestic 
consequences, international institutions, regimes and norms also have a closely 
interactive relationship with what is known as "domestic politics", which is 
getting increasingly harder to separate from the former. The interactive 
relationship between domestic politics and international institutions, including 
organisations and regimes, are dealt with precisely by Stein: 
...domestic political institutions must typically be supportive of 
membership, and thus we can talk of the domestic political requisites of 
joining international institutions. Further, there must be domestic support 
for subsequent compliance as well... But international institutions also 
affect domestic ones. First, because there are often domestic requisites to 
joining international institutions, membership conditionality has an 
important effect on internal political arrangements. Secondly, since 
membership in an institution subjects a state to continuing restraints, 
joining one has the affect both of locking in domestic changes and of 
making credible a domestic commitment to a particular policy path. 
Thirdly, international institutions may provide a degree of legitimacy and 
make difficult domestic changes more palatable by providing political 
cover. In these cases, domestic actors come to frame their arguments in 
terms of international institutions.82 
 
In the case of diaspora agency, this is particularly important. The political, 
social, economic and cultural demands made by diasporas, both via diaspora 
individuals and communities, shape, in their limited capacities, the policies, 
agendas or at least decision-making processes of international institutions, 
regimes and norms, in addition to shaping the policies of their home-state and 
host state. The opposite is valid too. Diaspora agency is also shaped by the 
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influences of international institutions, norms and regimes especially in the 
case of international law, international organisations and their approaches to 
issues pertaining to immigrant groups and diasporas. In that respect, one 
cannot consider diaspora politics merely as a direct duplication or reflection of 
homeland politics echoed in hostlands. Therefore, in order to have a better 
understanding of diaspora agency and diaspora politics, one should look 
beyond the home-land vs. host-land axis, and include the third dimension -
international institutions and regimes- into the equation. This third dimension 
of diaspora agency is of great importance concerning the experiences of 
Kurdish diaspora activists in London that I interviewed. In the upcoming 
sections of this thesis, it will be more apparent that the Kurdish diaspora 
activists underline their perception of insecurity and vulnerability, due to the 
pressures of international institutions and regimes, EU, NATO and evolving 
international regime on "terrorism".  
To sum it up with a concrete example, the Turkish state and the British 
state interact and influence one another both as individual states and as 
members or candidates of common international organisations, treaties, 
regulations and regimes. At the very same time, domestic and foreign policies of 
these two countries have certain influences on the Kurdish diaspora on many 
levels. Finally, within the third dimension, international organisations including 
the UN and the EU, through their regulations, and NATO, through its political 
and military priorities and actions, and the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR), through its rulings and legal jurisprudence, influence the agency of the 
Kurdish diaspora, the ways it operates and evolves. With its very existence, 
demands and struggles, along with many other diasporas and non-state actors, 
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Kurdish diaspora contributes to the formation, reproduction and re-negotiation 
of the norms, values and practices that constitute the international institutions 
and regimes, although as a non-state actor its power is relatively little. Key 
events, human tragedies and other occasions are of critical importance to the 
members and/or prospective members of the imagined transnational 
community of diaspora. Usually this transnational mobilisation functions as 
catalyst to the formation of diaspora identity. In his article, Sokefeld counters 
accusations of essentialism regarding diaspora identity: 
…the development of diaspora identity is not simply a natural and 
inevitable result of migration but a historical contingency that frequently 
develops out of mobilization in response to specific critical events. 
Diaspora [...] is not an issue of naturally felt roots but of specific political 
circumstances that suggest the mobilization of a transnational imagined 
community. The focus of mobilization in the formation of diasporas 
effectively encounters essentializing concepts of diaspora.83 
 
Although one can argue that diasporas have their own agencies, the role of the 
agency of host-state, home-state and international institutions cannot be ignored. In 
the figure below, I try to portray the tripartite mechanism that diaspora agency is 
affected by in the international arena. It shows how diaspora politics, identity and 
mobilisation are shaped as a result of interactions among diaspora's own agency 
with agencies of three other actors that constitute arguably dominant elements of the 
international system:    
 
 
 
                                                        
83 Martin Sokefeld, Mobilizing in transnational space: a social movement approach to the formation of 
diaspora", Global networks 6, no. 3 (2006): 280. 
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Institutions (Norms, Regimes, International Law and Customs) 
 
Figure 1: Diaspora agency and international interactions 
 
 
Here it should be noted that scholarly production of theoretical approaches to 
international relations is not free of foreign policies of states and 
intergovernmental institutions. As Steven L. Lamy puts it, neo-liberal theory of 
international relations vs. neo-realist theory of it has been the dominant debate 
around the paradigm of the contemporary international system. 84  Lamy 
emphasises that this neo-neo debate are "more than just theories, [they] 
represent paradigms or conceptual frameworks that shape individuals' images 
of the world and influence research priorities and policy debates and choices."85   
Whereas neo-liberalism refers to neo-liberal institutionalist theory in the 
scholarly domain of international relations, in the policy world, Lamy suggests 
that it means something different: 
A neo-liberal foreign policy promotes free trade or open markets and western 
democratic values and institutions. Most of the leading Western states have 
joined the US-led chorus, calling for the 'enlargement' of the community of 
democratic and capitalist nation-states. There is no other game in town, the 
                                                        
84 Steven L. Lamy, "Contemporary mainstream approaches: neo-realism and neo-liberalism" in John 
Baylis and Steve Smith, eds., The Globalization of World Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2000), p. 183.   
85 Ibid., p. 184. Emphasis mine (S.K.). 
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financial and political institutions created after the Second World War have 
survived and these provide the foundation for current political and economic 
power arrangements. These are the institutions created by policy-makers 
who embrace neo-liberal or realist/neo-realist assumptions about the 
world.86      
  
D) Theorising non-Western Experiences of Diaspora Politics 
 
 
The West-centric approach to diaspora studies almost as a whole brings about an 
analytical question: To what extent are the overall Western approaches to 
diaspora agency of the US, UK and Continental Europe models suffice when it 
comes to the need to investigate non-Western and Southern experiences of 
diaspora politics and agency-building processes? 
 
Millions of Syrian refugees or “guests” ( in the non-recognising discourse of 
certain refugee regimes in some Middle Eastern countries and Turkey), many of 
whom have fled the civil war in Syria following the Arab Spring, provide a good 
example of refugee communities beyond the West. Can we still evaluate this case 
in same way that we do the Poles or Palestinians migrating to Western Europe, or 
do we need to consider the far deeper historical, socio-cultural and regional 
relations among the Syrian state, Syrian migrants and the host state and societies 
that are located in its immediate vicinity such as Lebanon, Jordon, Iraq and 
Turkey? The hierarchical positioning of Turkey and  Turkish  migrants  vis-à-vis  
Germany or  of  Indian  migrants  and  India vis-a-vis  the UK, or of former 
Yugoslavs in Sweden, does not parallel the nature of the relationship that the 
Syrians have with their neighbouring countries in the Middle East. In other words, 
Middle Easterners flee to yet another Middle Eastern setting which can be 
considered relatively better off and stable. Although they also face serious socio-
                                                        
86 Ibid., p. 184. Emphasis mine (S.K.).  
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economic problems in their host land, one can argue that these problems do not 
emerge from a huge cultural “difference”, but are associated rather with similarity 
or minimal cultural distance in those areas, unlike the huge disparities between 
migrant groups and their host societies in western host lands. 
 
In the case of the Kurdish diaspora, this requires us to broaden the scope and 
tools with which to understand it. Kurdish communities historically spread around 
different parts of the immediate vicinity of their homelands, either through coercive 
imperial policies under the Ottoman and Persian dynasties, or for socio-economic 
reasons. In this vein, the study of the Kurdish diaspora can be reshaped paying a 
greater focus to the diasporic experiences of, for instance, Kurds in Mersin, 
Antalya, Ankara, Istanbul, Baghdad, Damascus, Tehran, Yerevan, Baku, Jerusalem or 
Bishkek. 
The need for new ways of examining diasporas and diaspora politics seems to 
be relevant in the case of many other non-Western cases, including African 
diasporas scattered in Africa and Asia (rather than in North America or Europe 
that constitute the major focus of the academia) and same goes for South American, 
Mediterranean, Eastern European and Asian experiences as host-lands rather than 
mainly being seen as homelands. Therefore, a non-Western academic involvement 
on these diverse countries would seem to be required. Again, in this case, the 
politics of theorising diasporas inevitably comes to the surface, yet the point is 
the direction of this power-based relationship87 among the researching bodies 
and subjects of diasporas and their home-lands.88  
                                                        
87 John Baylis and Steve Smith, eds., The Globalization of World Politics (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2000): 240. Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (London: Routledge, 2002). 
88 There have been studies of refugee communities in neighbouring countries, the studies of Afghan 
and Pakistani refugees can be given as an example. See World Development Report Background Note, 
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On the other hand, the very idea of universalism and human rights based on 
the assumption that the universal lies in “western values” and certain European 
ways of democratic experience makes it difficult to launch new 
theoretical/methodological approaches to the study of diasporas and migrants. 
                                                                                                                                                                        
"The Impacts of Refugees on Neighboring Countries: A Development Challenge", 29 July 2010.        
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CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY  
A) Researching Diaspora Politics in the Vernacular89 
This research is based on a 15-month-data collection period between June 2012 and 
September 2013 and it employs a qualitative approach. Although it benefits from 
ethnographic methods, I cannot claim to have conducted a full-fledged ethnography 
which requires immersion of the researcher in a social setting in which the 
community under study lives in the field, during the time that the fieldwork is done, 
to have a better understanding of a particular group.90 The research is mainly based 
on 20 in-depth interviews, casual participant observation, field notes and photos that 
I took; as well as social media accounts, publications and websites of Kurdish 
diaspora associations/community centres among others.91    
The field-site in which I have studied the Kurdish diaspora community is the 
Haringey and Hackney boroughs of London, which is the most cosmopolitan city of 
Britain and is thus capable of providing a "fertile" ground for my research. London is 
a special place in and of itself in terms of diaspora activism. First of all, among 
the British cities, it hosts the greatest number of diasporan Kurds.92 Secondly, 
political and cultural activities assumed by the diasporan Kurds are most 
institutionalised and intense in this metropolis compared to any other city in the 
United Kingdom. I chose the northern borough of Haringey and eastern borough of 
                                                        
89 “Vernacular politics” is a phrase I am borrowing from the American anthropologist Jenny B. White, 
Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
2002). Yet, it was originally used in the work of the Canadian political philosopher Will Kymlicka. See 
Will Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001). 
90 Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012): 465.   
91 In the course of this study, I use the words "association" and "community centre" interchangeably, to 
refer to the diaspora institutions run by the Kurds from Turkey in London.    
92 The number of the Kurds living in London is not exactly known, as the Kurdish ethnicity is not 
included in the population census in the UK. So there are only estimations in a very wide range 
between 100,000 and 200,000. Greater London Authority, Turkish, Kurdish and Turkish Cypriot 
Communities in London (London: Greater London Authority, 2009). 
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Hackney, as they are two of the areas populated with the largest number of Kurds 
from Turkey and thus host the two largest and most influential diaspora 
associations of Kurds from Turkey, the Kurdish Community Centre 93  and 
Halkevi/Mala Gel Kurdish and Turkish Community Centre94, founded respectively in 
1987 and 1984. Among these organisations, Halkevi was founded by activists from 
within the Turkish left; however, over time its administration  was  later  taken  over  
by  Kurdish  refugees  and  immigrants  who  came to London in large numbers. 
Although both organisations identify their vision and objectives mostly as a charity 
organisation which aims to further improve the integration of the Kurdish (as well as 
Turkish and Turkish Cypriot) community in British society, their functions cannot 
simply be reduced to it. They can be also considered civil society organisations, 
pursuing political activities most of which are based on ethnic diasporan demands 
and expectations regarding the century-old Kurdish Question, voiced by many 
Kurdish refugees from Turkey arriving in the UK in the last three decades. Apart 
from these two associations, I have had the opportunity to  m a k e observations 
on se v e r a l  other diaspora assoc i at ion s , community centres and thematic 
platforms, including the Day-Mer Turkish and Kurdish Community Centre, the 
Komkar Kurdish Advice Centre, the Roj Women’s Association, the Kurdish and 
Turkish Women’s Rights Association, all of which I have been keeping in mind as 
background information while writing this thesis. 
As p art  o f  t h e  qualitative fieldwork, I conducted 2 0  semi-structured in-
depth interviews, each lasting about two hours, with key persons involved in 
political activism in the Kurdish diaspora in London, as well as occasional 
                                                        
93  Kurdish Community Centre Website, accessed on 1 November 2012 via 
http://www.kurdishcentre.org/kcc/about_us.html.  
94 Halkevi Kurdish and Turkish Community Centre Website, accessed on 1 November 2012 via 
http://www.halkevi.org.uk/about-us.  
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participant observation with first and second generation diaspora members over a 
period of 15 months. By mentioning "key persons", I do not exclusively 
refer to "board members" of the associations. Key persons can be 
individuals with varying degrees of political participation in the 
organised activities of diaspora institutions. Although some key activist s 
are also board members of the associations, there are several other key 
diaspora members who take part in the diaspora's political activities, in 
leading or secondary roles, who are not board members, but "ordinary 
members" of the association. Shain and Barth put diaspora members into 
three categories; core, passive and silent members:  
Core members are the organizing elites, intensively active in 
diasporic affairs and in a position to appeal for mobilization of the 
larger diaspora. Passive members are l ikely to be available for 
mobilization when the active leadership calls upon them. Silent 
members are a larger pool of people who are generally uninvolved 
in diasporic affairs but who may mobilize in times of crises. 95 
 
In this study, I focus on core members and passive members mentioned by Shain and 
Barth. Representatives and active attendees of the diaspora associations constitute 
the majority of the people that I formally interviewed. Several others whom I had 
informal conversations with will henceforth be called “informants”.96 In line with the 
ethnographic methodology, I preferred conducting ‘semi-structured’ interviews 
with open-ended questions. Alan Bryman chooses the word "qualitative 
interviewing" to refer to both unstructured and semi-structured interviews, in 
contrast to quantitative interviewing and counts several advantages of qualitative 
                                                        
95 Shain and Barth (2003): 452. 
 
96 I use the word "informant" to refer either to the people I had a conversation with/interviewed 
casually, or to the people I interviewed formally or informally as a whole. I usually mean the latter in 
this study; unless otherwise implied to refer to the formal interview.   
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interviewing; i.e. the great emphasis it puts on the interviewee's point of view. He 
defines semi-structured interview as such: 
The researcher has a list of questions or fairly specific topics to be covered... 
but the interviewee has a great deal of leeway in how to reply. Questions may 
not follow on exactly in the way outlined on the schedule. Questions that are 
not included in the guide may be asked as the interviewer picks up on things 
said by interviewees. But, by and large, all the questions will be asked and a 
similar wording will be used from interviewee to interviewee.97 
 
Following this definition, Bryman describes this interview process as "flexible" and 
further explains the rationale behind qualitative interviews that is parallel to my 
motive to employ ethnographic methods to study Kurdish diaspora politics: 
...the emphasis must be on how the interviewee frames and understands 
issues and events-that is, what the interviewee views as important in 
explaining and understanding events, patterns, and forms of behaviour.98  
    
 In addition to formal and informal interviews, on many occasions, I visited my field 
site and stayed there for a few days for each visit, in my capacity as a "participant 
observer". In other words, I did not only ‘observe’ the experiences and developments 
in the field, but also attempted to ‘participate’ in the political and cultural activities 
of the diasporan individuals. In addition to my interviews with key activists in the 
Kurdish diaspora and various individuals who take part in these activities with 
varied frequencies, the numerous festivals, demonstrations, commemorations and 
panels that I have attended as an observer between 2010 and 2013 in the UK create 
the backdrop for this thesis. I had the opportunity to take snapshots of political 
experiences in the flesh-and-bone of people by sharing the same milieu and 
spending time both casually, as well as in scheduled events, with diasporan Kurds 
with whom I had already been familiar since September 2010, which was when I 
                                                        
97 Bryman, (2012): 470.  
98 Ibid., 471. 
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moved to the UK for my studies. In this regard, I attended Newroz, the Kurdish 
spring festival enriched with cultural and political elements of epic heroism 
which ascribe to Kurdish nationalism. Additionally, there were popular 
demonstrations, media and NGO events and cultural activities I attended that were 
held by the Kurdish diaspora community in London. In the process of analysing field 
data, I realised that this research provided me with a range of political/social themes 
and strategies embedded in the Kurdish diasporic space in the UK. Yet, due to the 
scope and constraints of this work, I will be able to introduce only a selected number 
of them that are vital for my research. 
 
B) Challenges, Limitations and Opportunities 
I found the participants of my research through Kurdish community centres as well 
as festivals, panel discussions and demonstrations. Some key figures in the 
community centres were helpful, in the sense that they functioned as sponsor who 
facilitated my access to the field, introducing me to their board members as well as 
ordinary members. However, this seemed risky to me. Taking into consideration that 
key members are usually the ones in leading positions in decision-making processes 
of a particular organisation, I was aware that their full guidance might lead to biased 
sampling. Therefore, I tried to reach diaspora members by different means. In this 
regard, I tried to build rapport with random visitors to the community centre on the 
occasions I went there. This was, at times, casual; at other times, scheduled. Festivals, 
political protests, panel discussions were among other settings where I met several 
diasporan members and conducted informal interviews or agreed to conduct formal 
interviews for later. Actually, the role of building strong relationship with informants 
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cannot be reduced to a tool for access to more participants. It contributes to 
contextualisation of the field findings by making it possible to make connection 
between seemingly unrelated things encountered on the occasions beyond formal 
interviews of the fieldwork.   
...the intimacy developed with informants is very important because it helps 
the ethnographer depict people not as one-dimensional research subjects, but 
as rounded individuals (Amit 2000: 2-3). At the same time, it enables the 
researcher to see crucial connections between totally unexpected – and 
seemingly separated – things, events and practices. This is where fieldwork 
has the measure of all other research methodologies.99 
 
In general, in the course of the fieldwork there are two positions for the researcher; 
participant observer (insider) and non-participant observer (outsider) (Kusow, 2003: 
597). One of the frequent questions coming to my mind during my field experience 
was whether I was an insider or outsider. The degree of insiderness seems to be not as 
advantageous as someone who has the opportunity to stay in the fieldsite constantly 
during the whole period of time that the field research is conducted.  
At the time of my field research I was not living in London, but in Birmingham. In this 
context, my position as a researcher and participant observer was subject to certain 
limitations, especially regarding interpersonal politics. My methodology, also 
negatively affected by financial and time-related issues, was limited by the short 
periods of time I could spend in London during the fieldwork. These limitations 
prevented me from penetrating interpersonal politics with the subjects of the field, 
the diasporan Kurds in London. For instance, on several occasions, the interviewees 
consistently refused to openly discuss their politics. Nevertheless, the deeper we 
                                                        
99 Brian Moeran, "From Participant Observation to Observant Participation: Anthropology, Fieldwork 
and Organizational Ethnography", Creative Encounters Working Paper, No. 1 (2007): 15. 
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went into conversation and off the record, the more they showed signs of relief and 
trust in me as a researcher. Actually, I realised that the more frequently I visited my 
informants, especially when I did more participant observation in the public events 
they organised or attended, the more approachable they were and felt more 
comfortable to share their political views with me. On such occasions, however, my 
position in the field may have floated between that of a researcher and a fellow 
Kurd/diaspora Kurd, or even a fellow heval.100      
C) Positionality/Reflexivity 
 Through the whole long process of years before, during and after this field 
experience, I could not help but question, re-imagine and re-produce my own 
individual and collective identities, as I was then in an extraordinary setting. I was 
living outside Turkey for the first time in my life. Yet, as a Kurd born in Istanbul, a 
Turkish majority city in Turkey, and born in a family with hardly any sympathy for 
the Kurdish identity, let alone for the Kurdish political movement, during the doctoral 
study abroad, I spent longer among the diaspora circles, through cultural and political 
events, Kurdish festivals and demonstrations, than I had in my entire life. 
On the one hand, this was about my own reflexivity, subjectivity and public 
performance; on the other hand, this was affecting the way my interviewees, friends 
and acquaintances were regarding me. At some point, a prominent diaspora activist 
with left-wing political outlook, who was one of my informants, and a Turkish friend 
of mine with centre-right political views, met at a political conference. While they 
                                                        
100 The Kurdish word "heval" literally means "friend", but in the political context that the Kurds use it, 
it refers to a "comrade", usually a Kurdish comrade fighting for or supporting the Kurdish cause with 
sympathy for the Kurdish ethno-national movement. 
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were having a conversation about their common friends, they discovered that they 
both knew me. The Kurdish activist used the word "bizim Şeref" (our Şeref) to refer 
to me and my Turkish friend told me that this made him angry. I realised that I did 
not think about my ethnic, national or urban identities when it comes to making 
friends and building social relations. Then I realised that I was developing a new 
identity within the diaspora, as I was also then living abroad and re-imagining my 
"Kurdishness" and following the political events in my homeland carefully.  
In my case, though, the "imagined homeland" is even more complicated. I was 
born and raised in a Turkish majority city (Istanbul); my parents and sibling were 
born in a province located in the north-east end of the country (Ardahan); during my 
field research I was living in Birmingham and making frequent visits and staying over 
for two-three days each time among the Kurdish diaspora community in London; my 
perception of homeland was becoming hybrid and dynamic. One thing was clear: I 
was developing more of a political consciousness about the rights, liberties and 
experiences of the Kurdish community. Moreover, I realised that the deepening of the 
Syrian Civil War and the emergence of autonomous Kurdish political entities in 
Rojava Kurdistan (Western Kurdistan) in Northern Syria had an impact not only on 
my informants, but also on me. The highly problematic and hostile policy of the 
Turkish government against the struggle of the Kurds in Syria fighting the jihadists 
and ISIS, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, was frustrating, as I was observing the 
protests of the Kurds in London and following the news on the internet. Therefore, I 
lived in my imagined diaspora101 in the contexts of two host lands, Birmingham and 
London and formerly in Istanbul, which is not seen as a historical homeland. Now my 
                                                        
101 Pnina Werbner, Imagined Diasporas among Manchester Muslims (James Currey, 2002). Also see, Joel 
Kuortti, Writing Imagined Diasporas: South Asian Women Reshaping North American Identity 
(Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2007): 3-7. 
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political imagination of homeland was a dynamic one, comprising Istanbul first and 
foremost; then, Qorevang village in Ardahan, a small yet cosmopolitan city in the 
Caucasus region of Turkey bordering Georgia and Armenia; being Kurdish, mainly 
relating to Syrian Kurdistan, which I have never seen. I had not been interested in 
Syrian Kurdistan as part of my imagination of "homeland" up until the Syrian Civil 
War and the emergence of the Rojava entity.  
I attended various events of the Kurds in London, not only political, but also 
social, cultural, culinary and artistic, before I started my fieldwork. This was both due 
to curiosity and my search for my own personal cultural roots; and for the sake of 
having joy and pleasure in artistic, cultural and social events concerning a special 
interest in folk traditions and culture. This motivated me to learn more about the 
Kurdish diaspora culture and politics as a researcher.                            
  Moreover, as I had just recently moved to the UK, the climate, food, socio-
cultural life, and consumption and leisure practices of this country gave me a culture 
shock. In order to pass that early transitory period in relatively easier conditions, I 
tried to hold on to Turkish and Kurdish spaces of eating out, leisure and socialising in 
Birmingham and London. Especially in London, many prominent restaurants, barber 
shops, off-licences, coffee shops that were run by the Turkish speaking community 
were actually owned by ethnic Kurds. Therefore, I found myself entering the field 
naturally while walking around London. As the Kurdish diaspora in the UK is a 
relatively recent one, comprising mostly first and second generation members, the 
lower level of integration of the Kurds in the host land reinforces the dynamics 
surviving an ethnic economy and accordingly a pattern of socialisation, consuming 
and producing in a closely-knit space and through mechanisms of identity formation 
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and protection. Kurds from Turkey in London socialising with their compatriots, 
including Kurds and Turks, makes it possible for Kurdish spaces to survive in London. 
As these were public places located in the vicinity of Islington, Haringey (Green 
Lanes), Hackney (Dalston), Edmonton Green etc., it was easy for me to familiarise 
myself with the field.  
D) Linguistic Strategy and Trust Building 
Difficulties in gaining trust and rapport building were fuelled by suspicious news 
about the political murder of three Kurdish women, who were key diaspora activists, 
in Paris, on 9 January 2013. One of them, Sakine Cansiz, was one of the co-founders of 
the PKK (Kurdistan Worker's Party), which is the armed wing of the dominant 
Kurdish movement both in Turkey and the diaspora. This murder, thought to be 
committed by the Turkish Intelligent Service (MIT), caused great shock, anger and 
fear among diaspora members in London. Even before this murder, the fear among 
diaspora Kurds of the Turkish Intelligence spying activities was present.  
As a matter of fact, my informants may have distrusted individuals in the 
Turkish speaking community. The access of a new-comer into a new group and 
setting requires a process of confidence and trust building. This process may have 
been easier for me, as I was also of Kurdish descent, still, it was not an automatic 
acceptance. I could feel the curiosity and some suspicion, if not total distrust towards 
me, as someone speaking Kurdish at an intermediate level. My main language is 
Turkish with no sign of Kurdish accent. I conducted the interviews mainly in Turkish 
and used English to clarify some of the questions, if the informant did not understand 
the question in the first instance; but this was rare. Moreover, I happened to use some 
Kurdish phrases, words and exclamations during the interviews, depending on the 
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interaction between me and the informant and the context that led me to do so; yet 
this was also rare. In this regard, I found myself, at times, struggling between 
"Turkishness" and "Kurdishness", in the sense of my linguistic strategy to conduct the 
fieldwork in a Kurdish setting. I should note that a large portion of the Kurdish 
community and activists in London were originally from the province of Maras, a 
multicultural city in the Mediterranean Region of Turkey. The demographic structure 
of that city, as well as the socio-political hierarchy and regime of linguistic 
assimilation in Turkey, the sending country, can be observed in the linguistic features 
of the diaspora community in the UK, the receiving country. 
 Among the diaspora individuals and key activists, Turkish was the main 
language of communication and mobilisation. Kurdish was not ruled out completely, 
though. There were Kurdish language courses taught at the Kurdish Community 
Centre, both for children and adults. Nevertheless, there were only a few classes 
which corresponded to a very small proportion of the large Kurdish community in 
London. Therefore, my informants and the large masses I observed in panel 
discussions, demonstrations, festivals and daily activities on various occasions, spoke 
mostly Turkish and sometimes Kurdish, frequently using the former as the main 
language and mixing it with phrases and words from the latter. Even if they spoke 
exclusively Turkish, I could observe traces of Kurdish accent in their spoken Turkish 
at varying levels, depending on their level of education and mode of interaction with 
Turkish individuals. A third influence was the British-English accent in their Turkish. 
This was the case, especially, for the second-generation Kurds in London. Therefore, 
they spoke Turkish with several Kurdish words, with the influence of English 
pronunciation and intonation. As for me, as the interviewer or participant observer 
 
 
54 
and a fellow Kurd interacting with these people, I was lacking these aspects. I did not 
speak very good Kurdish; I did not have any Kurdish accent in my Turkish and I was 
not British. As a result, I felt nervous about whether or not I would be given access to 
the field by my informants; especially in the earlier stages of my research.  
In addition to the linguistic, cultural aspects of my "impression 
management"102 in the field, I also hesitated to locate myself in the "right" position 
politically. I have always been supportive of individual and collective rights and 
demands of people including the Kurds. Yet I was not coming from a family 
background with sympathy for the Kurdish movement or any sort of Kurdish 
organisation. Therefore, when approaching my informants, I wanted to demonstrate 
my sympathy and support for their righteous endeavours for rights and liberties. 
However, as a political practice and public performance, this was very new to me.103 
In order to avoid hypocrisy and political inconsistency, I saw this research process 
also as an opportunity to understand my own political tendencies, meanings and 
values, in order words, myself.  
E) Ethical Concerns  
A major methodological question that came to my mind during this fieldwork was its 
ethical dimension. Ethical concerns about social research are crucial, due to reasons 
relating to the positioning and security of the participant and researcher, and the 
                                                        
102 For a discussion on impression management in ethnography,  the problems and dilemmas it causes, 
despite its possible contributions in an overt research in which researcher's identity as a researcher is 
not hidden, see Martyn Hammersley and Paul Atkinson, Ethnography: Principles in Practice (London: 
Routledge, 2007): 66-73.    
 
103 My earliest public personal encounter with the Kurdish political movement started in 2008, when I 
decided to conduct a qualitative research on the Democratic Society Party (DTP), the then major legal 
Kurdish political party in Turkey which was, in the course of my master's research, closed down by the 
Turkish Constitutional Court, based on allegations of separatism with reference to its alleged links to 
the PKK. 
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knowledge intended to be generated as a result of this interactive process between 
the two. In this context, research ethics is not only an issue of the responsibility of the 
researcher to the participants, but also to the knowledge he/she produces and the 
inner journey that he/she has. This research process made me re-think and re-
imagine several elements of my already existing identities, while adding some new 
dimensions to them as a result of my interaction with the members of the group 
under study.   
As for the practical ethical issues, in all stages of this research, as an 
interviewer, a participant observer and a fellow human being, I strove to abide by the 
rules of confidentiality and anonymity of my informants. I started off the research by 
revealing my identity, first as a researcher, before building a strong relationship with 
them, and I avoided covert research practice at all stages of the field research. Yet, 
often during the interviews, I felt the need to remind my informants that I would use 
pseudonyms instead of their real names, so that they could feel physically and 
psychologically secure. Due to sensitive political aspects of this research, I tried to 
understand their position as the ones "under study" and respected their decisions on 
the amount and nature of information they were willing to share with me, or hide 
from me.     
I was building rapport and meeting Kurdish diaspora members, not only for 
interviews, but also for non-political events, including concerts and casual friendly 
gatherings. This was particularly important, as I was trying to get involved in the 
daily lives of the Kurdish diaspora community to understand their practices, values 
and meanings through their everyday experiences, which is an important 
contribution of ethnographic methodology and anthropological approach to social 
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research in a broader sense. The ethical concern about the dilemma emerging from 
this engagement can be summarised with a situation of "offering friendship in return 
for information."104 Was I exploiting the good intentions of my informants in their 
friendly encounters with me that we were building outside the institutional spaces of 
community centres and other venues? This may be part of a broader epistemological 
question. What are the sources of knowledge and how do our personal, inner and 
outer engagements with individuals and groups affect and guide our knowledge of 
the world? At what point is knowledge individual, interpersonal and when does it 
become social and public? These questions can be expanded to several other 
concerning individual and social psychology of conducting social research, its tools, 
devices, techniques, methods and ultimate aims. I cut it short to reflect layers of my 
experiences, researching the diaspora here, to remind the reader of some ethical and 
methodological problems one can face in his/her engagement in such contexts. 
Keeping in mind the ethical dilemma is always there, I tried to keep a minimum of 
professional distance that would allow me to gain adequate observation and 
recording of data.105  
On the other hand, I wanted to understand the daily lives of my informants as 
much as I could. I also had to make an effort to have a balance. For instance, I joined 
halay/govend, Kurdish folk dance circles, that took place at several events organised 
by the associations. I made several friends that are part of the Kurdish diaspora 
during these dance sessions. Traditionally it is usual to join in the halay/govend 
circles during celebrations without any prior arrangements or even without knowing 
anyone in the circle. As a result of these shared experiences of joy and excitement in a 
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dance circle, singing and laughing together, I felt a higher level of trust that several 
diaspora had in me. Accordingly, I thought, they opened up to me and started to be 
more willing to accept me into their inner social/political circle. That seems parallel 
to my being accepted into the dance circle by them. Despite the entire ethical 
dilemma, I felt at ease as I was sure that I danced with them not because I wished to 
get more information from them. I always loved joining public events with music, 
culture and folk dance. As a child I used to join similar Kurdish dance circles at the 
wedding ceremonies with my family and relatives who were Kurds too.  
Moreover, I never pursued a covert research so that I could guarantee an 
ethical responsibility to my field and the participants. I often reminded my 
informants that I am a researcher who tries to understand the Kurdish diaspora 
politics in London. The more open I was, the easier it was for me to access the field, 
build rapport with my informants and have a balance of socialisation and conduct of 
research in the course of the field adventure.         
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CHAPTER IV: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND  
 
This chapter focuses on the historical background of Kurdish migration and aims to 
unveil the dynamics that led the Kurdish population to migrate throughout history, 
for a better understanding of modern Kurdish migration to the Western world, 
especially in the post-1980 period, to the present.  
 
A) Stranger at Home: A Brief Look at Migration and the Kurdish Issue from the 
Ottoman Era to the Early Republican Era (1870s-1940s) 
The people of Kurdistan have been asking the same questions since the 19th century: 
who are we, where is this place? The answers given bring new problems. This place is 
our home, these people are our neighbours. So far the questions and their answers 
are logical, but other questions disturb the frail equilibrium: If this place is our home, 
why are we treated as guests? If we are guests, what is the position of these people? 
Are they also guests, or are they the actual hosts and we are staying here 
temporarily? These and other questions and concerns lie at the heart of the Kurdish 
question, and express the issues of the Kurd who is treated "like a stranger in his own 
home." 
The Kurdish people are one of the ancient peoples of the Middle East, like the 
Arabs, Jews and Persians, among others. Seeing the Kurds living in their native land 
as a minority is an oft-repeated mistake, if it is not a by-product of an intentional 
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political position. The fact that the Kurdish population is dispersed in the land has 
been effective in the formation of this perception of Kurds as a minority group. Even 
if this has been the reason behind the perception, "minority" is an inappropriate 
word to refer to a people with a population of 30-35 million that was historically 
divided between different states as part of regional power share. There are various 
arguments regarding the roots of Kurdish people going back to antiquity and it is 
widely agreed that Kurds have been living in the region as an autochthonous people, 
in other words, a group of people native to the land where it currently lives. 
According to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, the known history of the Kurds goes back 
to the seventh century, when they converted to Islam: 
The prehistory of the Kurds is poorly known, but their ancestors seem to have 
inhabited the same upland region for millennia. The records of the early 
empires of Mesopotamia contain frequent references to mountain tribes with 
names resembling “Kurd.” The Kardouchoi whom the Greek historian 
Xenophon speaks of in Anabasis (they attacked the “Ten Thousand” near 
modern Zākhū, Iraq, in 401 BCE) may have been Kurds, but some scholars 
dispute this claim. The name Kurd can be dated with certainty to the time of 
the tribes’ conversion to Islam in the 7th century CE.106 
 
It would be beneficial to follow the political divisions and geographical dispersion of 
the Kurds from the work of Ismail Besikci, who has a significant body of work on the 
Kurdish issue, with particular expertise in colonialism and tribal sociology. Besikci 
emphasises that Kurds have been ‘divided, dissected and shared through imperialist 
and colonialist policies‘.107 Particularly these divisions deprived Kurds even of 
minority rights and resulted in their very existence being denied in Turkey. 
According to the official position of the Republic of Turkey until recently, "there is no 
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nation by the name of Kurds, everyone is Turkish."108 The results of these policies 
were such that Kurds were denied their right to speak their native tongue and their 
demands for rights were disregarded.  
The Kurds not being allowed to create a sovereign state has become the focal 
point of imperial powers and their politics of divide and rule. This strategy of divide 
and rule was most observable between 1915 and 1925. According to Besikci, in the 
first quarter of the 20th century, 'it is Kurdistan that is divided and the Kurdish 
people that are dispersed‘. Eppel explains the dividedness of Kurdistan by 
emphasising both internal and external dynamics and points to the crucial role of 
British imperial policies: 
During the First World War and thereafter, when the map of the Middle East 
was redrafted, states were establishes in the Fertile Crescent, and the 
Armenian Republic became part of the USSR, the Kurds had no leadership 
which could fill a role similar to that held by the Hashimite emirs in Hejaz in 
the emergence of the Arab national movement and the development of Arab 
nationalism during and immediately after the First World War... Admittedly, 
Shaykh Mahmoud Barzinji in the Sulaymaniyya area had been developing 
supra-local ambitions from 1918 and had even, at times, adopted nationalist 
terms. Nonetheless, he did not succeed in becoming a dominant force or in 
imposing his sovereignty on the Kurdish tribes in Southern Kurdistan and 
creating a power which would be attractive from the standpoint British 
interests. Following an internal debate, British officials and policy-shapers 
decided not to recognize him as the ruler of Kurdistan and favoured the 
annexation of Southern Kurdistan –the Mosul area- to Iraq, whose Arab 
majority the British had themselves created. During the years in which the 
map of the Middle East was drafted following the First World War, these were 
decisions made by British officials and statesmen who preferred to preserve 
the existence of Turkey and Persia...109 
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International Relations on Kurdistan during the First Half of the Nineteenth Century," Middle Eastern 
Studies 44, no.2 (2008): 237.  
 
 
61 
The strategy of divide and rule was not only about annexing land, but also about 
cultural and ethnic assimilation. During the Republican era, particularly, the single 
party rule, Kurdish people learned their history and past only to the extent that 
official history allowed, since the official history of the Republic was being shaped by 
the ideology of ‘one nation, one state.‘110 For this reason, Kurds had to write, interpret 
and read their own history, as it is always possible for Kurdish history to be distorted 
or abused if written by outside authorities with a will to power exertion, and this may 
become the basis for colonialist interventions. This special condition of the Kurds 
causes two different reactions from two different groups within the Kurdish society. 
The first group is the one that constantly tries to prove its existence and in every 
environment gives the message ‘I am a Kurd, not a Turk‘, either verbally or through 
its actions, and this category includes pacifists as well as those who try to prove their 
existence through political violence after the founding of the PKK. The second group 
consists of people who are estranged from their own Kurdish identities. 
The founding of the Turkish Republic was a turning point for the Kurds. They 
fought the War of Independence together with the Turks and shared their victory. 
However, the Treaty of Lausanne, signed on 24 July 1923, which is considered the 
founding document of modern Turkey, in regard to its recognition as a sovereign and 
independent state by the international community, did not recognise the Kurds, let 
alone grant any sovereignty or autonomy to the Kurdish people. The Treaty of 
Lausanne was signed by Turkey, as the successor to the Ottoman Empire, and by the 
Allies, including Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania and the Kingdom of 
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Serbs, Croats, Slovenes. This treaty recognised the borders of the modern state of 
Turkey and the previous demands of autonomy for Turkish Kurdistan and secession 
of Turkey's territory to Armenia was dropped.111 One of the most important issues of 
the Lausanne peace arrangements concerned Mosul. Mosul was mostly populated by 
Kurds, rather than Turks. The question is whether there was a Kurdish 
representative for a city with such significance for Kurds. The answer is both yes and 
no. Zulfu Tigrel Bey, the congressman representing the Kurdish province of 
Diyarbakir, was appointed by Mustafa Kemal Pasha to represent the Kurds. He was a 
member of the Ottoman Parliament from the Committee of Union and Progress. After 
the Armistice of Mudros on 30 October 1918, he was exiled by the British and 
subsequently returned to Ankara as a Diyarbakir congressman of the Turkish 
National Congress.112 The fact that he was of Kurdish descent does not mean he was 
representing the Kurds, as the demands of the Kurdish people were ignored in these 
discussions. Following the information that Besikci gives us, Lausanne meant 
colonisation of the Kurds by imperialist powers using the divide and rule strategy. 
The Turkish people, having secured their rights through the treaty, did not make any 
mention of Kurdish rights of sovereignty and freedom. Therefore, a Kurdistan 
unprotected on its borders became vulnerable to harassment by regional and global 
powers. Thus, Lausanne can be thought of as a breaking point for the relations 
between Turkey and Kurdistan. 
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 The nineteenth century was a time when regions with no particular owner like 
Kurdistan were easily colonised. The region included Kars, Ardahan and Batum, 
constituting the north-eastern border of the Empire and hosting a sizeable Kurdish 
population. While not being able to establish a state since the Ottoman Empire, the 
Kurds have managed to retain their culture and language. A significant portion of the 
Kurdish people has always insisted on their rights of sovereignty through rebellions 
and uprisings, which continue to this day. However, the uprisings during the time of 
the Ottoman Empire and the early Turkish Republic were far from being calls for 
sovereignty; rather, their reasons were economic and they resulted from not being 
able to adapt to what the new system had created.  
The Kurdish people historically rejected paying taxes and sending soldiers to 
the army through uprisings.113 The Ottoman Empire had responded to the uprisings 
by forced migration of any groups, including Turkish gocer (nomadic) tribes in the 
19th century, in order to consolidate its hold on the region and to strengthen its 
central authority. Thus, the forced migration of the Kurds is generally seen as a result 
of the Kurdish uprisings.  
Despite being one of the oldest established peoples of Mesopotamia, Kurds 
have not been able to establish a strong political presence, and as a result of this were 
often forced to migrate from the region systematically. Among all the powerful states 
in the region, the Kurdish people have been vulnerable as a result of being in a state 
of limbo. A clear example of the harm inflicted upon them is the Halabja Massacre on 
16 March 1988, during the Iran-Iraq War, and similar incidents during the invasion of 
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Kuwait by Saddam Hussein at the time of the Gulf War on 2 August 1990. During 
these conflicts the Kurds were subjected to massacres and were forced to migrate.114 
The politics of forced migration imposed on the Kurdish people can be traced back to 
the Ottoman-Persian rivalry in the Near East. With their lands divided between the 
Ottoman Empire and the Persian Empire, the Kurds were forced to migrate to places 
unknown to them. 
The forced migration policies that started during the Ottoman Empire 
continued with the founding of the Turkish Republic. During the expansion of the 
Ottoman Empire into Europe, a power vacuum had shown itself in its eastern 
territories, including the Kurdish regions, which resulted in Iranian raids towards 
them. At this point, Kurdish aşirets (tribes), who were loosely controlled by the 
Ottoman administration, came in to play an important role as protectors of Ottoman 
interests in the eastern borders of the empire after an agreement between the two 
parties. 
                                                        
114 Murat Özer, "Kürtlerin Zorunlu Göçü-1", Haksöz 145/146 (2003).  
 
 
65 
 
Map 1: Areas of majority Kurdish settlement in Southwest Asia. Source: Encyclopedia 
Britannica, Inc. 
Kurdish tribes on the borderline between the Ottomans and Persians were 
going to protect the Ottoman lands from Iran's expansion as part of their alliance115 
with the former. As a result, Kurds were to incur the wrath of both Iran and the 
Ottomans, because of their location and their affiliations.  
In November 1914, Kurds living on the Iranian side of the border (in Urmiye 
and Xoy) sided with the Ottomans in the war between Russia and the Ottoman 
Empire. This choice resulted in the Kurds being displaced by the Russian army and 
most of them were forced to migrate to Mosul (in today's Iraq). The war between 
Russia and the Ottomans meant that Russians moved towards Northern Kurdistan 
(Turkish Kurdistan), resulting in the forced migration of many Kurds from several 
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provinces with significant Kurdish populations, including Kars, Erzurum, Erzincan 
and Van.116 According to Erdem, in this period, relocation policies of the Committee of 
Union and Progress (CUP) were also instrumental in the forced migration of the 
Kurds to the western provinces, and their forced assimilation. He estimates the 
number of the Kurds that were subjected to forced migration by this policy of the CUP 
as 1.5 million.117 Writing about the migration of the Kurds, Abdurahim Rahmi 
(Zapsu), writer for the early Kurdish nationalist journal Jîn, published in Istanbul in 
1918-1919, holds, "Is it possible to read without feeling the sense of catastrophe, the 
disappearance of a whole village population, leaving only ten people behind? What 
happened to these people, how did they disappear?" Rahmi, who had also 
experienced forced migration himself, expresses this in poetry through a child’s 
mouth: 
I am left an orphan with no mom and dad, 
They demolished my house leaving me homeless,  
Faithless heathen have killed my father, 
I have become a beggar in front of my enemies,  
I opened my hands today 
Wolves on two feet attacked the sheep, 
I am now a nomad, going from door to door,  
I want a loaf of bread just to live, 
They show no mercy, just wrath.118 
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In some sources, it is estimated that between 1915 and 1916 800,000 Kurds were 
forced to migrate and, after many died on the road, there were only 250,000 - 
300,000 Kurds left. Deprived of all their possessions, the Kurds suffered from hunger 
and bad conditions during their forced migration.119 Talat Pasha, the Ottoman 
Minister of Interior, who supervised the Armenian Genocide in 1915 and 1916120, 
also played a role in the policies of relocation targeting Kurds. He sent a cipher 
telegram to the province of Diyarbakir on May 2, 1916, which demonstrates his plan 
to assimilate Kurds into Turkishness:  
..It is not permissible to send the Kurdish immigrants to the southern regions 
such as Urfa. Because they will either become Arabised or retain their 
ethnicities there, therefore they will remain useless and harmful. They should 
be relocated to other areas as mentioned below...121 
 
 As can be understood from the words of Talat Pasha, the Kurds were intended not to 
retain their identities in the places to which they migrated and, for this reason, the 
places were chosen specially. Furthermore, influential Kurds and the rest of the 
people were to be relocated to separate places. The Ottoman Empire would not let 
Kurdish people leave despite the uprisings. While Arabs and other minorities left the 
Ottoman Empire one by one, the state did not allow the Kurds to leave the Empire 
and decided rather to engage in forced migration. This was because letting the Kurds 
go their way would have had catastrophic consequences. To give up on the Kurds 
would have meant giving up on the Kurdistan region. In other words, it was for 
geopolitical reasons. Large portions of the territories Ottoman Armenians used to live 
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were overlapping with those of the Kurds. Therefore, as the Armenians were 
subjected to forced migration and mass killings by the Empire in 1915 and 1916, 
most of the region they occupied was left to the Kurds. After losing a significant part 
of its population during wars, the Ottoman Empire did not have enough people to 
relocate to its eastern and south eastern provinces. As for the Ottoman approach to 
the Kurdish uprisings and demands, the Empire considered them manageable, in 
contrast to its harsher attitude toward its Christian populations.122  
Kurds have been under severe pressure posed by the state policies of the late 
Ottoman era, and the plight of the Kurds worsened in the early Turkish Republic via 
legal and institutional mechanisms of nation-state building process. This 
homogenisation process was carried out in a variety of ways, ranging from policies of 
a unified education system with the Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu (the Law of Unification 
of National Education) in 1924, to the forced migration and settlement policies 
justified with the İskan Kanunu (Relocation and Resettlement Law) enacted in 
1934.123 We can also add more coercive implementations of Turkification policies 
taken up in the early Republican period, such as the harsh suppression of local 
unrests in the predominantly Kurdish regions.  
The injuries of the forced migration were intensified with further injuries. 
Kurdish people who were separated from their relatives and families had to face new 
prohibitions. The Relocation and Resettlement Law no. 2510 issued in 1934 held that 
those whose native tongue was not Turkish could not establish new villages, 
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neighbourhoods, workers and artists associations. While parents and their 
unmarried children were accepted as a family, married children of these parents 
were sent away to different cities. While other forced migrants could return their 
homelands after a period of ten years, those coming from the eastern provinces could 
not go back unless a special law was issued by the government.124 The law that was 
completed with these prohibitions clearly showed the state’s intent. The Kurdish 
people were to serve Turkish nationalism and the nation-building process by giving 
up their identities and forgetting who they were. As a result of assimilation, Kurds 
were not to become unified and create uprisings again, and would have to learn to 
live the fate that was designed for them. 
Top-down Westernisation and Turkification policies that intensified with the 
Republican era caused unrest among certain segments of the Kurds in Turkey. The 
Sheikh Said rebellion that took place in 1925 in Turkish Kurdistan was an example of 
this. This rebellion aimed at reviving the Islamic caliphate with certain elements of 
Kurdish nationalism.125 The rebellion was suppressed and its supporters were given 
capital punishment. The first forced relocation of the Republic was realised after this 
rebellion, exiling many Kurds towards Central Anatolia and cities to the west of 
Turkey. With the relocation law issued on May 31, 1926, the Kurds were forced to 
migrate to regions and cities that were predetermined by the state. The enforcement 
of this law was in the hands of local administrators and this often resulted in 
injustices and personal grievances, the ultimate result of which was the increasing 
insecurities and reactions it created. It was not only the Kurds who reacted to the 
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new rules and regulations of the new Republic, with each new law receiving 
opposition from certain segments of the public. However, the Kurds were the 
segment of the society that was suppressed most strongly. A salient example of this 
harsh response was the Dersim Massacre in 1938, a response to Kurdish Alevi 
rebellion in the province of Dersim, (renamed as "Tunceli", in modern day Turkey). 
The Dersim Rebellion was brutally suppressed with the bloodshed resulting in the 
deaths of at least around 10,000 people, including many civilians.126 Those who were 
thought to be related to the uprising were forced to migrate after the issuance of the 
Tunceli Law in 1937.  
The Single-Party period under the Republican People's Party (1923-1946) 
witnessed a high level of nationalisation and nationalist policies and approaches, 
which were already apparent in almost all spheres of life. The effects on the Kurdish 
people started to show.  
In a nutshell, given that the Kurdish question is inextricably linked to nation-building 
and therefore to the issue of territoriality, the Kurds had to leave their lands either by 
force or by involuntary methods. This naturally caused a sense of loss, pain and 
deprivation, but it also resulted in an effective and powerful diaspora, which 
remotely supports the Kurdish nation-building process and has the recognition of the 
international community.  
B) Contemporary Turkish and Kurdish Migration (1950s-1970s) 
Western European countries, damaged during World War II, entered into a growth 
and development process in the 1950s. However, these countries did not have 
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enough of a labour force to operate their mines and manufacturing industry. They 
tried to meet the labour requirements from neighbouring European states. Turkey 
began exporting labour largely from rural areas to Europe in 1961 with an agreement 
with West Germany. Later on, similar agreements were signed with Austria, Belgium, 
the Netherlands, France and Switzerland as well. 
The export of labour from countries where manual labour is dominant to the 
countries where industry and capital were required had economic, social, political 
and cultural impact. In the first stage of the labour migration, men who passed the 
required health check were allowed entry. In 1974, Turkish migrant workers 
obtained the right to bring their families to their workplace as agreed, "Family 
Reunification Law", signed with the Federal Republic of Germany. When the labour 
imports from Turkey stopped in the 1970s, immigration to Europe continued through 
family reunification, marriages, and illegal immigration. The immigration continued 
into the 1980s, mostly through political asylum seekers, including leftists, Alevis, a 
Muslim minority group and then Kurds, with the gradual militarisation of the ethnic 
conflict in Turkish Kurdistan after the 1980 military coup in Turkey. 
 In the 1960s, Turkish workers who moved to Western European countries 
were unskilled, unprofessional and uneducated. Therefore, they had serious 
adjustment problems in their host countries (and they still have in some countries). 
When they first went to these countries, their stay was considered temporary; 
however, generally they did not return to their homeland. There were several 
reasons for that. One reason was the economic problems back in their homelands. 
They were mainly peasants and unskilled labour from rural and not from the coastal 
regions of Turkey, where a broader range of sectors including service sector, tourism 
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and industry existed. The second important reason was that their families were in 
Western countries and their children started their education there. The opportunity 
for a better future for these children in Western European countries was another 
reason. Political reasons were also at stake. As Kalaycioglu et. al. states: "Even though 
migration is done by a single individual, it is not an individual process. The remaining 
family, relatives and communities are all affected by all aspects of the migration."127 
Icduygu explains the wider effect of migration that goes beyond the migrants 
themselves, by providing estimated numbers of migrants and their acquaintances 
affected by this process, which seems to be significant in the case of migrants from 
Turkey: 
Starting with the outflow of a few Turkish migrants in late 1961, there were by 
2011, when the population of Turkey itself was over 73 million, more than 3.5 
million Turkish migrants in Europe, some 100 thousand Turkish workers in 
the MENA [Middle East and North Africa] region, some 60 thousand settlers in 
Australia, and over 75 thousand workers in the CIS [Commonwealth of 
Independent states] countries. There were also more than a quarter million 
Turkish migrants in Canada and the United States. Thus, at any one time 
during these years, some six per cent of the Turkish population was abroad. 
And when we consider that some 40-50 per cent of the early emigrants 
returned permanently to Turkey, it would appear that a sizeable minority of 
the present Turkish population has had a direct experience of emigration, and 
an even larger proportion has had - through the emigration of a close relative 
or friend - an indirect experience.128 
 
The immigration from Turkey to Europe entered a new phase after the September 12, 
1980, Military Coup. The first groups attacked by the military power were leftist 
people and trade unionists. As a result of the coup's policies which disregards human 
rights and rule of law, many academics, artists, unionists, and members of leftist 
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organisations sought political asylum and took refuge in Western European 
countries. This time, an important segment of the refugees were qualified and skilled 
professionals. 
The third phase of mass migration started after the 1984 attacks of the PKK 
which marked the outbreak of the armed conflict between Kurdish guerrillas and 
Turkish soldiers. In addition to Kurdish activists struggling for their liberation 
movement, many others who were ordinary Kurds from predominantly-Kurdish 
eastern and south-eastern provinces in Turkey were caught in the crossfire between 
the state and the PKK, and they sought political asylum in Europe. During this 
process, the Kurds of Turkey mainly took refuge in Western and Northern European 
countries and in the United Kingdom. Kurds continued their political endeavours in 
these countries as well. Thus, a dynamic Kurdish diaspora was established in Europe. 
Kaya and Ugurlu explain this long-distance nationalism in through diaspora political 
activism as: 
The Kurdish diaspora, although they stayed far away [physically] from the 
ethnic conflicts in the Middle East, has been one of the most important actors 
in the conflict. One of the greatest desires of the Kurdish diaspora, without any 
doubt, is to prepare the ground for the Kurds to be an actor in the new world 
order. In this respect, Europe has become an area where the Kurds re-enter 
the identity struggle. Many social networks have been created to revive 
Kurdish nationalism, in particular and to draw attention to the war that goes 
on in the homeland. Television channels, newspapers, magazines and 
academic institutions were established in order to keep the "Kurdish 
consciousness" alive and provide support for the "Kurdish cause."129 
 
During the first migration wave, men who migrated to Western Europe as a labour 
force had to leave their wives and children back in the country. This situation needs 
                                                        
129 Ilhan Kaya and Omer Ugurlu, Ulusotesi Milliyetcilik Baglaminda Avrupa Kurt Diasporasi (Istanbul: 
UKAM Yayinlari): 195. Translated by me (S.K.)         
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to be re-addressed and considered in the context of gender relationships and 
interactions.130 
On the other hand, the interaction with the host society has been a very 
painful process. The migrant worker communities took their cultures, traditions and 
religion from their homeland and brought them to Europe, a safer environment to 
flourish. However, the migrants had to create spaces where they could practise their 
everyday lives and make their own syntheses of their already existing norms and 
values with the new ones they face in the host land. As time went on, immigrants 
shaped the migration process into a new understanding of life. Thus, they created a 
new transnational identity. 
A new immigrant community was born with the migration of wives and 
children and new areas and institutions have been formed accordingly in the country 
of settlement. Coincidentally, in Turkey migration began from rural to urban areas in 
1960s, while the urban population steadily increased as the rural population 
decreased. This internal migration began in Turkey primarily due to economic 
reasons, much like the labour migration to Western Europe. Industrialisation which 
began in 1950s has concentrated in the western Turkish cities and in Istanbul in 
particular. Although the industry was a foreign-dependent assemblage industry, a 
labour force was needed and this had an effect on the increase of migration from 
rural areas to big cities. In rural areas, due to the agricultural mechanisation and the 
development of the agricultural industries, the need for labour has decreased. 
Furthermore, the profits from agricultural products are relatively low. In addition to 
                                                        
130 For an edited volume covering cross-cultural and gendered experiences of migration, see Sibel Safi 
and Seref Kavak (eds) (foreword by Heaven Crawley), Gender and Migration: Critical Issues and Policy 
Implications (London: London Centre for Social Studies Publications, 2014).  
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these economic reasons, social and cultural factors like polygamy and high rates of 
childbirth, especially in the predominantly Kurdish eastern and south-eastern 
regions, strengthened the economic reasons of migration from rural areas to urban 
areas. 
Turkey cannot reach the level of industry of the West due to the foreign-
dependent industry. This also reduces profitability. As a result, salaries of workers 
coming from rural areas and working in the industry are relatively low. However, this 
problem has been partly addressed when more than one person in the family has 
started to work and the salaries combined in a single pot. The extended family has 
thus determined the future of immigrant families. 
Economic migration within the country is not limited to the Kurds. Turkish 
people mainly from the Black Sea region and Central Anatolia have also migrated to 
Istanbul and other cities in the west of Turkey for the very same reasons. Another 
reason for internal migration is that universities and big hospitals were, in the past, 
located only in big cities. Many families migrated to the big cities for better education 
or facilities relating to vital issues such as health, well-being and socialisation. 
Istanbul has had the biggest share of these migrations. In this respect, as throughout 
history, Istanbul continues to be a centre of attraction in all areas during the period of 
Republic of Turkey as well. 
Internal migration has affected the biggest cities like Istanbul, Ankara and 
Izmir at first. The urbanisation of the rural population which was started with 
squatting has been as painful as it was for those who went to Europe for work. 
Uneducated and unprofessional rural people, who migrated to cities seeking better 
living conditions, received more income gradually and achieved social change, 
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development and progress. While the ratio of the population who lived in rural areas 
in Turkey was 75 per cent in 1950, it was only 22.7 per cent in 2012.131 During this 
rapid urbanisation period, internal migration to the big cities mostly came from the 
Black Sea and Central Anatolia regions, and, to some extent, from the western 
countryside. Following the the 1980 military coup and the beginning of the PKK's 
armed struggle in 1984, the pressure on the Kurds in the eastern and south-eastern 
regions increased and the Kurds were forced to migrate to western cities like 
Istanbul. Due to the increase of the Kurdish population in the western Turkish cities, 
the Kurdish question has begun to be experienced more in these cities as well. 
C) The Military Coup Period and the Rise of the PKK and Armed Conflict (1980-
2000s) 
Just as in the case of the migration to Europe, the migration that started with 
unqualified people without a profession became an economic, cultural, social and 
political power after the families settled in the big cities of the West. Thus it was only 
then it was realised that the Kurdish problem, which was assumed for years to 
concern Eastern and South-eastern Anatolia only, actually concerned the entire 
country. This stemmed from the fact that any problem not effecting the west of 
Turkey, Istanbul in particular, was not considered to be a state problem. For example, 
in Turkey –which is located on an active seismic zone– despite the dozens of 
earthquakes following the disastrous Erzincan earthquake in 1939 (earthquakes in 
1943 in Ladik-Samsun, 1944 in Gerede-Bolu, 1957 in Abant-Bolu, 1961 in Varto-Muş, 
1970 in Gediz–Kütahya, 1971 in Bingol, 1976 in Muradiye–Van, 1983 in Erzurum, 
                                                        
131  The World Bank Web Page, accessed on 20 January 2015 via 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.RUR.TOTL  
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1992 in Erzincan), necessary precautions were not taken in the country against the 
damage done by the earthquakes.  It was not until the 1999 Izmit Bay earthquake that 
affected Istanbul severely that Turkey started to take effective and active precautions 
against earthquakes and prepare and implement relevant legislations and 
regulations. Similarly, when the Kurdish question was felt strongly in the western 
Turkish provinces and especially in Istanbul, it was then understood to be the most 
important problem of the country at large. Certainly here we cannot ignore the power 
and influence of the internal diaspora of the Kurds who had migrated to western 
Turkish cities. The Kurds who migrated from villages to cities quickly started to 
become politicised. Between the 1960s and 1980s the pro-Kurdish political stream 
maintained its institutional presence mainly within the Turkish left.132 With the left 
movement's loss of power after the the 1980 military coup the Kurdish movement 
transformed into a movement of Kurds by approaching the nationalist line. The 
militant Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and its leader Abdullah Urbanisation133 
played important roles in this transformation. The armed conflict of the PKK which 
started in the Kurdish region in 1984 marked a cornerstone in the evolution of the 
Kurdish question. The PKK that carried out armed struggle in the mountains also 
started to influence civil Kurdish politics in the cities. 
                                                        
132 MPs of Kurdish descent supporting a socialist agenda took part in the TIP, Turkish Labour Party 
(1961-1971). It was an important experience regarding both the early politicization of the modern 
Kurdish ethno-national movement in formation and popularisation of a legal socialist political party 
for the first time in the history of Turkey. It is important to note that among the young Kurdish activist 
and politicians that joined the TIP, many were students of boarding schools and universities. They 
migrated from Kurdish villages or smaller towns to larger Kurdish cities, notably Diyarbakir, and 
western Turkish cities like Istanbul. In this context, migration has a significant role in network-
building and politicisation of the Kurdish intellectuals and activists which can be seen as turning point 
for the formation of the Kurdish ethno-national movement in Turkey. For a detailed analysis, see 
Ahmet Alis, "The Process of the Politicization of the Kurdish Identity in Turkey: The Kurds and the 
Turkish Labour Party (1961-1971)", MA thesis, (Bogazici University, 2009): 68-72. 
133 Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the armed wing of the Kurdish national movement in Turkey, also 
had experience of migration and politicisation in the leftist circles from a predominantly Kurdish town 
in eastern Turkey, (Urfa) to the western Turkish city, Ankara in 1966-1968 for high school education; 
to Istanbul and Ankara in 1971-1984 for university education which turned into a longer period of 
political mobilisation.     
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After the the 1980 military coup, masses of the Kurdish activists and the 
Turkish left were subjected to systematic torture in military prisons. This pressure 
and the torture in the prisons, instead of diminishing the inmates' political 
consciousness and resistance, increased them, and this resistance led to a new 
movement, spreading across the country. Within the same period, thousands of Kurds 
were forced to migrate to western cities of Turkey or abroad (mainly Western 
Europe) due to arrests, years-long detentions, executions and forced expatriations. 
Waves of internal migration caused socio-cultural problems in the host cities. 
Especially since 1990, the Kurds who migrated in masses to the southern and 
western Turkish cities  have  been  dealing  with  issues  regarding  their  established  
relations,  sense  of belonging, conflict with the society, comprehension and 
transition. Naturally, this interaction has deeply affected Turkish society in the west. 
It is also natural that the Kurds, having been exiled from their homes by force, went 
directly into a new struggle for basic needs in European cities in which they arrived, 
including housing, employment and education. Danis analyses political and socio-
economic motives of Kurdish migration to Europe and emphasises how the political 
dimension of the Kurdish migration to Europe is covered up in Turkey: 
While the environment of mistrust feeding the ethnic conflict in the Southeast 
was a driving force behind the migration of the Kurds to Europe, it provides an 
"opportunity  to  migrate"  for  those  who  made  that  decision  due  to  
financial difficulties at a time when Europe put an end to work-force 
migration. Even though the migration of the Kurds as well as the Assyrians, 
the Chaldeans and the Yezidis who also left Turkey has always been a topic 
covered up by a widespread defensive reflex, it is a fact that this situation gave 
birth to important results. For those from Turkey in Europe this population 
movement which was ignored in Turkey resulted in their differentiation in 
terms of political identity and "discovering" of their ethnic and sectarian 
identity. Furthermore, political activities of "the Kurds in the diaspora" led to 
the recognition of the PKK's armed struggle and of the Kurdish problem and to 
receiving financial support in Europe. The reflection of all these occurrences 
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unfortunately did not turn into a serious discussion [in Turkey] beyond the 
expression "they humiliate us in front of Europe!"134 
 
Danis' perpective is important in the sense that it shows how monolithic, top-down 
homogenisation of a "nation" leads to adverse effects in the diasporic communities 
originating from that sending society. In other words, not recognising the existence of 
ethnic and religious groups in their host lands, or denying them their rights and 
liberties in the sending country, may backfire and cause further ethnic, sectarian and 
religious differentiation and divides sought by diasporas of those same groups in 
receiving countries.    
The Kurds, who have been living with the pressure of assimilation from the 
states to which they belonged for centuries, faced a new threat of assimilation with 
the mass migrations. However, together with the PKK's armed struggle the Kurds' 
(both natives and migrants in the Western cities) political struggle helped them 
overcome the pressure of assimilation; they also strengthened the Kurdish 
mobilization and identity by institutionalising their ethno-national movement. From 
the early 1980s through to 1990s, the PKK organised itself not only in the military 
field, but also in the civil society and legal political arena, through parties and urban 
mobilisation efforts. Urbanisation of Turkey at large followed, in a parallel line, by the 
urbanisation of the Kurdish political movement via migration and diasporisation.  
After 1990, the conflict in the region intensified and when the state could not 
cope with the PKK they resorted to destroy the Kurdish villages – burn them to the 
ground. During this period an internal migration took place from the east to the west. 
                                                        
134 Aslı Didem Danis, “Yeni Göç Hareketleri ve Türkiye-1,” Birikim Journal, no. 184-185 (2004): 6. 
Translated by me (S.K.) 
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Western Europe also had its share from this wave of migration. This time the Kurds 
went to Europe as political refugees. The Kurds who migrated to Europe quickly 
started working as the PKK's missionaries, as it were, by being organised in a short 
period of time in the countries in which they settled. The refugees began to get their 
voices heard by getting the support of their compatriots who had previously 
migrated to Europe for economic reasons. At the same time, these organisations 
prevented the one-sided propaganda of the Turkish government by drawing 
attention to the PKK and the Kurdish Question and putting them on the European 
agenda. In addition, they provided financial support for the PKK by various means in 
European cities they lived in, to contribute to the "national cause." These means 
included fundraising campaigns and donations accepted by the PKK.  Concerning the 
Kurdish diaspora in Sweden, Baser states that ‘the PKK encouraged Kurdish 
immigrants to pay their "revolutionary tax" and also recruited Kurdish youths, as 
they did in other European states.’135 These associations in Europe produced several 
publications, such as magazines in Kurdish, as well as founding TV channels, thus 
enabling the Kurdish language to flourish. Therefore, European Kurdish diaspora is 
not only one of the important forces of the political activism of the PKK, but also a 
powerhouse for the broader Kurdish movement that pursues cultural, linguistic and 
social goals, not limited to a narrow nationalist agenda.136 
The end of the Baath regime in Iraq, as a result of the US-led invasion in 2003, 
paved the way for a new environment for Iraqi Kurds, as well as Kurds in the 
neighbouring countries and the diaspora. In 2005, the Iraqi Kurds established a 
                                                        
135 Bahar Baser, Diasporas and homeland conflicts: A comparative perspective (Farnham: Ashgate 
Publishing Limited, 2015).  
136 For an early analysis of the Kurdish diaspora in Germany and its activities in the transnational 
space see;  Thomas Faist, "Transnational social spaces out of international migration: evolution, 
significance and future prospects," Archives Européennes de Sociologie 39 (1998): 213-247.   
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constitutionally recognised entity called "the Kurdistan Regional Government" (KRG) 
which was formerly only de-facto autonomous.137 The KRG has a parliament, 
elections, government, state institutions, army, currency, flag and a national anthem. 
Thus, it could be argued that at least a semi-independent Kurdish state has been 
established in Iraq. Undoubtedly, this has had a huge impact on the Kurdish 
movements of historical Kurdistan. The Kurds, as political actors, have now reached 
an inter-governmental level. The headquarters of the PKK militants, who are engaged 
in armed struggle in Turkey, are located in the Qandil region of the KRG as well. 
Surely these developments have contributed to the consolidation of the influence of 
the PKK as a key player in the region. 
Before the popular uprisings across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
ignited a vicious civil war in Syria in 2011, Kurds were usually considered within the 
framework of minorities—with the exception of the autonomous KRG in northern 
Iraq. A major consequence of the ongoing Syrian Civil War has been a radical change 
in the global perception of Kurds as Kurdish political struggle for self-rule in Syria has 
so far successfully established three autonomous cantons (i.e., Jazira, Kobani, Afrin) 
— in January 29, 2014. This was a huge political development fondly referred to by 
sympathisers of the Kurdish political movement as the “Rojava Revolution” or the 
“Kurdish Spring.”138 Until the emergence of two de-facto independent Kurdish 
polities in northern Iraq and Syria, the conventional minority status of Kurds stood as 
                                                        
137 The first article of the Iraqi Constitution dated 2005, while guaranteeing the integrity of the 
country, also defines is as a 'federal' state. More importantly, article 4, paragraph 3 of the Iraqi 
Constitution, which references directly and openly the Kurdish administrative unit, states that the 
official federal associations of the 'Kurdistan region' use the two official languages (Arabic and 
Kurdish) of the country. http://www.iraqinationality.gov.iq/attach/iraqi_constitution.pdf  (Accessed 
on 13 November 2013). 
138 Evangelos Aretaios, "The Rojava revolution," Open Democracy, 15 March 2015, accessed on 21 
March 2015 via https://www.opendemocracy.net/north-africa-west-asia/evangelos-aretaios/rojava-
revolution   
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a major obstacle before the recognition of “Kurdish nationhood” even in certain 
provinces where they constitute the undisputed majority (i.e., parts of east and 
southeastern Turkey, northern Iraq, northern Syria, and parts of northwestern Iran). 
As for the situation in Turkish Kurdistan, March 21, 2013 marked the start of a 
peace process between the PKK and the Turkish Army which had started in 2011 
with the series of meetings of Turkish officials and the jailed PKK leader Abdullah 
Ocalan in Imrali Prison in Turkey.139 Accordingly, PKK militants were supposed to go 
abroad with their arms, and Turkish government was supposed to reform the 
constitution and make laws for a sustainable peace and consolidation of democracy in 
Turkey, which would guarantee the rights, liberties and political demands of the 
Kurds. Nevertheless, the resolution process could not bring out the expected 
outcomes and the insurgency resumed. The ruling AKP (Justice and Development 
Party) government did not respond to the demands from the Kurdish side, such as 
the recognition of Kurdish identity and assignment of constitutional rights, 
democratisation of Turkey, reinforcement of local governance, removal of political 
pressure, including a general amnesty for political prisoners. 
In light of the recent developments in the greater Kurdistan and the Middle 
East at large, it may be anticipated that political instability and clashes in the region 
may have long term effects on the pace and the motives of Kurdish migration to the 
West. Accordingly, the migratory movements of the Kurds within the Middle East and 
to Europe may influence the content and the tools of transnational politics of the 
Kurdish diaspora.     
                                                        
139 Huge Pope, "Turkey and the PKK: A peace process without end goals?" International Crisis Group, 23 
November 2014, accessed on 27 November 2014 via http://blog.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-
asia/2014/11/23/turkey-and-the-pkk-a-peace-process-without-end-goals/   
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CHAPTER V: DIASPORA AGENCY AND NATIONAL/TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS 
A) Creative Agency-Building and Struggle for Legitimacy 
Most of the Kurdish activists I have talked to in London emphasised the negative, or 
at least balanced, approach of the UK authorities towards Kurds and the Kurdish 
cause. They were explaining this in relation to the British state policy not to ruin its 
relations with Turkey and the international economic and political system, while 
preserving their good relations with the Kurds. Most diaspora activists showed their 
disapproval of and frustration about this 'balanced' policy of the UK. However, there 
was a shift when it came to their perception of the British local government and their 
engagement with the Kurdish people and the organisations in the UK. They 
wholeheartedly praised both their own civic engagement with the local government 
in London and the welcoming and supportive approach of those councils and public 
institutions toward the Kurdish associations’ projects in London. 
   S: How successful do you think is your informing them about the projects  here in 
yielding results? 
   D: Local governments, municipalities, for example, are politicians, are they not? 
They are chosen people. However much we go to them, they come back to us just as 
much. This is not about the UK only because the Kurdish Community Centre is not an 
introverted, closed organisation. It is extroverted, open to everybody. For example 
we have very good relations with Haringey Council. If we hosted a reception here 
they would come; we can go to them for a reception or a meeting to be informed, 
because this is an endeavour done together. We are not forming here a commune 
[sic] life. Here, we are together with the public, with the government, local 
government, in order to make life easier for the people here as much as we can. Is 
that not the responsibility of municipalities? 
   S: Yes. Then what kind of difficulties do you come across while providing this not 
'commune' but closely tied-together life?140 
                                                        
140 Delal (pseudonym), interview by the author, tape recording, London, UK, 10 June 2012 
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Here one can observe the role of political culture and the changing nature of policy 
implementation between different nation-state traditions, in our case, between 
Turkey and the UK. Whereas a highly centralised and state-controlled government 
model is still dominant in Turkish politics, a relatively highly individualised, 
decentralised governance model is valid for British politics, where local politics 
constitute the core of greater public policy in which grassroots organisations and lay 
people are taken more into consideration. As a result of this difference, I believe, the 
Kurdish diaspora activists show greater sympathy, content and optimism when they 
talk about their relations with British local government, as opposed to their negative 
and bleak perception of British foreign policy as self-interested and based on 
realpolitik: 
S: What did you observe as an association, as an individual? What did you 
observe personally? Or maybe with members of parliament (MPs)? At the 
local or national level...  With  politicians,  institutions,  what  kind  of  
difficulties  do  you  face  when forming relationships? 
D: Look, there is a very beautiful thing here. If you speak English well and have 
a good head on your shoulders you do not experience difficulty with anyone 
here. Because whether it is a member of parliament, the chosen ones, or let us 
skip the members of parliament, from the council to the lords at the top... 
Unfortunately [sic] people here do not have that arrogance as in our country. 
People here know. They know their responsibilities.  They  do  not  try  to  be  a  
hero  just  because  they  have  become members of the parliament. With their 
public –just as our BDP MPs, the chosen ones' acting with their public – MPs 
here act with their public. When you meet a member of parliament here you 
do not have to, like, button up, move your head down and bring your hands in 
front of you. … Because the man [sic] is aware of this: you brought me to this 
position. You chose me. My mission is to satisfy your needs. This is my 
mission. Those here know this. The system here makes sure this is known.141 
Apart from the structural advantages that local government in the UK provides with 
Kurdish diaspora associations, unlike the state-based obstacles that the Kurdish 
NGOs are facing in Turkey, we should not underestimate the role of community 
agency and, even more than that, of the individual agency of diaspora members. 
                                                        
141 Delal (pseudonym), interview by the author, tape recording, London, UK, 10 June 2012 
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Delal’s formula for her success along with her institutional endeavours in London is 
quite telling in this regard. She feels the need to underline how important it is to be 
positive, optimistic and proactive in civic engagement efforts and charitable work vis-
a-vis government authorities when she demands to be provided with certain 
facilities, promotion and incentives: 
S: For example, can you act as comfortably as the settled communities here, 
the individuals in the society or as the institutions formed by the settled 
community? Do you really get the same conditions? 
D: If you work for it why would you not get it? In my opinion, yes. I am a 
positive person. Let me tell you why I am positive: if I want something I do it. 
It is important to want it. And why you want it. Today let us say that I will 
open a charity shop in the name of Heyva Sor. I will ask for the council's 
support. If the council gives it to Oxfam, to Council Search, to here or there, it 
has to give support to me too. That is why I can open that shop. Do you 
understand what I am saying? Why would they turn it into a problem? This 
place does not have the understanding of the politicians in Turkey. I do not do 
anything bad here. This community centre does not do anything bad in this 
country; instead, it does very good things – looks after its own community. The 
municipality helps to satisfy our needs. In our women's projects there is 
employment, education, a lot of things... As it is how can there be bad blood 
between us and the local government or why would it prevent me?142 
 
Here I would argue that diaspora individuals, and through them their associations, 
are building up creative agency as personas and institutions. This creative agency 
may be thought to emerge from their bitter experiences as members of a people 
historically deprived of certain rights, liberties and opportunities. However, I would 
argue that creative agency is beyond the language of “victimisation” that cripples the 
diasporan community by seeing them as passive victims of persecution, as 
individuals and as an entity as a whole. Diasporan individuals have the chance to be 
more creative and proactive in producing novel things and opportunities; material 
                                                        
142 Delal (pseudonym), interview by the author, tape recording, London, UK, 10 June 2012 
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and psychological well-being and new spaces143 they acquire by being away from the 
threats and subjection they encounter in their homelands. In this vein, despite 
keeping their reservations about the host country circumstances, due to their 
disadvantages as newcomers in the host society, all my informants sounded very 
confident and proactive in initiating innovative and diverse projects, and in having 
these adopted by the British local government. 
This creative agency they are building up proactively helps diasporan Kurds to 
identify themselves as British Kurds much more easily than they would have done 
otherwise, if they kept complaining about the system and spent time grieving about 
their pains rather than finding remedies of their own that they create themselves.144 
What is very significant here is the fact that the more proactive and creative that 
agency-building of diasporans gets, the higher degree of legitimacy they potentially 
gain. This is manifested in their numerous activities, from local ethnic  festivals  to  
events  and  activities  of  universal  solidarity  relating  to  super-diverse themes 
including women’s rights, children’s ecological rights, rights to the city, indigenous 
peoples' rights, class-based socio-economic problems beyond the UK, Turkey and the 
Middle East. My informants from Kurdish associations in London mentioned the 
organisations they worked in collaboration with, including other migrant groups such 
as Somalians, Tamils, and Ecuadorians so and so forth.  
                                                        
143 For a detailed discussion of "the diasporic public sphere" based on a the study of British Pakistani 
Muslims in Manchester and the alternative spaces they create that go beyond national public sphere, 
see Werbner (2002): 15, 251-276.  
144 Appadurai describes diasporic public spheres as "phenomena that confound theories that depend 
on the continued salience of the nation-state as the key arbiter of important social change." Arjun 
Appadurai, Modernity at Large (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996): 4.  
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Photo 1: Kurdish Community Centre (KCC) hosting “Miss Ecuador 2012” beauty 
contest in its community hall in Haringey145 
 
The Kurdish Community Centre (KCC) activist sharing the photo above explains the 
broadly-based mission and vision of the KCC: “the Kurdish Community Centre has 
assumed the role to bridge different cultures in the Haringey region. Ecuadorians 
held their Miss 2012 beauty contest at our community centre.”146 This is a very 
simple and humble yet very creative activity of the Kurdish diaspora institutions. The 
Kurds in this case show their solidarity with other migrant groups living alongside 
them in the same locale and present their agency in a very creative way in such non-
political grassroots level activities, although they are a highly politicised group 
themselves. Ecuadorians, Somalis, Tamils, Turks, Indians, Arabs and several other 
national groups that the Kurdish diasporans are working hand in hand with do 
represent a sort of nuanced integration into British society, while showing greater 
                                                        
145 Photo taken by a London-based Kurdish activist whose facebook profile name is "Kurdish Centre," 8 
July 2012.  
146 Translated by me (S.K.) 
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sympathy for minority groups that are thought to be more vulnerable to the effects of 
socio-economic difficulties here. Therefore, they attempt to beat “structure” with 
their creative proactive agency in the diasporan sphere. From the point of view of the 
British establishment and politics, these efforts of the Kurds in the UK seem to be 
invaluable as they contribute to the “community cohesion” agenda of the government 
with their own initiatives and productive grassroots activities.  
Community cohesion is a term referring to the policy of integration with a 
nuanced version of multiculturalism which argues that the multiculturalist idea of 
differences within the society should not be reduced to ethnicity; rather it should 
focus on broadly-based issues including sexual orientation, gender, faith, disability, 
nationality and other forms of identities, as well as that of ethnicity. The term was 
first used by Ted Cantle as a new policy paradigm in response to the riots and local 
unrest in England in 2001.147 After the riots in 2011, the debates around this policy 
have revived. Rather than ethnic/racial differentiation and parallel lives within the 
society, this policy emphasises shared values, a common vision and sense of 
belonging for all communities. It can be argued that community cohesion policy was 
welcomed by the British government not only due to its identity dimension; this 
policy was important particularly because it encouraged proactive participation of 
communities in civil society by contributing to the social well-being of the British 
society through charitable activity, donations and raising awareness.  
Hence, with their creative agency, the Kurdish diaspora in the UK finds itself in 
a much more legitimate position in the eyes of the British elites and the British public 
rather than being perceived as merely a political group of people lobbying the 
                                                        
147 Ted Cantle, Community Cohesion: A Report on the Independent Review Team (London: Home Office, 
2001). For a revised and extended later work by the same author, see, Ted Cantle, Community 
Cohesion: A New Framework for Race and Diversity (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).   
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government about harsh political problems such as the Kurdish struggle and the 
upheavals in the Middle East. One of my interviewees, Mahsum, commented about 
the legality and legitimacy of political parties while he was speaking about the 
relations of the Kurdish community associations with British political parties and 
actors. He was saying: 
M: We have connections. That is, with mayors, members of parliament, the 
police, other non-governmental organisations that I mentioned, even with 
political parties we are in dialogue.  For example, when we organise our 
congress we invite the mayor. When we organise our congress...148 
 
Then comes the very interesting point he makes: 
M: Because we are in Haringey here, we invite the mayor of Haringey. Again, 
we invite political party representatives. We do not make a distinction 
between this party and that party. We invite the political party representative 
who represents, especially in parliament, the existing legal parties, all political 
representatives.149 
 
As a diaspora activist who once fought for the Kurdish cause as a PKK guerrilla fighter 
on the Kurdish mountains and was thus labelled a ‘terrorist’ by various hegemonic 
states including Turkey,150 US,151 UK152 and the European Union (EU),153 Mahsum is 
perhaps trapped in a contradiction. He is coming from the background of illegal 
struggle and he still does not defy the militant PKK, but on the contrary identifies 
with it, as he sees it as a "national liberation movement." In addition, the PKK has 
                                                        
148 Mahsum (pseudonym), interview by the author, tape recording, London, UK, 1 September 2013 
149 Mahsum (pseudonym), interview by the author, tape recording, London, UK, 1 September 2013 
150 Ic Isleri Bakanligi Emniyet Genel Mudurlugu Terorle Mucadele Dairesi Baskanligi Website, accessed 
on 5 May 2015 via  
https://web.archive.org/web/20130114042731/http://www.egm.gov.tr/temuh/terorgrup1.html  
151  US Department of State Website, accessed on 5 May 2015 via 
https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm 
152 Proscribed terrorist groups or organisations (London: Home Office, 2013): 14. 
153  Council of the European Union Website, accessed on 5 May 2015 via 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/terrorist-list/   
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always considered itself a revolutionary movement and has not turned down the 
armed struggle as a major means of politics in the Middle East. In the last two 
decades, the PKK decided to transform its struggle strategy from an armed movement 
to a broader movement, including legal political actors such as the founding legal 
political parties competing in local and nationwide elections both in Turkey’s Kurdish 
and Turkish majority provinces and establishing other legal civil society institutions, 
like the Demokratik Toplum Kongresi (DTK)154 among others. Yet the PKK did not 
abandon arms and even in this period of cease-fire, due to the peace process with the 
Turkish state in 2013 and 2014, never did degrade its three-decade old armed 
struggle as illegitimate. So Mahsum’s over-emphasis on their relations with legal 
parties in the British political arena sounds rather interesting coming from a 
revolutionary PKK guerrilla’s point of view. Obviously, this is not solely related to 
Mahsum’s personal insight as a pro-PKK activist, but is more linked to the securitised 
public space of post-9/11 Europe by which they as diaspora activists have to abide. 
This is also a striking indicator of the illusion that, as soon as the diaspora activists 
reach their host country in Western Europe, they feel perfectly free to do whatever 
they aspire to politically, without thick walls and securitising borders.  
In this context, in the squeezed space of the diaspora activists there are some 
factors at play. The role of non-state actors in the international political arena is 
underestimated theoretically by the scope of international relations, as it is still 
largely based on major actors especially states, in the first instance, and 
intergovernmental alliances and their institutions, in the second. Nation-states which 
                                                        
154 Democratic Society Congress was founded in Diyarbakir, Turkish Kurdistan on 30 October 2007. It 
declared unilaterally "democratic autonomy" of the Kurdish people in Turkish Kurdistan in 2011 
which caused controversy in the Turkish public. For a detailed analysis see Seevan Saeed, Kurdish 
Politics in Turkey: From the PKK to the KCK (New York: Routledge, 2017): 102-115. 
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still decide the main framework of trade, economic relations, legality and illegality in 
all sectors are seen as more important than small scale non-state actors, one of which 
is diasporas.  
Another factor for this strong emphasis on legality by diaspora activists is 
perhaps related to the issue of representation. I speak of representation in terms of 
security concerns relating to risks, threats and challenges faced by the activists and 
the associations they are affiliated to, and second, in terms of representing their 
(im)personal views, a performative act in the way they want to appear on the stage. 
When I asked my informants from Kurdish diaspora circles about the attitude of the 
British authorities towards the Kurds in the UK, they often underlined the balance of 
power relations among the UK state policy, the Kurds and Turkey: 
A: ... as I stated before, the Kurdish issue is Turkey's issue but Turkey is an ally 
of this country. They are allies in NATO, in joining the European Union, 
supposedly a candidate country, United Nations and in many other 
international institutions they are allies, acting together...  The operations in 
Afghanistan included.  Therefore, Turkey is important for this country. They 
care about Turkey's interests in terms of their own interests. As such they do 
not want the Kurds here to have an issue with the Turkish state. 
S: Do they pursue a balance? 
A: Balance... They pursue a big balance. Whenever the Turkish state has issues 
with this country, economic or political, when they have certain issues with 
regard to the military, in my opinion they hold the Kurdish issue against the 
Turkish state. But if they are on good terms with the Turkish state, if they do 
not have any issues, they ignore the Kurds.  Not saying anything against the 
Kurds takes its source from their constitution. Because [it] advocates universal 
democracy for them; declaring and claiming to bring democracy to the world, 
led by themselves to spread... They have certain things in their laws. 
Therefore, if they were to implement policies about the Kurds, they would 
clearly contradict their laws and discourses. This is why yes, maybe they do 
not ignore the Kurds, and maybe there is nothing towards the Kurds... But just  
as  in  Turkey,  where  the  state  wants  from  the  Kurds  to  be  the  compliant 
individuals of a compliant society, what is wanted from the Kurds here is to be 
integrated, compliant  individuals  of  a  compliant society... As the Turkish 
 
92 
state wants, individuals who do not object, question, defend their rights; who 
submit, surrender...155 
Quite clearly, the Kurdish diaspora activists tear down the cliché portraying the 
hostland as a completely free and cosy safe haven embracing the ones oppressed who 
have fled their homeland. The political, economic, military and strategic relations 
between the host state and home state are a major reason for this. Diaspora agency 
and activism is also affected by the international politics of both the host state and 
home state that they develop through formal or informal alliances within supra-
national organisations like the EU and intergovernmental military/security pacts like 
the NATO. In this context, Aram's emphasis on "balance of power" among the actors 
shaping diaspora politics is instrumental to understand the nature of world politics in 
a multilateral setting.  
B) Grassroots Agency and the Denial of Representation 
It may be true that the increasingly securitised space against the sympathisers of 
armed groups in Europe has a strong impact (mostly a curbing one) on the activism 
of diaspora circles linked to the Kurdish guerrilla movement; the grassroots of this 
ethno-national group in Europe seem to be much more radical than the diaspora 
activists struggling on their behalf. What my informants see as the will and demands 
of the Kurdish people counts a lot at this point.  
A large number of Kurdish people in diaspora are under the direct influence of 
the PKK as a national liberation movement and a legitimate "political representative" 
for themselves in their own words. Therefore, it is quite understandable to hear some 
of my interviewees telling me about the Kurdish people visiting their associations in 
                                                        
155 Aram (pseudonym), interview by the author, tape recording, London, UK, 18 July 2012 
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London asking for activism to protest the ongoing threats against the Kurdish people 
and pro-PKK cadres in Turkey. In this vein, the discourse of spontaneity of pro-PKK 
protests and events reflecting and emerging from the voices of the Kurdish masses in 
London makes sense, especially for someone who had the opportunity to see similar 
support for the PKK, as an armed and political group in the homeland, 
Kurdistan/Turkey. I use the word "discourse of spontaneity" to describe the 
narratives of the Kurdish diaspora activists who claim that most of the activities they 
organise, especially pro-PKK protests, demonstrations and events take place solely in 
a spontaneous way with the initiative of ordinary Kurds in the diaspora, rather than 
the encouragement of key diaspora activists. In general, these "spontaneous" events 
are the ones with more political motives than cultural ones, especially those relating 
to sensitive issues of warfare, conflict and legitimacy of the PKK as a "national 
liberation movement." The discourse of spontaneity is perhaps part of a strategy of 
division of labour decided by the diaspora activists. In other words, perhaps, they 
want to show that they leave the space of sensitive issues and high politics as the 
domain of "ordinary Kurds" in London. In this regard, one can understand why the 
diaspora activists that I interviewed preferred to present their associations more as 
"cultural centres" mainly carrying out charitable and cultural work, rather than 
political activism or lobbying.  
As part of the above-mentioned strategy, perhaps, the categories of "ordinary 
Kurds," "the people," "the Kurds" are less vulnerable ones to immediate threats and 
accusations, as they are abstract. Nevertheless, institutional activity organised by 
diaspora associations are under direct control of the public and the media which may 
keep them accountable as supporters of "PKK terrorism." One of the prominent youth 
activists of the Kurdish Community Centre (KCC), Cafer, explained the agency of the 
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ordinary Kurds that support the PKK and therefore, shape the activism of the 
diaspora, especially concerning strong reactions and demands about protesting 
against anti-Kurdish policies in Turkey and the Middle East: 
S: Well, what activities, events does an ordinary citizen take part in more here 
in London? Which activities draw more attention? Which activities do not? 
C: It is interesting that PKK still has influence over the populace here. That is 
in terms of topics outside here. Through the media, through different things 
[tools] it commands the populace here. 
S: Commands the grass roots here, how? 
C: For example, incidents happen occasionally. For example, the public has 
demands like these. At the end of the day we as an association are not PKK's 
representative. But because we are a Kurdish association, the public comes 
and expects such a thing from us. Expects such a demand [sic]. They say, 
“Look, there is an attack against the PKK, we need to take precautions.” 
S: The average citizen here? 
C: A Kurd, here at the Kurdish Community Centre we are effective in relation 
to Kurds. But the PKK is more effective over the Kurds here than we are. That is 
not in terms of being a representative [of the PKK]. For example I go spend time 
among the [ordinary Kurdish] people. Nobody asks me about the activities of 
this community centre. They talk about PKK's politics.156 
S: Are you referring to the Kurds who came here? 
C: Yes, the ones who came here... Apart from this, as it is I am a representative 
of youth. I go to colleges, universities, weddings, funerals, shops. For example, 
let us say that I form a football team. I need a sponsor. I go to a restaurateur 
[sic]. There, [what I would say] it is not directly “I need a sponsor”; instead we 
converse a little. When I look, I see his language is the language of the PKK, 
PKK’s politics. That is, there still are many organisations here that lead the 
political life of the Kurds – but it is the PKK [for them]. That is, besides current 
legal topics, in cultural topics, the PKK is effective here. Despite not being its 
representative. At least not that I know of...157 The public, you realise, follows 
the agenda very well. For example, most of the time there are only a few 
people at the Kurdish Community Centre. When Selahattin Demirtas158 came, I 
was inside the [Kurdish Community] Centre, I did not have that kind of feeling 
                                                        
156 Emphasis mine  (S.K.) 
157 Emphasis mine  (S.K.) 
158 Demirtas is the leader of the BDP, Baris ve Demokrasi Partisi (Peace and Demokrasi Party) and the 
HDP, Halklarin Demokrasi Partisi (Peoples' Democratic Party), the last two of subsequent legal pro-
Kurdish political parties inspired by doctrines of the PKK.  
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[that a lot of people would attend the event at the KCC] but I came that day 
and saw; it was full. That is, there was no space.159 
 
Cafer, like his colleagues in the diaspora associations, seem to be happily sharing the 
agency of  policy-making  between  diaspora  activists/institutions,  on  one  side, and  
ordinary Kurdish people in London, on the other. For a political group claiming to be 
a national liberation movement, this is an essential point to underline, as populism 
does inevitably lie at the heart of success of such political streams. On the other hand, 
the impact of the securitised European public space of the post-9/11 world can be 
easily sensed in the cautious discourse of some diaspora activists, especially in our 
conversation about the relationship between the PKK, which is banned in the UK, and 
the diaspora associations which are legal, yet are inspired by the politics of the PKK: 
S: Both of the diaspora associations, the Kurdish Community Centre and the 
Halkevi are in line with the PKK, are they not? 
K: we, as associations, don't do anything ourselves according to the 
ideological, political line of thought of any political movement. For us, if [they] 
are Kurdish, came from Kurdistan, we must be sensitive towards that 
geography and prioritise the freedom of our community. We see ourselves as 
responsible, sensitive like this. We try to fulfil the responsibilities that we have 
for the Kurdish public to live justly, equally, freely. The Halkevi is also a 
sensitive association on these issues, as am I. But in the end [we/they are] two 
separate associations, independent from each other. We, I repeat, do not 
represent a political party ideologically, politically. We are not an ideological, 
political representative of any party. We do not operate on their [PKK's] 
behalf. We do not have the right to act in their [PKK's] name anyway. 
S: It is not hard to see that the people who come here are more PKK's 
grassroots, let us suppose that if they lived in Turkey they would vote for BDP, 
call Apo160, Serok, their leader. 
                                                        
159 Cafer (pseudonym), interview by the author, tape recording, London, UK, 14 April 2013 
160 "Apo" is the shortened version of the first name (Abdullah) of the PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan, who 
is in jail in Turkey. Serok means literally translates as "chief," yet, in this context, it is used to refer to 
the exclusive position of Ocalan in the dominant Kurdish national movement, that reveres him as their 
"leader," "founding father" and "national hero." Among the dominant Kurdish nationalist movement 
from Turkey, it is only Ocalan, who is referred to as "serok" whereas all other guerrilla leaders and 
legal politicians of the same movement are usually referred to as "heval", which means "friend," and 
"comrade" in Kurdish.   
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K: They can come; we cannot tell them not to come. At the end of the day, the 
vast majority of the people who come to our association sympathise with the 
PKK and try to support it in a way. And many of those maybe paid the price 
because of the PKK. That is, about Kurdishness, they paid a price regarding the 
PKK. Either they were arrested by the Turkish state, subjected to torture or 
spent years in prisons. Or people from his or her family, relatives were killed, 
fell as martyrs. As I said, the vast majority of the people who come to our 
association sympathise with the PKK. We cannot go ahead and say to them, 
"You cannot sympathise with the PKK. If you do, you cannot come to our 
association or cannot sympathise with other Kurdish parties, you cannot come 
if you do." [It is] a Kurdish association, our door is open to everybody. But an 
association that makes more thing [sic] [of] the people from Turkish 
Kurdistan, from Northern Kurdistan, that carries out activities. But this does 
not mean that we are not an association for the Kurds from the other parts of 
Kurdistan.161 
 
S: What are the expectations of the people who come here of this association? 
Y: The expectations of people who come here of this association are mainly to 
seek help for their issues. Let me say, the issues here: Health issues, education 
issues, sheltering issues, welfare benefits issues. Apart from these, I do not 
know... judicial issues that can arise. Again, for example, our contributions in 
solving the problems for those who do not speak the language by translating 
for them...There are a lot of expectations in this regard.  Social, cultural, 
sporting activities directed at young people... There are expectations like these 
from us. But at the same time, in this country, we are expected to be sensitive 
towards the events happening in Kurdistan. Our people do not see us as an 
association responsible only for what happens in this country. They see us, at 
the same time, as an association that needs to show responsibility towards 
issues in the country that we came from. They have expectations like these. In 
case of issues in the country, say a massacre or an attack, our people strongly 
suggest and demand of us to show a reaction here. They criticise us when we 
do not do it.162 
 
S: Were you as an organisation influential in the protests for Roboski163? 
                                                        
161 Kemal (pseudonym), interview by the author, tape recording, London, UK, 25 April 2013 
162 Yusuf (pseudonym), interview by the author, tape recording, London, UK, 9 April 2013 
163 Roboski Massacre which is also known as "Uludere airstrike" took place on 28 December 2011 near 
the Turkish-Iraqi border where 34 male Turkish civilians (mostly boys and young men) were killed by 
the airstrike of the F-16 jets of Turkish Air Force due to false intelligence provided with the Turkish 
government that supposedly aimed to target the PKK guerrillas crossing the border from Iraqi 
Kurdistan through to Turkish Kurdistan. It caused public indignation in Turkey and abroad, 
particularly, among the Kurds. Peter Beaumont, Guardian, "Turkish Air Strikes Kill Dozens of Villagers 
near Iraq border," 29 December 2011, accessed on 13 May 2015 via 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/29/turkish-air-strikes-iraq-border  
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H: Absolutely. For example in that Roboski massacre protest, I saw many 
Kurds there whom I do not know personally or are familiar with. At the 
protest... Again, for example, regarding the conditions of the PKK and the 
public's leader Ocalan's isolation, the public here have great concerns. 
S:  Is this often on the agenda?  There are many announcements about this on 
Facebook. 
H: Yes. People are rightly concerned about Ocalan's health and security. 
Therefore, they want to be informed. But there are no conditions for being 
informed. And people even started to discuss whether he is alive or not. For 
this reason our people are sensitive and they respond accordingly. Many 
events were organised regarding this. There has been a demand for our 
association to lead these events. We cannot be irresponsive to these demands. 
If the people who come to our association see Ocalan as  their  leader  and  are  
concerned  about  his  health  and  security it  becomes  an inevitable 
responsibility for us to be concerned about him and be sensitive about the 
issue. Therefore we have tried and still are trying to lead these events. 
Notifications were handed out regarding Ocalan's health and safety. 
Notifications were handed out, meetings were held, and will be held. If 
Ocalan's isolation conditions get severed and if he cannot be heard from, I am 
sure the Kurds here will display their concerns with far greater reactions.164 
 
Here, the general atmosphere and concerns that my interviewees are reflecting are 
more of a squeezed psycho-social and political mood between legality and legitimacy; 
nation-state boundaries and statelessness. Kurdish diaspora activists, despite 
numerous facilities and opportunities in the transnational diasporan sphere, still do 
face the thick walls of nation-states and barriers of legality in accordance with 
international legal and political regimes. Charges of terrorist activity, for instance, 
seems to be one of the biggest fears among diaspora circles based on the accusation 
that they have organic ties with the PKK which is banned in the UK and all over 
Europe. Furthermore, there is the dilemma of civility in the case of the members of 
the pro-PKK Kurdish diasporans. The Kurdish diaspora activists are civilians and 
carry out civic, social, political activities which are legal. However, their support for 
                                                        
164 Huseyin (pseudonym), interview by the author, tape recording, London, UK, 12 June 2013 
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the PKK as a "national movement" and a "political party," albeit an illegal party, puts 
the diasporan Kurds in a limbo situation. How major nation-states and international 
organisations sees the PKK does not match the way that the Kurdish diaspora 
activists see it. In the context of an ethno-national movement, operating in the 
transnational space, one can see why many diaspora activists feel the need to use a 
more "inclusive" and participative language when they talk about the agency of the 
Kurdish masses who ask for events and agenda items to be put on the top of the 
priorities of the Kurdish community centres in London, rather than- as my 
interviewees claim- the Kurdish diaspora associations themselves deciding on them. 
 
C) Cross-disciplinary Quests: Need for an Anthropology of International 
Relations 
The seemingly controversial academic field ‘the anthropology of international 
relations’ has been a relatively new invention, trying to bring some novelty into 
research techniques and methodologies used in the study of international relations 
and anthropology, broadening  the  epistemological  borders  of  the  two  disciplines  
combined.  Although this effort has been made mainly by scholars coming from 
anthropology165 166 and sociology,167 backgrounds which I would call grassroots 
social sciences, I would suggest that the researchers of international relations and 
global politics need this sort of opening even more, given the vicious cycle of its major 
debates on such issues as “human nature” and “state-centred agency and actor 
                                                        
165 Thomas Hylland Eriksen and Iver B. Neumann, “International Relations as a Cultural System: An 
Agenda for Research”, Cooperation and Conflict 28, no. 3 (1993): 233-264. 
166 Pnina Werbner, “Notes from a Small Place: Anthropological Blues in the Face of Global Terror”, 
Current Anthropology, 51, no. 2 (2010): 193-221. 
167 Johan Galtung, Mainstream vs. Counter trend in International Relations Theory: On the Linkage 
between Cosmology and Epistemology (New Jersey: Princeton University, 1986). 
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problem” in international relations theory. Despite its novelty and possible 
opportunities, not many authors have written authoritatively on the critical marriage 
of these two disciplines. Thomas Hylland Eriksen and Iver B. Neumann published one 
of their articles on the topic and they explained their understanding of the 
“anthropology of international relations” in the article titled “International Relations 
as a Cultural System” as follows: 
... a comprehensive agenda for research, where models of thought and 
research methods originating from social anthropology are applied to the field 
of international relations, which has traditionally been the domain mainly of 
political scientists. We suggest a number of possible anthropological 
approaches to the investigation of cultural aspects of international relations in 
the contemporary world. The aim is, on the one hand, to contribute new 
analytical perspectives to international relations, and, on the other hand, to 
open up a new field of inquiry in anthropology. A tactical intent can be added 
to our theoretical concern with cultural issues in international relations.168 
 
I would like to name this approach, the entire framework I am using to looking into 
diaspora politics in the case of the British Kurds. Do we need to go towards an 
anthropology of international relations in the sense that the diasporan individuals in 
London are behaving or controlling their political behaviour vis-a-vis the 
international system? When I asked them questions about their political activism in 
London or even in a small neighbourhood of London, they felt the need to underline 
the difficulties, the hardship related to the international political system. For 
instance, they frequently mentioned NATO policies or the UK-Turkey strategic 
political and economic relations in relation to the greater structures of the EU, NATO 
and even the Western alliance deeply rooted in the Cold War world order that 
situated Turkey within the western capitalist bloc alongside the US, UK and Western 
                                                        
168 Eriksen and Neumann (1993): 233. 
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Europe. Then, they usually elaborated on how the Kurds have been squeezed 
between UK and Turkey relations and their mutual interests as two nation-states, as 
well as concerning their positioning within other international, inter-governmental 
and supra-national political structures mentioned above. In other words, when a 
Kurdish student or activist in London was telling me about the opportunities and 
limits of her/his individual political activism, he/she was feeling compelled to talk 
about the problems within and emerging from the international political system and 
how sovereign nation-states are abusing their powers as major actors pursuing the 
self- interests of their nations at the cost of the democratic deficit for others: 
S: Actually I think this is a general thing. The majority of the foreigners who 
come to this country come from the countries previously colonised by the 
British Empire. While some of these colonies became independent by fighting 
for it, some of them still maintain good relations with their former coloniser 
despite being independent. That is, even though these countries fought against 
this country [the UK] and gained independence, they established good 
relations afterwards.  We can give India, Pakistan and many African countries 
as examples. Therefore, many of them are countries that gained independence 
but then became dictatorships.  And against these people who came here, to 
their former coloniser, having escaped dictatorship. I think the same politics is 
at work, that is, the politics regarding the Kurds. Because for this county, that 
is the UK government, in my opinion, this is my personal opinion, what is 
important is their own interests. What are these interests? Economic interests, 
political interests, military interests. I do not mean the interests of its public, 
mind you. I do not mean the interests of the UK public. I mean the state's 
interests. For this reason as far as their interests are concerned they can very 
easily cooperate with dictators; they can very easily suspend democracy. But 
whenever they have a conflict of interest, they would become the biggest 
apostle of democracy. They would say they are enemies of dictatorship.169 
 
The experiences of the British Kurdish diaspora activists in London clearly 
demonstrate how lonely the Kurdish diaspora remains as a non-state actor vis-a-vis 
the unchallenged state-centric nature of the international system, even in this highly 
                                                        
169 Sinem (pseudonym), interview by the author, tape recording, London, UK, 7 July 2012 
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globalised era. My informants emphasised their isolation not only as a community via 
their institutions in the eye of state institutions,  but  also  as  Kurdish  individuals  
sensitive  to  their  homeland  issues  in  their everyday lives. This fact itself should 
drive us into a deeper inquiry into the anthropology of international relations 
concerning political matters that non-state actors are involved in. Methodologically 
speaking, resorting to such major tools as ethnography and its subfields make us 
benefit from anthropological research in an attempt to reflect layers of the lives of a 
certain group of people. When we are talking to a group of individuals with such a 
high level of politicisation and rich socio-political experience, we observe a resistant 
actor, an ethnic or political group isolated from the political structures and multiple 
contesting agencies built in strong hierarchy, based on geo-political and economic 
variables. In this case, we observe the triangle of events that reflect the uneven power 
relations between state actors and a stateless diaspora concerning events taking 
place in the homeland of the diasporan group and its (in)visibility in the hostland: 
S.K: Yes, what did we say? How do the institutions in this country, the 
politicians approach the Kurds as far as you can see? 
S: Now as you know over the course of Mr Abdullah Ocalan's solitary 
confinement we prepared dossiers, brought them to many official institutes 
such as the Association of Journalists, the Red Cross, the Ministry of External 
Affairs. Solitary confinement is actually unacceptable. This is not just a case for 
leadership. You are all alone on an island, think of the island as a country OK? 
Look at it that way, it has seriously its own laws now. Consider it as a country, 
you lock up a person to a country and isolate him from everything. Does it look 
like an acceptable situation? When we present this, put the Roboski massacre 
in the dossier, the massacre in Uludere... besides, this exile policy against the 
Kurds, that is, it was applied very well after the Van earthquake. That "we are 
doing it, what else do you want?" mentality in the aftermath of the Van 
earthquake. Many things like this that we can call wrong, bad or inhumane or 
things a state should not do. When we present these to the authorities there is 
a shock stemming from not knowing (!); of course not very convincing I must 
say, honestly. 
S.K: Their not knowing? 
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S: I do not find this to be believable. But regardless of that, when you 
constantly constantly, constantly, push forward like "what are you going to do 
now that you know?" mentality should arise. This is actually a type of politics. 
Here or in the world, except for the societies that only sleep or inhumane 
societies that do not bother to do anything, everybody knows what the Kurds 
are going through there. Everybody knows. There is this thing called the 
Internet.170 
 
Sara's complaints about the deliberate ignorance or indifference of the British 
authorities toward  the  Kurdish  national  cause  and  human  rights  issues  of  Kurds  
in  the  homeland reminds me of the hegemony debate that Eriksen and Neumann 
carry out in their article on anthropology of international relations where they also 
touch on hegemony and power relations while looking at the interplay between 
domestic regimes and foreign policies: 
Any comparative study of political regimes runs the risk of being caught up in 
the normative perceptions and perspectives of the hegemony; in a sense, the 
social sciences, including anthropology, form part of the legitimizing structure 
of the hegemony (Ashley, 1988)... The strength of anthropology in this respect 
lies in the sensitivity  to  contextual  variables,  enabling  us  to  understand  
the  regimes  of contemporary nation-states in a language more sophisticated 
than often functionalist and behaviouralist terminology of US quantitative 
political science (Pye and Verba, 1965)... The general question to be posed 
here is: how does the type of political government in a nation-state influence 
its foreign policy? One dimension which needs   to be explored   comparatively   
by   anthropologists   is   that   of   popular participation in domestic politics, or 
the relationship between state and society. If a regime is faced with a legal, 
vocal opposition; if it risks being confronted with popular demonstrations, 
petitions and a poor rating at polls, it must take measures unnecessary for a 
totalitarian or otherwise authoritarian regime. Nation-states where the bulk of 
the population is well integrated at a national level are usually more closely 
monitored by their citizens than those which are poorly integrated. How can 
this influence their participation in international society?171 
 
                                                        
170 Sara (pseudonym), interview by the author, tape recording, London, UK, 6 July 2013 
171 Eriksen and Neumann (1993): 256. 
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In a nutshell, the reluctance of the dominant regional actors (Iran, Turkey, Syria, Iraq) 
to recognise the Kurds as a distinct ‘nation’ with a right to rule themselves or even to 
decide their own fates without external pressures from global actors like the US, 
NATO, the EU, the UK  etc.,  lies at  the  heart  of  the Kurdish  question.  This is very 
much linked to the predicaments of the Kurds, deriving from their lack of an equal 
status as a political entity in the age of nation-states. 
It may sound like an oxymoron to call the framework I am suggesting “the 
anthropology of international relations”. Anthropology looks at the human 
phenomena based on human behaviour and human emotions and their interactions 
and thus the human itself (anthropos). On the other hand, international relations 
looks at social phenomena from a top-down grand narrative perspective that takes 
big actors into account and focuses on international politics or global affairs. There is 
a clear differentiation of levels and units of analysis between anthropology and 
international relations. Therefore, one can think that an anthropology of international 
relations    essentially holds serious epistemological contradictions. However, it does 
not, especially in my experience of the study of the Kurdish diaspora, because the 
individual stances and encounters of diaspora activists and members are very much 
interconnected with the international system’s forces and the dynamics imposed 
upon them. How the British government manages the British Kurds’ politicisation, 
when they question the legal system in Turkey, or when they show their support or 
sympathy toward the PKK operating in Turkey, a political actor which is outlawed in 
the UK, and how UK-Turkey relations are affected negatively, if the diaspora 
increases its support to a visible level and if it risks Turkey’s or the UK’s stability, are 
all interrelated. An anthropology of international relations is vital when looking at the 
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ethno-national problem of a non-state actor who has now been increasingly 
transnationalised after three decades of clashes and new transborder developments. 
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CHAPTER VI: DIASPORA COMMUNITY AND ENGAGEMENT IN LOCAL POLITICS 
 
A) Diaspora’s Diaspora, from Kurdistan to Turkish Cities and then to the UK 
Recent  migration research has used the concept of ‘circular migration’ to refer 
to the movement of people who keep migrating back and forth to the homeland, 
unless they feel satisfied in that particular hostland, especially relating to labour and 
socio- economic wellbeing conditions.172 Diasporan individuals who are unsatisfied 
with circumstances in their subsequent destinations feel the need to migrate from 
one hostland to another to be provided with better conditions. Therefore these 
migrants constitute what I call a diaspora’s diaspora. A diaspora's diaspora is a state 
of successive migration which is frequent among the Kurdish migrants I have 
interviewed.  
Several of the diasporan Kurds I met in London had already been in the 
diaspora even before coming to the UK. Azad, who is originally from Mus, in 
Turkish Kurdistan, moved to Kutahya, a western Turkish city, to attend boarding 
school. While I was interviewing him, he kept using ‘we’ to refer to the Kurdish 
students at the high school dormitory and mentioned that this marked "their" 
early phase of politicisation as Kurdish youth. This kind of ethno-politicisation is 
quite similar to that of the Kurdish high school and university students moving 
to Istanbul and Ankara in 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, forming the early Kurdish 
movement through student activism, subsequently coming out as prominent 
politicians or opinion leaders. The diverse line of student activism and 
politicisation from the "1950s Kurdish revival" to the Kurdish socialist awakening 
of 1960s-70s within TIP (The Turkish Labour Party) up to the Apoist movement of 
                                                        
172 International Organization for Migration Report Series 4 (Geneva: IOM, 2008) 
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late 1970s that would later establish the PKK, has numerous examples supporting 
the impact of migration, on politicisation in the sense of ethno-regional 
consciousness, despite the fact that their migration movement was usually one 
that remained within Turkey and Kurdistan's neighbouring regions173 
The internal diasporisation of the Kurds from Kurdistan to Western Turkey 
enabled them to enter into a preparatory step before they got into the usual 
diaspora experience in a completely foreign country, in our case, the UK. Education, 
schooling and labour processes function in this way for Kurdish migrants, so they 
do not feel a huge culture shock when they leave their small village or town for, say, 
Istanbul before they migrate to London. On the other hand, this early 
diasporisation experience within the diaspora's diaspora pattern, gives Kurdish 
migrants first-hand knowledge and control of the process of being excluded from 
the majority community and culture. Therefore, I would argue this sort of a double 
diaspora 174 experience is a catalyst for faster and deeper politicisation of 
Kurdish migrants. Several informants from the Kurdish diaspora community in 
London stated that they had this sort of a double diaspora experience, especially 
moving from bottom to top economically, like moving from Malatya to Gaziantep 
and then to London, or from Maras to Istanbul and then to London.175 
 
                                                        
173 Alis (2009): 68-71. 
174 Double diaspora as a term is used to imply an ethnic, racial or religious group "that has gone 
through two successive diasporas". As Wacks states, it has usually been used to refer to "Indians from 
Tanzania (who then scatter throughout the Anglophone nations of the developed world), to Haitians 
(diasporic Africans who form a new diaspora as Haitians in France, Canada, and the US), to Israelis 
(who returned from diaspora to Zion, then scattered again)." See, David Wacks, "What is Double 
Diaspora?"(2011), accesed on January, 25, 2015 via 
http://davidwacks.uoregon.edu/2011/03/21/double  However, I am using double diaspora as a 
simple term to refer to having to leave first the homeland and then the hostland for a second hostland. 
Therefore, I use the term double diaspora interchangeably with what I call diaspora's diaspora. (S.K.) 
175 Taylan (pseudonym), interview by the author, tape recording, London, UK, 22 May 2013 
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B) A Symbolic Assessment of Diaspora Texts: Intertwined and Divergent 
This section is designed to carry out thematic analysis as a convenient way of 
evaluating data based on the epistemological premises of phenomenology, as 
opposed to a positivist understanding of acquiring knowledge. In other words, I am 
adopting a  qualitative research methodology which concentrates on the human 
experiences and dynamic nature of human circumstances in the course of Kurdish 
lives, without reducing them to abstract forms or numbers. Elliot et. al. explain that 
the aim of qualitative research i s  “to understand and represent the experiences 
and actions of people as they encounter, engage and live through situations.”176  
As  for  analysing  texts,  I  would  agree  with  the  view  that  not  only human  
beings but also the texts they produce and the contexts that constitute them are 
a live and dynamic, sometimes talking for themselves, exceeding the influences of 
their authors or initiators. Therefore the study of texts, I would suggest, should 
be taken as seriously as the study of their creators, since the texts are being 
produced and re-produced by their readers over and over through various 
processes and mechanisms. At that point, studies that  relate -one way or  
another- to  discourse  analysis177 178 179 are beneficial  in  having a  critical  
evaluation attempting to reveal the power structures and relations inherent in 
daily routine and social practices that we encounter.  Bearing in mind that 
discourse analysis could potentially provide a more sophisticated and deeper 
insight, I am combining it with certain thematic headings here to be able to take 
                                                        
176 Robert Elliott, Constance T. Fischer, and David L. Rennie, "Evolving guidelines for publication of 
qualitative research studies in psychology and related fields" British Journal of Clinical Psychology 38 
(1999): 215. 
177 Norman Fairclough, Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research (London: Routledge, 
2003). 
178 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (London: Routledge, 2002). 
179 Kenneth J. Gergen, An invitation to Social Construction. (London: Sage, 2002). 
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more practical and “flexible” steps.180 Accordingly, I am benefitting from alternative 
sources including logos and posters displayed on the web pages of the diaspora 
associations. After all, ‘texts’ are not necessarily pieces of writing, but rather 
various combinations of daily circumstances, images and effects that we create or 
that shape our milieu.181 In this context, images, colours, sounds, symbols and 
various other forms of personal and collective expression might be of help to 
understand politics hidden in everyday life, details to which we may not be paying 
much attention. The questions of what is "politics" and what is "political" also shape 
our way of looking at such data, including symbols. As Verdery defines politics as "a 
form of concerted activity among social actors"182 by rightly asserting that "politics 
is not restricted to the actions of political leaders," it is interesting to evaluate 
alternative data to reproduce our "universes of meanings" by mindfully engaging 
with symbols and messages we receive from ordinary material.  
 
C) Conflicting Symbols of Homeland(s): Turkey vs. Kurdistan 
In the case of diasporas, symbols and their interpretation can be implicitly or 
explicitly political. For instance, traditional music of the homeland may evoke 
cultural imaginations of homeland, or maps redrawing the boundaries of the ethno-
national diaspora, may help diaspora members reproduce their political 
imaginations of homeland. In all cases, these symbols will have dynamic meanings 
depending on the perceptions and worlds of meanings of each diaspora member. I 
have evaluated several texts produced by Kurdish diaspora organisations. Here, I 
                                                        
180 Virginia Braun, and Victoria Clarke, "Using thematic analysis in psychology" Qualitative Research in 
Psychology 3, n. 2 (2006): 77-101. 
181 Hulya Bartu, A Critical Reading Course, (Istanbul: Bogazici University Press, 2002). 
182 Katherine Verdery, The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Postsocialist Change, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1999).  
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will present some examples from selected material produced by the KCC and the 
DayMer Turkish and Kurdish Community Centre. This evaluation is based on the 
web pages of the diaspora associations and chooses to look at the “About Us” 
sections in them which describe the aims and roles of these institutions. Therefore, 
the themes prevalent in these online documents are analysed with a comparative 
perspective, since they represent different political stances and organisational 
strategies, as well as having certain features and goals in common. 
 Based on the information given on their websites, as part of the facilities that 
these two diaspora associations provide, we could count their role in advice and 
information for their communities including refugees and asylum seekers, covering 
education, employment, benefits, housing, health, immigration, ESOL classes, 
interpreting service, educational support, cultural and sports activities, relief from 
poverty and prevention of youth from crime, among many others.   
At the very top, each web page welcomes us with two different maps 
representing seemingly conflicting insights of the associations: 
 
 
                 
                Figure 2: DayMer's Logo                  Figure 3: Kurdish Community Centre Logo 
 
As seen in Figure 2, DayMer’s logo consists of two shaking hands that constitute the 
territory of T u r k e y  i n  the background. In c o n t r a s t  t o  D a y M e r ’ s  l o g o ’ s  
m e s s a g e  o f  coexistence within the territorial integrity of Turkey with the 
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agreement of "two sides" symbolised by shaking hands, the KCC logo reflects a more 
trans-Turkey union, or at the very least cooperation among the Kurds, from within 
the boundaries of four sovereign states, Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. And whereas 
the logo of DayMer uses a plain white background on the map of Turkey, KCC’s logo 
consists of the ‘tricolor’ of the “Kurdish nation” kesk u sor u zer (green, red, yellow) 
and the very symbol of roj (sun) regarded as inevitable elements of a future 
Kurdish flag by the Kurdish nationalists. In that respect, one can draw the 
conclusion that DayMer is rather interested in the problems and issues of Kurds 
and Turks from Turkey, whereas the KCC has its focus exclusively on the Kurds 
from entire Kurdistan, a virtual homeland of the Kurds who identify themselves with 
their ethno-national belonging, rather than a civic identity that relates them with 
the greater societies they used to live in, including Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. 
Therefore, such seemingly decorative details as symbols, signs and colours used in 
the texts and platforms of diasporan associations may imply certain meanings that 
they attribute to their identity and “homeland”, as well as the scope and scale of 
populations that they work with and for. 
Furthermore, the names of the two associations back up the symbols used in 
their logos and the possible meanings attached to them. DayMer stands for Turkish 
and Kurdish Community Centre according to its home page. However, other pages 
mentioning its activities reveal the fact that its name is also used as 
Turkish/Kurdish Community Solidarity183 Centre. On the one hand, they claim to 
provide solidarity within Turkish and Kurdish communities. On the other hand, 
they aim to reinforce solidarity between Turkish and Kurdish communities living 
in London. As for the KCC, which stands for Kurdish Community Centre, the 
                                                        
183 Emphasis mine (S.K.) 
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emphasis is exclusively on Kurds regardless of their being from any of the four 
sending countries shared by the ‘Kurdistan’ geography. 
 
D) “Shaking Hands” in Different Colours 
Although  the  two  associations  contrast  in  their  outlook  regarding  their  
perceptions  of ‘homeland’ and interest areas, they have commonalities in their 
goals. Arts and culture is one of these areas. On the advertisement of the 22nd 
Culture and Arts Festival organised by DayMer, its logo is displayed to express the 
distinctiveness of the cultures of Kurds from those of Turks, despite the fact that 
they both originate in Turkey. In this logo, those two shaking hands are painted in 
two different colours: 
   
Figure 4: DayMer’s 22nd Culture and Arts Festival Poster
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From a bicommunal184 perspective, Figure 3 may be implying the recognition of two 
distinct peoples in Turkey: Kurds originating  in  Eastern  Turkey  symbolised  by 
the  colour  yellow,  while  Turks  by  white, shaking hands in an agreement or 
reconciliation. One should note that the use of two separate colours does not 
necessarily mean a  segregated or ethnicised space divided into two sides. We can 
draw this conclusion from the fact that t h e  more Turkishpopulated western 
‘hand’ is surrounded by yellow lines, perhaps, symbolising the extension of Kurdish 
population to western Turkey, just as the more Kurdish eastern ‘hand’ is firmly 
grasped by ‘fingers’ in white, symbolising the Turkish population and, perhaps, their 
interest in the predominantly Kurdish east.  
This allegorical picture has some implications for the refusal of a hierarchical 
positioning between Kurds and Turks, as the ultimate solution to the ongoing 
ethnic problem is a peaceful polity. Keeping in mind the context of the poster, 
which is a “culture and arts festival,” the protection of culture and rights to develop 
one’s own language and culture appear as possible expectations. The diasporan 
individuals who live in the host (British) society still have their links with the 
sending (Turkish) society, not only in a real sense through such means as visits 
‘home’, and by their relatives to the ‘new home’, but also in an imaginary sense 
through various occasions like cyber networking and interaction with the wider 
Kurdish diaspora groups living in other parts of the diasporan space, i.e. Germany, 
France and so forth. 
The handshake can be interpreted in another way. The two colours - white 
and yellow – are not contrasting but very similar, complementary shades. This also 
                                                        
184 Merriam Webster Dictionary defines "bicommunal", as " involving or including two distinct 
communities of people : of, relating to, or being a society composed of two distinct or separate 
communities often with conflicting interests." Merriam Webster Dictionary, accessed on 23 May 23 
2016 via https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bicommunal     
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reflects and helps convey the message being portrayed. Particularly, taking into 
consideration that an internal armed struggle emerging from an ethno-national 
problem has been going on in Turkey for more than three decades, the 
interpretation of major symbols of a diaspora association representing a hybrid 
identity of Turks and Kurds can be understood in the context of peace-building 
regarding a political imagination of the homeland and solidarity among the two 
communities in the hostland.  
 
E)  Upbeat Grassroots Political Activism in London 
Balance of Tendencies: Trans-border, Intra-Kurdish and pro-Turkey-fication 
The strong link between diaspora and homeland political agendas can be observed in 
the case of the Kurdish diaspora in the UK very clearly as the century-old Kurdish 
Question is still there in the Middle East and Turkey. Turkey’s presidential election, 
the first of its kind to elect the president based on popular vote as against the earlier 
fully parliamentary system, provides  us  w i t h  a  good  example  for  this  strong  
interplay  between  diaspora  and homeland politics. The ruling AKP government’s 
amendment of the voting law m a k in g  i t  poss i b l e  t o  vo t e  from abroad made 
this transfer of homeland political issues to the diaspora via elections more dynamic 
and vibrant. In the 2014 presidential election campaign, the then Prime Minister 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited several European cities as part of his election 
campaign, as did Selahattin Demirtas, the co-chair of HDP (Peoples’ Democratic 
Party), the latest pro-Kurdish political party in Turkey. However, Demirtas visited 
the European cities neither for a local or parliamentary election, nor as the 
representative of the pro-Kurdish party. This time he c a m e  a s  a  candidate for 
the Presidency of t h e  Turkish Republic. This marked a very remarkable moment 
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in the history of the modern Turkish Republic.  
The contentious politics of identity pursued by the Kurds in Turkey lasted 
for nearly a century, during which they experienced different methods and means 
and political inclinations, including the guerrilla fight for secession to form a united 
and independent Kurdish state comprising four parts in Turkey, Iraq, Syria and 
Iran, to consider reconciliation with the Turkish state, to have a democratised 
Turkey that would provide Kurds with autonomy and several rights, while keeping 
the country united.  
The Kurdish  movement  tried  several  other  means  and  strategies  in  line  
with  the  national, regional and global conjunctures of the time. During the post-
Cold War period, especially well into the late 1990s and then gradually through 
2000s, the main strategy of the Kurdish movement in Turkey has evolved into what 
is called Turkey-fication (Türkiyelileşme,), which meant the renunciation of the 
earlier secessionist agenda replaced by a united, yet democratic, Republic of Turkey, 
which would also grant some sort of autonomy to the Kurds. This preference of the 
Kurdish movement reflects both pragmatic and principled dimensions. On the one 
hand, the positioning of the Kurdish movement vis-a-vis the main actors of the 
Turkey and the Middle East has reflected certain pragmatic aspects, most visibly in 
its relations with the ruling AKP government. On the other hand, the pro-Kurdish 
actors especially those in the legal sphere, such as the BDP and its successor HDP, 
and NGOs like DTK etc., have followed the very inclusive path of Turkey-fication in 
an attempt to reach out to almost all disadvantaged groups and segments in 
Turkey, from workers to Muslim  and  non-Muslim  minorities,  women  to  LGBTIs,  
ecologists  to  political  dissidents, rather than exclusively emphasising the 
problems of Kurds, although they constitute the vast majority of their electorate 
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base. In this vein, the Presidential candidacy of a pro-Kurdish MP coming from the 
Kurdish movement to serve the entire society of Turkey is the peak of the Turkey-
fication attempts of pro-Kurdish actors.  We should note that Demirtas and his 
party, HDP, during the presidential election campaign insisted on referring to him 
as “halklarin ve degisimin adayi”, the candidate of peoples and change; peoples in 
plural form, in order to imply that he will be the guarantee for a pluralist 
multi-ethnic society, rather than the current status quo of a strictly unitarian 
nation-state based on assimilation i n t o  T u r k i s h n e s s .  Therefore, r e g a r d l e s s  
o f  t h e  r e su l t s  o f  t h e s e  e l e c t i o n s , Demirtas symbolised the further stage of 
pro-Turkey-fication, yet democracy and autonomy-seeking characteristics of the 
mainstream Kurdish political movement in Turkey. 
 
  
Photo 2: Banner of the Presidential Candidate, Selahattin Demirtas at Lee Valley 
Athletic Centre, London185 
 
Rallies in several European cities have been strongly supported by Kurdish 
diaspora activists in these countries including Germany and Switzerland. In this 
regard, homeland politics was actively and dynamically imported into the 
                                                        
185 Blue banner (in Turkish) "Halklarin ve Degisimin Adayi" (Candidate of Peoples and Change); red, 
yellow and green banner (in Kurdish) "Silav Ji Şoreşa Rojava!"(Greetings for Rojava Revolution!). 
Photo taken by me (S.K.), Lee Valley Athletic Centre, Edmonton, London, 20 July 2014. 
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hostland by homeland political elites and the ordinary members of the Kurdish  
diaspora in London were mobilised during the elect ion campaign.  In 
the UK, the community page Sen de Gel, Ingiltere186 (Come join us, UK) was created 
on Facebook just before Demirtas came to London, and within a few days 
hundreds of people had subscribed to it and published humorous videos to 
publicise the rally in Edmonton Green’s huge outdoors leisure centre, Lee Valley. 
Several thousands of people from all walks of life, mainly Kurds but others too, 
like Turkish leftists, Alevis, democrats and Turkish Cypriots, even some English 
people living in different parts of the UK (most of them from London as well as 
from other cities like Birmingham, Manchester, Cardiff, and Stoke-on-Trent etc). 
So, the publicity of Demirtas's "I am Going... Are You Coming?" Rally has been 
achieved by means of social media, smart phones, peer groups and other diaspora 
familial and neighbourhood networks.  
             
Figure 5: Demirtas Presidential Election Rally Leaflet in 3 languages, Turkish, English 
and Kurdish. 
 
Many non-Kurdish people originating from Turkey yet living abroad, which we can 
                                                        
186 "Sen de Gel Ingiltere", accessed on 19 July 2014 via https://www.facebook.com/DemirtasLeaValley   
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call Turkiyeli Diasporasi “Turkey-origin diaspora”187 have also welcomed Demirtas's 
presidential bid especially based on the democratic and secular character of pro-
Kurdish political actors as a reaction to the ruling AKP’s and the then PM Erdogan’s 
increasingly authoritarian conservative government in Turkey that appeared to 
oppress almost all social and political opposition groups, as well as being more and 
more corrupt. 
 
  
Photo 3: Demirtas making his speech to several thousands, Presidential Election 
Rally, London188 
 
Despite the non-ethnic discourse of Demirtas and the HDP, especially 
concerning the elections for the Presidency for the entire Turkey, there were certain 
issues where the Kurdish dimension of the rally was obvious, including Rojava 
(Western Kurdistan/Northern Syria), the ongoing civil war in Syria and its impact 
                                                        
187 I use this term the context of migrants/diaspora communities originating from Turkey, regardless 
of their ethnic or sectarian background.   
 
188 Photo taken by Aledin Nisebin, Kurdish language teacher at the Kurdish Community Centre in 
London and shared by Mark Campbell, an Irish human rights activist supporting the Kurdish cause, on 
his facebook page, Lee Valley Athletic Centre, Edmonton, London, 20 July 2014. (There were many 
people waving the flags of the Kurdistan Regional Government and the Kurdish parties across the 
Middle East, especially those of the PKK and its sister organisations (PYD of Syrian Kurdistan/Rojava, 
and PJAK of Iranian Kurdistan) and posters of Abdullah Ocalan, all over the rally area.) 
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that on the Kurds and other groups living in Syria and its vicinity. 
Although the Kurds in the diaspora do not oppose to the Turkey-fication 
attempts of the Kurdish movement, which is obvious from the way they support 
Demirtas's candidacy for the Presidency of Turkey, people have still been very keen 
on their ethno-national agenda, Kurdistani politics. Typical slogans of the Kurdish 
movement were prevalent in the chants and appraisal of the PKK, Kurdistan and 
the PKK leader, mainly by emphasising the "leader of the nation", by shouting, as 
“Biji Serok Apo!” (Long live Leader Apo!) could be easily heard from the crowds 
whenever they got excited as they listened to Demirtas's speech. However, the 
crowds' chants with stress on the PKK and the Kurds did somehow fade away 
with auto-censorship of ( probably) the staff in the organising committee and 
those diasporan individual activists within the audience. I thought they were trying 
to be careful not to annoy/scare the groups of people who supports Demirtas's 
candidacy as president of Turkey, those non-pro-PKK or even non-Kurdish 
supporters of Demirtas may have been scared away, if they were exposed to a 
strictly pro-PKK image of Demirtas as a potential president of the entire Turkey, 
where the PKK is still seen as a “terrorist organisation” both legally and by the 
majority of Turks. 
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Photo 4: Turkish Kurds asking for donations for Rojava/Syrian Kurdistan. On the 
donation boxes is written: "All donations are for our people in Rojava", Presidential 
Rally, London.189  
 
 
Women’s Activism in the Kurdish Diasporic Space 
My first visit to a Kurdish diaspora association started with the help of a Kurdish 
university student in London, a young woman in the diaspora, Ruken190, who had 
been living in the UK for five years. She was born in Diyarbakir, the largest city in 
Turkish Kurdistan, but she was raised in Adana, a Turkish majority Mediterranean 
city where several thousands of Kurdish immigrants live. Therefore, she and her 
family had already experienced being in the diaspora, as they left their hometown in 
Kurdistan even before coming to the UK. She came to the UK as a political refugee 
after her elder sister “came down from the mountain”, where she had served as 
a Kurdish guerrilla fighter for the PKK and then settled in the UK as a refugee. As a 
social sciences student, she was trying to engage in political activities, especially in 
                                                        
189 Photo taken by me (S.K.), Lee Valley Athletic Centre, Edmonton, London, 20 July 2014. 
190 Ruken (pseudonym), interview by the author, tape recording, London, UK, 9 June 2012 
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those fields relating to human rights issues. I met her on a London-based 
Facebook group called “Kurdish Studies and Students Organisation 191   that 
connects Kurdish students from all over the world. She kindly agreed to put me 
in touch with some of the prominent figures among diaspora circles in London, 
as well as younger activists engaging in activities carried out individually and 
collectively via diaspora associations or alternative platforms. 
We agreed to meet at a protest event she planned to attend concerning the 
highly controversial anti-abortion statements made by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the 
then Prime Minister of Turkey. The demonstration was not organised exclusively by 
Kurdish associations, yet the largest share and influence was obviously that of 
Kurdish groups. In addition to Kurdish organisations the like Kurdish Community 
Centre, Halkevi, and Roj Women, there were Turkish socialist/left-wing and 
feminist groups attending, as listed on the flier and in the press release of the 
demonstration. Among those associations were: Avrupa Demokratik Kadin 
Hareketi (European Democratic Woman Movement), Sosyalist Kadinlar Birligi 
(Socialist Women’s Union), El-Com (Elbistan Community Centre), Day-Mer Turkish 
and Kurdish Community Centre, Yeni Kadin (New Woman), Gik-Der (Refugee 
Workers’ Cultural Association,  YCKM  (Yuz  Cicek  Acsin  Kultur  Merkezi,  a 
diaspora  association inspired by the MKP (the outlawed Maoist Communist Party 
of Turkey) and Nurhak Cultural Centre (an Alevi hometown association). 
The caption of the press release of the demonstration was “To the Policies 
of the Prime  Minister  and  the  Government  of  Turkey  that  Target  Gender  
Equality,  Women’s Bodies, Reproductive Rights, and Sexual Rights, Our 
                                                        
191 Kurdish Studies and Students Organisation (KSSO) Facebook Group, accessed on 17 September 
2014 via https://www.facebook.com/groups/janroj/ 
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Response is a Resounding NO!” The press release gave a long list of participating 
institutions which are raising their voices strongly against a possible legal 
regulation to ban abortion, which is seen as a “violation of women’s human rights 
to health and life and to make their decisions about their own sexual and 
reproductive health and rights”. These women were condemning what they 
regarded as a male-dominated and male-led policy, as “another manifestation of 
conservative policies that does not view women as equal individuals.”192 
This demonstration reveals a key feature of diaspora politics: 
“transnationality”. Although these activists do not live in Turkey anymore, they 
pursue a political activism that directly relates to the human rights issue in their 
sending country. The whole protest is about a human rights issue in Turkey and 
not the UK. On the other hand, the universalistic language these mostly socialist 
feminist women use make it easier for them to link their homeland-based 
activism to the hostland, the UK, and even beyond to any other country in the world  
where  women’s  rights  are  violated,  regardless  of  their  race,  religion,  or  class.  
In addition, these activists successfully link this gender-based issue to other major 
political debates going on in Turkey and the Middle East, especially to those 
issues relating to the Kurdish question, children’s rights and rights to education.  
The stress on the overlapping plights  of  women  and  the  Kurds is obvious  in  the  
content and  language  of  the protest’s press release and its motto. Here is an 
extract from it: 
… Isn’t the Prime Minister (Erdogan), the person who said to the poor 
villager who was there with his mother and made a complaint about 
their situation: “Go away from here taking your mom with you!”Isn’t the 
Prime Minister, the person who openly threatened the Kurdish women and 
                                                        
192  "Londra'dan Kurtaj Yasagina Tepki," accessed on 8 July 2014 via 
http://acikgazete.net/ingiltere/2012/06/10/londra-dan-kurtaj-yasagina-tepki.htm?print  
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children by saying “We will confront them in the necessary  way  regardless  
of  the  fact  that  they  are  women  or  children?”…  Isn’t Erdogan  the  
person  who  said  at  his  party’s  recent  Women’s  Congress:  “Every 
Abortion is an Uludere” (a Kurdish town where the Turkish F-16 jets killed 
34 Kurdish civilians in an airstrike that had supposedly aimed at 
“terrorists” on 28 December 2011 193 ) (S.K) 194  and caused huge 
controversy! … Obviously, this is not just Erdogan’s personal opinion. This 
is also the misogynous opinion of the bigoted state mechanism and their 
centuries-old colonial societies and of their male-dominated mentality… 
Abortion is not murder! Right to abortion is a woman’s right to decide 
whether to give birth and her right to decide on her life. We say NO to the 
system that tries to take  woman  under  their  control  once  again  by  
confronting  them  with  bigoted understandings and superstitions and that 
tries to subjugate woman by implementing policies on her body. Our body is 
our right! Keep your hands and words off our bodies! Abortion is a right, 
Roboski is a massacre! 
 
As touched upon shortly in the previous chapter, Roboski is the name of the Kurdish 
village in Uludere district of Sirnak, the Kurdish city in southeast Turkey. The terms 
"Roboski Massacre" and "Uludere Air Strike" are interchangeably used to denote the 
notorious killing of Kurdish civilians by the jets of Turkish Armed Forces, on 28 
December 2011. While the former underlines the Kurdish character of the area and 
hence the Kurdish identity of the people killed by the state, the latter uses the 
Turkish name for the Kurdish district instead of “Qileban”, the Kurdish word used 
by the local people. Here, the differentiation of terminology and language preferred 
by Kurdish women activists is important. While Erdogan as an authoritarian 
conservative politician tries to control and suppress opposition groups with 
arguably most effective of politicisation and activism, women and the Kurds, 
Kurdish diaspora activists, perhaps, employ the strategy of "killing two birds with 
one stone." On the one hand, they oppose what they consider male-dominated 
politics and social patriarchy, by condemning Erdogan's willingness to ban abortion 
                                                        
193 The Economist, “The Kurds and Turkey: Massacre at Uludere”, 9 June 2012, accessed on 21 January 
2015 via http://www.economist.com/node/21556616 
194 Emphasis mine, (S.K.) 
 
123 
, on the other, they criticise his policy against the Kurds, which seems to be more of 
a pragmatic than a democratic one, bringing about emancipation and sustainable 
peace. In this context, key events like massacres, government-led operations and 
other state policies that are based on violence and harsh measures create another 
space for diaspora activists to be more visible and raise their voices via protests 
and public events. I would argue that the ability to define an incident by giving it a 
particular name is part of politics and political activity. In this respect, diaspora 
Kurdish women challenge the policies of Erdogan, by addressing above-mentioned 
village in its original version in Kurdish, as opposed to the official name in Turkish 
that Erdogan insists using. Moreover, he does not call the Kurdish civilian losses 
caused by the military jets a massacre, and diaspora activists challenge this by 
naming it a massacre and condemning Erdogan's speech that equates abortion with 
a massacre.    
 
Women's Festival Named After Female Kurdish Guerrilla “Zilan” 
 
   
Photo 5: Gultan Kisanak, the Co-chair of pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party 
(BDP) from Turkey as the keynote speaker of the 9th Zilan Kurdish Women’s 
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Festival j o i n t l y  organised by t h e  Roj Women's Association, the Kurdish 
Community Centre and Halkevi195 
 
The  second  biggest  festival  after  Newroz,  the  Kurdish  Spring  Festival,  that  
the  Kurdish diaspora organises and celebrates in the UK is a  women’s 
festival called “Festivala Zilan” (the Zilan Kurdish Women’s Festival), named 
after a heroic martyred Kurdish female guerrilla fighter of the PKK. During my 
field research I had the chance to attend these annual festivals organised by 
branches of the Kurdish Community Centre and Halkevi, the Kurdish and 
Turkish Community Centre, as well as t h e  Roj Women Association, another 
pro-PKK diaspora association.  
The women’s festivals were all arranged and presented and mostly 
attended by women, mostly Kurdish as well as Turkish, English, British African, 
and East European, among others. The presentations were tri-lingual: Turkish, 
Kurdish and English. The music and other cultural activities of the event were 
mainly related to Kurds and Kurdistan, i.e: folk dance performance with Kurdish 
traditional dress, Kurdish music concerts, drama performances demonstrating 
the plights of Kurdish women not only against the state but also patriarchal 
male hegemony within their own community and beyond it. Apart from the 
cultural and social dimensions of the women’s festival, the political aspects have 
always been very strong; each year one or two prominent Members of 
Parliament (usually a female politician) from the pro-Kurdish party in Turkey 
come to London as the special guest and keynote speaker of the Kurdish 
Women’s Festival at the Kurdish Community Centre. The public speech of the 
pro-Kurdish MP from Turkey is followed by a large public Question-and-Answer 
                                                        
195 Photo taken by me (S.K.), Kurdish Community Centre community hall, Haringey, London, 28 June 
2012. 
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session, where there is a harsh debate on the Kurdish Question.  In  accordance  
with  the  zeitgeist  of  the  last  few  years,  the  Kurdish Women’s Festivals 
taking place in London have witnessed vibrant debates around the Kurdish 
peace process between the state and the PKK in Turkey, as well as  issues  
relating to  the freedom of  Syrian  Kurdistan  and  their  autonomy,  and  the 
situation  and  role  of  women  with  the  greater framework of  gender  
perspective in  the resolution of those issues. There is one inevitable focus in 
the community centre during women's festivals, as well as other events: The 
status of Kurdistan (Turkish Kurdistan) and freedom for Ocalan and the wider 
PKK cadres. 
At the festival hall, slogans (in Kurdish) around the stage and the conference 
hall were quite diverse: “Ji Ocalan re Azadi, Ji Qirkirina Gele Kurd re Na!” (Freedom 
for Ocalan, No to Massacre of the Kurdish People!”) and “Ji Qirkirina Jine re Na!”(No 
to Women's Massacre), Bedena min e, biryara min e! (It is my body and it is my 
decision!”) referring to the Turkish government’s efforts to criminalise abortion, 
“Em jin in, ne namuse tu kesi ne!” (We are women, we are nobody’s honour!), “Em 
ne namusa tu kesine, Namusa me azadiya meye!” (“We are nobody’s honour, our 
honour is our freedom!).” The slogans and the main themes prevalent during the 
Kurdish women’s festival in London reflect the strong sense of feminism the 
Kurdish movement carries as one of its distinguishing features vis-à-vis Turkish 
politics, or even Middle East politics in general. The struggle for emancipation and 
freedom by Kurdish women has been so powerful, however, in response to 
patriarchal structures they suffer in Kurdistan. Hence, the main body of the pro-
Kurdish actors in Turkey has always been bound by Kurdish female voices. The 
PKK as a vanguard party for of the Kurdish national movement has been very 
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encouraging and on certain occasions has compelled Kurdish men to accept their 
female counterparts as equals, so that they can create a healthier Kurdish nation 
with the support of independent, strong women. 
 The most tangible example is the co-chairship mechanism that has been 
suggested by the PKK leader Ocalan and then enforced literally in all party 
posts, from local governments to metropolitan municipalities, from the party’s 
neighbourhood organisations to province administrations. Each post has a 
female and a male co-chair, which is still unique in Turkish politics and even in 
most western European cases, let alone the Middle East. Another solid example of 
women’s participation in power-sharing and politics from the mains Kurdish 
movement in Turkey is the gender quota and its relatively successful 
implementation. In the Turkish Grand National Assembly’s (TBMM) 23
rd 
legislative 
term, the proportion of women MPs to the whole number of MPs was only 9 per 
cent. However, the pro-Kurdish party DTP’s women MPs constituted 38 per cent 
of the number of DTP MPs, whereas the other 3 political parties AKP, CHP196 and 
MHP197 had much lower ratios respectively: 9 per cent, 8 per cent and 2 per 
cent. 198  In the legal political arena, the Kurdish movement in Turkey has 
demonstrated a syncretic green, socialist, feminist ethno-national ideology which 
emerges from its outlawed armed forces, the PKK’s ideological transformation 
under Ocalan’s doctrines in the cause about four decades. The PKK presents an 
interesting militia force comprising men and women together as “warriors of 
                                                        
196 Centre-left, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party) 
197 Ultra-nationalist, Milliyetci Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Movement Party) 
198 Seref Kavak, “Kürt Siyasetinin 2000'li Yılları: "Türkiyelileşme" ve Demokratik Toplum Partisi” 
(Kurdish Ethno-politics in the 2000s: Turkey-fication and the Democratic Society Party) in Büşra 
Ersanlı, Günay Göksu Özdoğan and Nesrin Uçarlar (eds.) Türkiye Siyasetinde Kürtler (Kurds in Turkey's 
Politics) (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2012a): 166. 
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freedom” and of “revolution”. The very nature of the militia as a male-dominated, 
“masculine” and right-wing domain has been challenged by the Kurdish movement, 
as they justify female  participation  in  the  PKK  as  part  of  building  a  new  life  
based  on  eco-feminist communal principles where, they argue, equality of men 
and women would exist in harmony with nature and other nations.199 
Certain aspects of male dominance in social and political life usually function 
as an obstacle to women’s participation in politics, which has been the case for 
Kurdish women in Turkey, as well a s  in the grassroots of pro-PKK actors that 
are known to give relatively greater space to feminist movement within its 
circles.  I did come across this during a previous field research in Istanbul among 
Kurdish women active in the Democratic Society Party (DTP) circles, the pro- 
Kurdish party of the time, taking place in 2009-2010: 
As I asked (Berivan) how it would be possible that many traditional women 
could join demonstrations and conferences held by the party, she gave a 
comparative response with regard to the entire picture of women in Turkey: 
“Those who are beaten most terribly by the system are women. Indeed, the 
pressure on women is much greater in [sic., among] Turks; it is smaller in the 
DTP.” Berivan’s concerns about the strict patriarchal structure of the society 
were also relevant for [sic.] Fatih’s statement: “It is women who hold our 
party upright. We bring our sisters, mothers and our wives into politics so 
that they will learn about society and equality.” Men, namely husbands, 
fathers or brothers, are the main obstacle before or catalyst for woman’s 
integration into political life, as it is clear from the expression ‘we bring’ 
[that] my male informant uses. According to Caglayan, this adoption [sic., 
incorporation] of Kurdish women [ in] to the public realm is only possible  
by  purifying women  from  their  sexuality,  which  is  seen [as] dangerous 
and/or dirty, and sending them into the dava [the Kurdish cause] after this 
purification.200 
 
However problematic the situation of women in the Kurdish national movement is, 
                                                        
199 Handan Caglayan’s work on the women issue in the Kurdish movement presents a critical approach 
to the “women emancipation” within the greater Kurdish movement. Handan Caglayan, Analar, 
Yoldaslar, Tanricalar: Kurt Kadin Hareketinde Kadinlar ve Kadin Kimliginin Olusumu (Istanbul: Iletisim 
Publications, 2007): 195. 
200 Kavak, (2012a): 99. 
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as Caglayan states elsewhere201, it should not be ignored that the political 
participation of Kurdish women, despite being instrumentalised “for the sake of the 
Kurdish cause” in some respects, has helped these women to give shape to the 
direction and political agenda of the pro-Kurdish party towards a broader space 
that deals with other aspects of life that also interest women. When it comes to the 
gendered experiences of Kurdish people in the diaspora, the core of the problem still 
remains the same, yet with certain improvements that make a difference, especially 
for women’s participation and agency. The possible effects of Aleviness, a heterodox 
Muslim sect followed by the majority of the Kurds living in London,202 should be 
taken into account in that respect. The possible impact of Alevi culture and faith on 
British Kurds is not restricted to women’s problems; it has broad repercussions on 
other fields of social and political life, including its scope and ways of protest. 
Aleviness and Kurdishness in the Diaspora: Between Contestation and 
Reinforcement 
Religion or faith-based identity is usually seen as a rival identity that may challenge 
or complement ethnic identity of individuals.  For instance, many conservative 
Sunni Muslim Kurds identify themselves with Islam and/or the ummah, the 
universal Islamic brotherhood/sisterhood. This is the case for many Alevi Kurds 
who prefer to identify themselves with Alevi faith and culture initially, and Kurdish 
ethnic identity afterwards.203 Therefore, one may think that religious identity plays 
a highly obstructive role promoting loyalty to the Kurdish cause among Kurds in the 
diaspora. Although that may be partly true for certain segments of British Kurds, still 
                                                        
201 Caglayan (2007): 227. 
202 Ipek Demir, “Battling with Memleket in London: The Kurdish Diaspora's Engagement with Turkey”, 
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 38, no. 5 (2012): 824. 
203 Ibid., 824. 
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large parts of politically active Kurds in the UK see both identities as important to 
them. Considering the fact that the large numbers of the politically active Kurds in 
London are of t h e  Alevi faith group, the combination of these two disadvantaged 
identity groups, the Kurdish and the Alevis, create a deeper sense of injustice for the 
people belonging to them. Religious identity,  in  this  case  the  Alevi  identity  (a 
heterodox  minority  faith  group  compared  to Orthodox Sunni groups among the 
Kurds as well as Turks), functions as a catalyst to protest culture and the activism 
of the Alevi Kurds who constitute a very large part of the Kurdish activists in 
London. According to the Britain Alevi Federation, which is an umbrella 
organisation for Kurdish and Turkish Alevi organisations in the UK and has 
branches in several UK cities including London, Glasgow, Coventry, Croydon, 
Harrow, Bournemouth, Nottingham, Doncaster, Hull, Sheffield and Edinburgh, there 
are approximately 300,000 Alevis living in the UK.204 This estimation about the 
overall number of Alevis in the UK may sound a bit too high. Yet it should be noted 
that it includes Alevis of both Kurdish and Turkish background. It is very significant 
that a huge portion of this population is estimated to be Kurdish, if not the vast 
majority. Based on my observations and interviews with the Alevis, Kurds and Alevi 
Kurds in London, this faith-related factor seems to be of great importance to 
understand the protest culture and activism strategies, as well gender-related 
aspects of diaspora activism in the UK. 
 
                                                        
204  Britain Alevi Federation Website, accessed on 26 January 2015 via 
http://www.alevinet.org/SAP.aspx?pid=About_en-GB  
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Photo 6: Gultan Kisanak, Co-chair of pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party 
(BDP) visits the London Alevi Cultural Centre and Cemevi (Alevi Temple) in 
Hackney205  
 
The  way  Kurdish  women  mobilise  and  the  occasions  on  which  Kurdish  
women organise, shape, decide and present a social, political or cultural activity 
is beyond equal compared to their male counterparts in the diasporic space in 
London. Women are visible more often on the front stage of Kurdish diaspora 
circles in London as well as off-stage. The reason for this strong female 
participation in the diaspora compared to the Kurdish movement in the 
homeland there may be several explicit and implicit reasons, like the abundance 
of formal facilities for women as well as men in civil society and in other societal 
domains, compared to the Middle East. One factor, though, seems to me to be 
often underestimated in the case of British Kurdish diaspora from Turkey: 
Aleviness (Elewi/Alawaite). Large parts of diasporan  Kurds,  as  well  as  Turks,  
in  London  are  of  Alevi  religious-cultural background which may possibly be 
                                                        
205 Photo taken by a London-based Kurdish activist whose Facebook profile name is "Kurdish Centre," 
Alevi Cultural Centre and Cemevi, Hackney, London, 29 June 2012. 
 
131 
considered to open up relatively more spaces to women’s participation in 
social life, due to a more egalitarian interpretation that this faith group has 
with regard to gender equality and t h e  co-existence of men and women in 
civic and religious spaces in everyday life. This is symbolically manifested in the 
Alevi religious rituals/dances practised jointly by women and men side by side 
and face-to-face with each other in the same hall, especially in Turkish and 
Kurdish Alevi traditions.  Most of my Alevi informants, men and women, 
emphasised this non-segregating practice and philosophy of Aleviness, in 
particular as an advantage the Alevi communities h a v e  compared to other 
communities in most parts of the Middle East. In the case of the British Kurdish 
diaspora, this factor seems to be valid and the motivation arising from 
membership in the Alevi community among Kurds and Turks seems to 
support this relatively fair and equal space-sharing and decision-making in their 
socio-political circles in London.206 
Dedeoglu describes the Turks, Kurds and Turkish Cypriots in the UK as the 
“injured communities of Turkey”, as “the migration of these groups was due to deep 
socio-economic upheavals,  conflicts  and  violence  imposed  upon  certain  groups  
who  received  injuries because  of  their  religious  and  ethnic  identities.”207  The 
migrants from Turkey (in the UK) that have suffered the gravest religious and 
ethnic injuries are from the Alevi and Kurdish communities, although there are 
other groups. The larger migrant populations in London coming from certain Alevi 
                                                        
206 For a detailed study of Alevi communities originating from Turkey, their identity construction, 
group formation and struggles for recognition in the diaspora in Europe, particularly in Germany, see; 
Martin Sokefeld, Struggling for Recognition: The Alevi Movement in Germany and in Transnational Space 
(Berghahn Books, 2008). Also see, Ruth Mandel, Cosmopolitan Anxieties: Turkish Challenges to 
Citizenship and Belonging in Germany (Duke University Press, 2008).  
207 Saniye Dedeoglu, Migrants, Work and Social Intergration: Women's Labour in the Turkish Ethnic 
Economy, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). Chapter 4 of this book is particularly helpful to 
understand why these communities feel "injured" and how these injuries are reflected in the Turkish 
speaking communities' ethnic economy in London.    
 
132 
and Kurdish-dominated districts of certain cities with symbolic associations such as 
Maras, Malatya, Sivas, Bingol, Dersim and Kayseri, reflect  the  ethnic  and  sectarian  
characteristics  of  these  “Injured  communities”  of Turkey.  
However, a s  already m e n t i o n e d , t h e  p e r s e c u t i o n  a n d  other 
a s p e c t s  o f  the bitter p a s t  experienced by the Alevi minority in Turkey also 
function against their loyalty to Kurdish ethnicity at times. Some Alevi Kurds 
identify primarily as Alevi rather than Kurds.  I  attended  a  panel  discussion  
taking  place  at  t h e  Halkevi  Kurdish  and  Turkish Community Centre in 
Hackney concerning the Commemoration of Madimak Massacre (named after the 
hotel where the Alevi intellectuals were staying and were killed by an arson attack 
during an Alevi festival) committed by radical fundamentalists in Sivas, Turkey, 
on 2 July  1993. During the commemoration event, one of the young Kurdish 
male informants, whom I had already met at the 9th Annual Zilan Women Festival 
at the Kurdish Community Centre in Haringey, criticised the Alevis harshly, 
including Kurdish Alevis, his own community. He compl ain ed bi tt er l y that 
“many Alevi Kurds in the UK do not acknowledge their Kurdishness and they 
substitute it with their religious identity”. He was finding this “unfair”, as the 
“Kurds are being persecuted as well as the Alevis”, so “both of these communities 
should be taken into account”, as “the Kurdish and Alevi identities should not be 
mutually exclusive; on the contrary, they should reinforce each other’s activism and 
protest.”208 
                                                        
208 Hasan (pseudonym), interview by the author, tape recording, London, UK, 2 July 2012. 
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Photo 7: Madimak Alevi Massacre of 1993 Commemoration and Panel  
Discussion organised by the Halkevi Kurdish and Turkish Community Centre, 
Hackney209  
 
Several members of the Kurdish diaspora I interviewed in London found it 
more convenient not to consider ethnic and religious/sectarian identities as 
hierarchically ordered.  They preferred to see all sorts of injustices as unfair 
and all identities as precious and equal. My Kurdish informants (mostly of Alevi 
background), however, underlined the interconnectedness and harsher 
characteristics of multiple-layered discrimination experienced by certain 
groups: Alevi Kurds, Kurdish women, Alevi women, Kurdish workers, Alevi 
Kurdish workers and Alevi Kurdish women and the like. A Kurdish Community 
Centre activist I interviewed used the motto: “I am Alevi, I am Kurdish and I am a 
woman.”210 Another of my Alevi Kurdish interviewees touched on the issue of 
sexual orientation and strongly emphasised marginalised sexualities, 
mentioning homosexuals as another important  group  being  oppressed  by  the  
                                                        
209 Photo taken by a London-based Kurdish activist whose Facebook profile name is "Kurdish Centre," 
Halkevi Kurdish and Turkish Community Centre, Hackney, London, 2 July 2012. 
210 Fatma (pseudonym), interview by the author, tape recording, London, UK, 19 September 2012. 
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hegemonic  patriarchal  and  heteronormative system, adding the LBGTI to the 
chain of disadvantaged groups in addition to ethnicity, faith and class: 
B: …Do you know what sort of a thing homosexuality is? On top of it, if 
she/he is also a Kurd… She/he would be oppressed first because 
she/he is a homosexual; second because she/he is a Kurd; third 
because she/he is coming from second/third class. Erm… let’s not name 
it as “oppressed” but because she/he is second/third class citizen. 
 
S: In regard to sexual orientation? 
 
B: In regard to the problematic approach to her/him. These people are 
marginalised in so many ways. Maybe this should be one of your further 
research topics, in my opinion. Really tough… On top of it, if it is a 
woman, then she will be oppressed for a fourth time. What if we are 
talking about a homosexual woman. Even harder…211 
 
Photo 8: Roj Women Association activists joined by Nursel Aydogan, pro-
Kurdish BDP MP for Diyarbakir, Turkey, the guest speaker at the 10th   Kurdish 
Women’s Festival organised by the Kurdish Community  Centre,  marching  to  
raise  awareness  about  human  rights  issues  of  Kurdish women on the streets 
of North London 212
                                                        
211 Berfin (pseudonym), interview by the author, tape recording, London, UK, 3 June 2013 
212 Photo taken from Roj Women Website, accessed on 28 June 2013 via http://rojwomen.org/   
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Some of my informants that are active in women's branches of the Kurdish diaspora 
associations have expressed their concern about familial problems and how they 
affect not only women, but also children and men. It was quite interesting to 
observe that the concerns of Dilan, a young feminist Kurdish Alevi woman, about the 
maintenance of “family discipline” and the “stability” of community members 
through a healthy family life, were not very different from the concerns of Kurdish 
migrants coming from a conservative background. I started to find it more 
understandable, though, after I heard so often from many London Kurds and Turks 
that the rate of criminal offences and suicide is particularly high among Turkish and 
Kurdish youth in London. Most of my informants highlighted the fact that parents 
lack a healthy communication and interaction with their children, in addition to 
structural problems that second-generation migrants are facing in the UK that 
influence the sense of alienation of Turkish and Kurdish youth in London. 
Therefore, weak family bonds and inadequate knowledge and devotion of parents to 
their children, and hence a need for “family discipline,” is usually stressed by my 
informants in London: 
...For instance, there are so many projects to improve the society at 
Halkevi. Or to put it this way: there are so many projects and efforts 
to serve the society. For example: consultancy services. Most of our 
(Kurdish) institutions give consultancy services. These are very 
important. Because, they (migrants) come to this country and one of 
the biggest problems of our society which I also criticise a lot is that 
they don’t make any effort to learn English. They just arrive here 
and work. Of course this doesn’t only affect language. I believe, the 
family discipline is affected very badly too. They lose a lot of things 
because of such concerns as to work harder and harder to get 
economically much better off. For instance, family discipline within 
that family... For instance, our children... Think that if the father 
works 20 hours a day and that mother looks after the child alone... 
And a weak mother... When I say “weak”, I mean a mother who can’t 
give much to her child in terms of education. As the father is also 
inadequate in terms of education, both parents do not make an effort 
to  improve  themselves  in  terms  of  education  when  they  come  
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to  this country... Indeed, there are big opportunities. But we are such 
a society thinking like: “What else can I gain in terms of benefits from 
the government, in terms of economic gain? How can I be more 
powerful?” They lose with all those concerns.213 
 
However, the core difference, in Dilan's critique, between the weak woman who 
does not know about life in general and child rearing, in particular, and the 
insufficient father that has little or no knowledge about child-raising, is that this 
type of father leaves all the burden of family maintenance to the females in the 
family. Moreover, the Kurdish women activists stress that women are important, 
not solely due to their status as mothers, but also as strong, independent 
individuals in the community and the greater society where they are supposed to 
partake as equals, in this case as Londoners: 
S.K: So what is the role of the Kurdish Community Centre and 
Halkevi? 
 
A: The role of the Kurdish Community Centre and Halkevi: They are both the 
same. They work for the community and to support and, you know, to advise 
and to bring people together… Or maybe try to support the Kurdish people 
to integrate. There is lots of things. There are lots of reasons. One of the 
things -a lot of projects are taking place actually- to support the Kurdish 
people to integrate into London. Because it’s very hard  for  people  that  
have  come  from  a  village  and  they  can’t  speak  any  other language than 
Turkish or Kurdish. So, when they come here you need to get them some 
sort of support in a way to actually become part of the community in 
general, in London. And the Roj Women actually empower Kurdish women, 
to support them in many ways actually.  Not just like integration or ….  But 
things like domestic violence, things like supporting employment, career and 
trying to find things for them to -you know- make use of their time. Because 
a lot of women that come to London to carry on their lives, they 
immigrated, whatever, most of them come from an uneducated background. 
So that’s very important. Kurdish women in particular come from an 
uneducated background. So they have always been oppressed by their 
partners, let’s say. In many ways actually, so… So when they come here Roj 
Women tries to do something for them to support them in many ways.214 
 
                                                        
213 Dilan (pseudonym), interview by the author, tape recording, London, UK, 15 March 2013 
214 Asmin (pseudonym), interview by the author, tape recording, London, UK, 27 March 2013 
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Many answers w e r e  heavily loaded with critiques of gender problems and with 
strong emphasis on the importance of t h e  empowerment of women through 
civic engagement projects and free training facilities. This was a key message 
stressed by interviewees about the role of their diaspora association in general. It 
shows the rapid progress and a positive shift of the mindset by the Kurdish 
community in the diaspora. On the other hand, it demonstrates the vastness of 
problems that are gender-related within the greater Kurdish community, both in 
the homeland and the host country. All in all, the opportunities of the hostland, 
especially enabling civil society to be more powerful in such serious matters as 
gender equality and the like, seem to make Kurdish diaspora women more 
powerful, in having a stronger agency in decision-making and agenda-building 
processes in their community. 
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CHAPTER VII: VISIBILITIES AND ALLIANCES AS PRIORITIES ON THE AGENDA   
 
A) Challenging the Invisibility of Kurdishness Abroad      
Kurds in the diaspora are generally regarded as an "invisible" community.215 From 
this standpoint, in spite of having a significant presence in terms of the space they 
occupy, the distribution of their population, as well as the effectiveness of their 
activities, one complaint of  Kurds in London  was  the  issue  of  not  being  
referred  to  as  Kurds,  not  being "recognised" as Kurds. Here I analyse the 
"invisibility" of the Kurds as various discourses and practices that fail to recognise 
or misrecognise216 Kurdish individuals, either intentionally and d i r e c t l y ,  o r  
u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y  a n d  i m p l i c i t l y .  Charles T a y l o r  a r g u e s  t h a t  
p o l i t i c s  o f  recognition is a fundamental right to heal the "wounds" of social 
groups that experienced exclusion in various ways, such as non-recognition, or 
generally misrecognition, by being attributed negative qualities. Moreover, Taylor 
states that misrecognition has a deeper meaning than merely not giving the respect 
to one who deserves it. In other words, misrecognition can at the same time "inflict 
a grievous wound, saddling its victims with a crippling self-hatred. Due recognition 
                                                        
215 Pinar Enneli, Tariq Modood and Harriet Bradley, Young Turks and Kurds: A Set of ‘Invisible’ 
Disadvantaged Groups, (York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2005). 
Also see, Russell King et al., ‘Turks’ in London: Shades of Invisibility and the Shifting Relevance of Policy 
in the Migration Process (Brighton: University of Sussex, Sussex Centre for Migration Research 
Working Paper No. 51, 2008). 
Also, Jane Holgate, Anna Pollert, Janroj Keles, “To whom do I turn when I am invisible? The experiences 
of 
Kurdish workers who have problems at work” (Conference paper at the British Sociological 
Association Annual Conference, Cardiff, UK, 15-17 April 2009). 
Also, Demir (2012): 815. 
216 Charles Taylor et al., Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton, N.J: 
Princeton 
University Press, 1994): 26. 
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is not just a curtsy we owe people. It is a vital human need."217  
While the political system and the established societal acceptance of Turkey place at 
the central axis the notion of not recognising Kurds, different communities 
originating from Turkey who migrate to foreign countries – despite the erosion of 
the notion of assimilation vis-a-vis diaspora – in actual fact reproduce these 
reactions. In other words, sometimes non-recognition and a t  other times 
homogenisation policies of the T u r k i s h  state, exercised towards its own 
citizens, go beyond the national territorial boundaries and become transnational. 
Turkish and Kurdish immigrants carry their homeland identities, influenced by 
the political culture of modern Turkey, with them to their new countries of 
settlement. In other words, political and cultural discourses rooted in the homeland 
as well as counter arguments to these discourses are transmitted to the hostland and 
reproduced there with new experiences of diaspora communities. Politically active 
diasporan Kurds, just like the Kurdish movement in Turkey, function as significant 
elements that break the routine of Turkish politics. They deconstruct218
 official 
Turkish identity, so as to make Kurdishness visible and/or increase its c u rr e ntly 
limited visibility. Immigrants from Turkey and of Turkish origin, meanwhile, 
experience the process of recognition/non-recognition that they started to face in 
Turkey differently, as well as adjusting their positions towards this process. In the 
matter of visibility/non-visibility of the Kurds, there is another decisive element 
                                                        
217 Ibid., 26. 
218 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, translated by: Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore and 
London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998). Even though the concept of déconstruction, which was 
introduced by Jacques Derrida in the 1960s, is in actual fact, a linguistic philosophical approach that 
primarily finds its home in literary theory, I use it here in order to refer to a political activism. In 
addition to holding subject to criticism by decomposing with its practical equivalents the Turkish (in 
fact according to some, being from Turkey) identity presented to the Kurds as 'a definition of common 
citizenship cleansed from ethnic implications', we can read in the context of deconstruction their 
efforts to create alternatives by themselves, as well as with the people of neighbouring countries. 
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other than Turkish state politics. This element, despite being seen as the most 
external, in fact accounts for the most important factor, the fact that states that 
achieve official/political recognition and their policies are still the most effective 
institutions and actors in the world. For instance, in terms of its own interests, the 
asymmetry in the state of the UK's approach towards the Turkish nation-state and its 
approach towards the Kurds from Turkey, who are considered an "ethnic" 
community, a "minority" without status, is very striking. Aside from bilateral 
economic relations, it is possible to say that in the context of the strategic relations 
with international organisations such as NATO and the European Union, compared 
to the Kurds from Turkey, the perception of Turkey from the viewpoint of the UK is 
by far at the forefront.  Kurdish activists I interviewed in London are in agreement 
on this and on their complaints about it. The Iraq-Kurdistan Regional Government's 
acquiring certain economic  and  political  power,  by  virtue  of  its  official  
recognition  by  the 2005  Iraq Constitution, paved the way for the de facto 
recognition of Iraqi Kurdistan. However, in contrast with the Kurds from Iraq 
whose interests are beneficiary to the British government in terms of economic 
energy and infrastructural sectors, it is not possible for the Kurds from Turkey, who 
do not have a recognised status, separate from Turkey, to be as effective in the UK 
as is the Turkish government. Therefore, reading the diaspora of the Kurds from 
Turkey vis-a-vis the Turkish state entails exploring the struggle for power, as actors 
compete in an asymmetrical relation, a situation enforced by the nation-state system. 
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When we consider the practices of silencing and non-recognition in the 
academic field, which can also be seen as a natural consequence of the 
international system, we can understand why the Kurdish diaspora's struggle 
with this problem occurs. In  Europe,  and  especially  the  UK,  it  is  a  fact  that  
the  main  axis surrounding the debates of the academic and political circles on 
immigrant communities and minorities is maintained particularly around the (lack 
of) success of multiculturalism based on religious diversity.219 In a context where 
even Turkish immigrants, who are seen as belonging to a higher category than 
Kurds, become invisible under the generalisation of Muslim immigrants, the 
invisibility of the Kurds from Turkey, who are reduced to a lower category among 
the "Turkish speaking communities", is intensely felt. For when a "Muslim 
immigrant" or "Muslim minority" is mentioned, what comes to mind, especially in 
the UK, is mainly South Asian Muslims. Politics and information technologies 
prioritise Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Indian Muslim communities. Therefore, in this 
picture, Kurds put up a fight for recognition not only against the official ideology 
brought to them from the "homeland" by their old –compatriots – the Turks– but 
also against the UK political and social apparatus dealing with immigrant 
communities.220  
It is necessary here to present some aspects of how this struggle takes form 
at its base, taking the example of London, in order to understand the shape and 
direction of the efforts of the Kurdish diaspora on how to respond to the 'Kurdish 
question'. For example, "Turkish" children who take the British General Certificate 
of Secondary Education (GCSE) exams also have the right to take a paper in 
Turkish. In comparison, it is important to see the Kurdish activists' efforts towards 
                                                        
219 Demir (2012). 
220 GCSE in Kurdish Campaign Website, accessed on 3 November 2013 via http://kurdishgcse.org/  
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recognition concerning the Kurdish language as separate from "Turkish- speaking 
communities", by running campaigns in support of GCSE in Kurdish in which 
emphasises their right to their native language.221 It is evident that the Kurds in 
London, for various reasons, speak more Turkish than Kurdish in their daily lives. 
This is why I believe that it would not be incorrect to say that the main priority in 
the efforts of Kurdish Londoners is to get the group recognised through their 
native language, thus enhancing the security of their identity, rather than simply 
improving their linguistic or exam success. Another example of the efforts of the 
Kurdish diaspora in the UK for visibility and recognition are the campaigns that 
recommended to register in the 2011 census, in addition to "any other white" or 
"British" (if those were the marked categories), "Kurdish" in the blank space 
following the list of ethnic categories. We can say that this campaign too 
challenged the existential anxieties of identity and invisibility.222 
As mentioned earlier, the plight of the Kurds with regard to their invisibility 
as an ethnic/national group is reproduced in the diasporic spaces. Neither the 
wider society and the state of their sending country, nor the receiving country, 
recognise their distinct identity, mostly due to the lack of a status for the entire 
Kurdish people, and this situation continues to be a big problem that affects the 
Kurds who come from all four parts of Kurdistan.223 Consequently, diasporan 
Kurds are recognised in official and even academic papers under the categories of 
"Turkish", "Iraqi", "Iranian" or "Syrian". The invisibility handicap experienced by 
                                                        
221 GCSE Campaign: "Empowering the Future Generation of Kurds" Website, accessed on 3 November 
2013 via http://www.ksso.org.uk/2012/02/05/kurdish-gcse-campaign-empowering-the-future-
generation-of-kurds/  
222  “Census 2011:Make Yourself Visible as Kurdish”, accessed on 3 November 2013 via 
http://www.ksso.org.uk/2011/02/22/census-2011-make-yourself-visible-as-kurdish/  
223 It should be noted that even the Kurds from Iraq, who achieved a significant level of autonomy by 
virtue of being recognised as the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and accordingly hold psycho-
social advantages compared to the Kurds from other parts of Kurdistan, are still recognised officially in 
the UK as "Iraqi" or "Iraqi citizens". 
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the Kurds as a result of being a diaspora without a nation-state is observed in 
the detailed research report of the Greater London Authority about "Turkish 
speaking communities".224 In some academic circles, Kurds in Europe, in our case 
in Britain, are put into the same basket with ethnic Turks from Turkey and 
Turkish Cypriots, all of whom are referred to as “Turkish speaking communities,”225 
which is a reductionist categorisation, if not discriminatory. It is necessary to 
problematise this categorisation for the Kurds who speak Turkish, not because it is 
their native language, but because they are obliged to do so. We can consider this 
categorisation to be a case of misrecognition rather than non-recognition. Here I 
must add that I heard many complaints about this misrecognition problem from 
the Kurdish activists I interviewed in London. 
On several occasions over the course of my research, and in some other 
instances since I moved to the UK, I observed that Turkish migrants whom I knew 
or encountered, almost without exception, all define Kurdish migrants according to 
a relation based on their nationality, referring to the nation-state that they (the 
Kurds) left behind, despite the fact that the Kurds are an ethnic group that Turks 
are closest to and know best. In this context, ethnic Turkish  migrants  define  the  
Kurds  from  Turkey  as  “Turkish”  and  the  ones  from  Iraqi Kurdistan as “Iraqis” 
or “Northern Iraqis”, although they know they are neither Arab, nor Turkmen, but 
definitely Kurdish. For instance, a kebab shop named after the biggest Kurdish city 
in Turkey “Diyarbakir” that is owned by a Kurdish migrant is referred to as "Turk 
kebapcisi" (Turkish kebab shop) by almost all of the Turkish migrants I met in 
London. 
                                                        
224 Greater London Authority, Turkish, Kurdish and Turkish Cypriot Communities in London (London: 
Greater London Authority, 2009), p. 7. 
225 Originally referred to as the ‘Turkish Speaking Communities’, this phrase turns into 'Turks in the 
UK' in daily language and especially among the Turkish migrants. 
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These attempts at “homogenising" the Turkish nation even outside Turkey 
can be interpreted as a reproduction of the “Turkification” policies of the modern 
Turkish nation-state, internalised by its citizens of Turkish origin.226 Therefore, any 
positive value including of cuisine and business acumen is attributed to 
"Turkishness," which impels Kurds towards assimilation even in the diasporic 
space. This leads to certain reactive responses by the diasporan Kurds. As the 
political and physical environment they now live in is quite different from, and 
relatively more ‘tolerant’ than, that in their sending country regarding their ethnic 
identity, they do not even feel the need to emphasise and promote "Türkiyelilik" 
(being part of the society of Turkey), as opposed to "Türklük" (Turkishness) that 
connotes ethnicity. In other words, we can call this a reflection of the 
internalisation of the modern republic's Turkification policies by a significant part 
of the population at the level of its transnational diaspora. 
One highly critical aspect of this issue concerning (non)recognition and 
invisibility is hidden in these daily and, on the surface, ordinary examples that 
need to be inspected carefully. If positive values and meanings are to be attributed 
to Kurds in many different areas of their lives, in terms of their cuisine which is 
capable of becoming a brand, and various fields based on vocational skills in 
particular, this is done so as to emphasise Turkishness, making it independent 
                                                        
226 I first came across such terms as homogenising the nation and Turkification in the various works of 
Ayhan Aktar, a Turkish sociologist working on the nation-building processes especially in late Ottoman 
and early Republican Turkey with special emphasis on non-Muslim minorities. Ayhan Aktar, 
“Cumhuriyetin ilk yillarinda uygulanan ‘Türklestirme’ Politikalari” in Tarih ve Toplum, no. 156 (1996):  
4-18; Ayhan Aktar, Varlik Vergisi ve ‘Turklestirme Politikalari (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 2000); 
Ayhan Aktar, “Turkification’ Policies in the Early Republican Era” in Turkish Literature and Cultural 
Memory edited by Catharina Duft (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2009): 29-62. Also see Mesut 
Yegen’s work that investigates the evolution of “Kurdishness” and ethnic/non-ethnic citizenship vis-a-
vis Turkish state discourses and practices; Mesut Yegen, The Turkish State Discourse and the Exclusion 
of Kurdish Identity, Turkey: Identity, Democracy, Politics (London: Frank Cass, 1998). In this respect, the 
impact of “ideological apparatuses” of the state, in an Althusserian sense, should be noted: Louis 
Althusser,“Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” in Lenin and Philosophy, and Other Essays 
translated by Ben Brewster (London: New Left Books, 1971): 127-188. 
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from the fact that these aforementioned individuals are Kurdish. Instead of 
referring to successful examples that deserve praise or positive comments as 
"Kurdish music", a "Kurdish restaurant", or, for example, "a successful Kurdish 
student", i t  has become virtually a rule to present them as "Turkish music", a 
"Turkish restaurant" and "a successful Turkish student". 
Despite the strong assimilation in Turkey being questioned and corroded by Kurds 
who struggle to assert their identity in the diaspora, it is rather difficult for this 
struggle to succeed against the dominant-nation dynamics, especially under the 
circumstances of a competitive and integrationist market. The market is on the 
side of the powerful, and the one perceived to be weak will either lose whatever 
power it still holds, or fade away completely, unless it agrees to be part of the 
powerful. In her study of Kurdish male migrants' reconstruction of their ethnic 
identity through food in the ethnic economy of Hackney, East London, Sarah Keeler 
makes interesting observations confirming some of my observations on the Kurdish 
migrants especially in Haringey, North London. Keeler states: 
The realities of "people needing to earn a living" can often be seen to conflict 
with possible desires to express loyalty to, or assert identification with, a 
particular sense of "Kurdishness". Placement within the ethnic economy, and 
variable positionality according to differences of age, gender, or social class 
internal to the so-called "Kurdish community", can also lead to considerable 
ambiguity in the ways and means considered possible or desirable for 
expressing ethnic identity. At such times, the lives of informants became 
interstices for cross-cutting sentiments and pragmatic concerns relating to 
livelihoods and beliefs about identity, with food culture serving to bridge 
these tensions.227   
  
 As a case in point, we can look at the state of Kurdish migrants who, 
despite strongly opposing the assimilation of their Kurdish identity, give names to 
their businesses such as "Turkish Delight", "Turkish restaurant" or "Turkish 
                                                        
227 Keeler (2007a): 174. 
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barber," due to understandable reasons ranging from wanting to be accepted to 
adopting the name of the bigger part that is seen as more prestigious, in order to 
compete successfully in the market. On the other hand, when you come across 
these same migrants on other occasions and find the opportunity  to  converse on a 
one-to-one basis,  when  they  feel  comfortable  enough  to  trust  you beyond their 
commercial concerns and when they sense that you are from the "inside", you see 
that they are highly critical of Turkey. My thoughts on this were confirmed at the 
Newroz celebrations organised by the Kurdish associations in London, when I came 
across a group of Kurdish  shopkeepers  whom  I  observed  to  be  in  a  similar  
situation  and  knew personally, and saw them enthusiastically waving flags 
bearing the national Kurdish colours of green-red-yellow (kesk u sor u zer), 
which has become a political symbol.228        
Based on her fieldwork, Keeler discusses the identity issues of Kurds in 
Hackney by emphasising the role of ethnically demarcated economic setting that 
they work in, and explains how this setting shape their strategies of becoming 
"Kurdish", the difficulties of this process and ambiguities created by it. Keeler states 
that: 
Certainly, among Kurds in Hackney, only the most well established 
entrepreneurs can "afford" to display highly visible signifiers of particularly 
politicized "Kurdishness," or, as one informant explained to me: "Most people 
wouldn't risk putting this [flag or maps of Kurdistan] up, because they'd be 
afraid to lose their Turkish customers, who they need for business.229 
 
One of the reasons for this apparent contradictory behaviour can be explained with 
what I call hegemonic willingness, which is inspired by Gramsci's concept of 
                                                        
228 The aforementioned event took place on 24 March 2013 at the Newroz festival in Finsbury Park, 
London. "Newroz 2013 Celebration of Kurdish New Year in London" accessed on 11 November 2013 
via http://www.citizenside.com/en/photos/culture/2013-03-24/76651/newroz-2013-celebartion-
of-kurdish-new- year-in-london.html#f=0/686467  
229 Keeler (2007a): 175. 
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consent.230 Being defined by the dominance of others as something other than 
what you are, without your consent, causes a negative response. We can see this 
in the context of diaspora, where this pressure is relatively less and at least not 
direct, as a state of accepting by consent a kind of hegemony under a community 
which is bigger, as well as closer, in terms both of culture and communication. On 
the other hand, this hegemonic willingness that the Kurds in the diaspora 
perform can be interpreted as a strategic act that they proactively choose. In 
the context of diaspora, this choice of Kurds leads to strategic alliances with 
the Turks, who are fellow migrants in London. Keeler discusses this complex 
set of relations created through social antagonism, alliance and ethnic 
resistance through the "language of food": 
...whenever Kurds in the diaspora perceive attempts to obscure 
their identity in anyway, cultural practices and traditions call upon 
this history of oppression and inform the relations with Turks in 
the migratory setting, with whom there is a considerable degree of 
interaction (particularly in commercial encounters within the 
ethnic economy) and an equally high level of social antagonism. 
However given the pragmatic demands for solidarity required to 
access resources made available through agencies such as local 
government, the Home Office or the Refugee Council, Kurds do at 
times ally themselves with their better-established Turkish 
counterparts. This means that, rather resulting in open conflicts at 
the community level, the social antagonisms tend to be somewhat 
latent and usually expressed informally through verbal asides and 
digressive social encounters. In the course of conducting 
fieldwork, the most commonly used vehicle for expressing such 
resentments was through the language of food.231   
 
This situation also brings to mind the principal motifs of the seemingly 
contradictory general state that Kurds from Turkey are in, in the diaspora. It 
reminds us that they are cutting ties with Turkey, but also battling with it and 
                                                        
230 Quentin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, eds., Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio 
Gramsci (London: ElecBook, 1991): 145. 
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demanding rights, while missing the "homeland", which is conceptualised by Demir 
in terms of the "battlefield" metaphor.232 In my opinion diasporan Kurds continue 
this struggle not only against Turkey, the "Turks" and the British public, but also 
against themselves and their own contradictions regarding their individual and 
collective subjectivity. The struggle with the latter will be effective in 
determining the borders and tone of the visibility of the Kurds. 
B) From Local to Transnational 
One of the most critical suggestions towards answering the Kurdish Question by the 
mainstream Kurdish political movement, which corresponds for the most part to the 
grassroots of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK; which is recognised as a terrorist 
organisation by the US, EU and Turkey) in Turkey, as well as legal political 
parties that succeed one another such as the Democratic Society Party (DTP) and 
the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), is a demand, a "request for status" by the 
Kurds for the integration of an autonomous administrative model in Turkey.233 
Even though Kurdish politics officially explain this situation as a non-ethnic 
project234 aiming to make the administrative structure manageable, in different 
contexts and in conversations and discussion outside of the official party 
statements, the Kurdish dimension of the issue is also stated. They, however, 
still openly and strongly support ‘Turkiyelilesme’ (Turkey-fication) of the Kurds as 
Kurds, while denouncing the earlier demands for secession from Turkey and 
proposing a solution to the Kurdish  Question  through  the  recognition  of  the  
                                                        
232 Demir (2012). 
 
233 Kavak (2012a): 172-174. 
234 For a detailed study on the subject see Büşra Ersanlı and Halil Bayhan, “Demokratik Özerklik: Statü 
Talebi ve Demokratikleşme Arzusu” (Democratic Autonomy: Request of Status and the Desire for 
Democratisation) in Büşra Ersanlı, Günay Göksu Özdoğan and Nesrin Uçarlar (eds.) Türkiye Siyasetinde 
Kürtler (Kurds in Turkey's Politics) (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2012): 203-250. 
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Kurdish  identity and  rights  within  the current territorial borders of Turkey235. 
While the boundaries of "Kurds" in this desire for voluntary integration or Turkey-
fication are not very clear, the goal is to value the acknowledgement of a Kurdish 
identity and of rights in relation to this identity.236 
Yet the picture changes somewhat in the diasporan space. Although most of the 
politically active diasporan Kurds I have come across in London are almost 
exclusively BDP supporters, their discourse regarding their link to ‘being part of 
Turkey’ is weaker than their fellow Kurdish ‘comrades’ in Turkey. They refer to 
Kurdish-populated areas in Turkey in a number of ways on different occasions as 
kuzey/bakur (north), meaning “Northern Kurdistan” Turkiye Kurdistani (Kurdistan 
of Turkey). However, when they talk about their informal daily routines, like 
visiting Turkey to spend their holidays in their hometown, i.e. Maras or Dersim, 
they describe it as "Turkey". Yet, when it comes to a political issue, they 
insistently name their hometown as "Kurdistan", ulke/welat (the country), or at 
least indirectly they refer to it with demonstrative pronouns such as ora/orasi 
(there) rather than Turkey. Therefore in several cases diasporan Kurds are 
squeezed between naming their hometown in their cultural and imagined political 
boundaries, namely "Kurdistan", and official formal names like Turkiye (Turkey). 
They can display more freely their Kurdishness and the fact that they are coming 
from Kurdistan, as opposed to coming from Dogu or Dogu Anadolu (East [of Turkey] 
                                                        
235 My earlier works have touched upon the question of “Turkeyfication”(Turkiyelilesme) dealing with 
it particularly based on the internal dynamics of the Kurdish legal political party the Democratic 
Society Party (DTP), its voters; and MPs’ approaches to the question of ‘ethnic identity vs. national 
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or Eastern Anatolia). However, on the occasion they encounter Turkish migrants, 
they are not as free and comfortable to utter their ethno-national identity, possibly 
because they might be intimidated and face accusations relating to allegations of 
links with terrorism. 
 
 
Figure 6:  Facebook Event Invitation for the “PKK’s  34th   Anniversary  
Celebration”  at  the Kurdish Community Centre, Haringey, 27 November 2012237 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
237 "PKK'nin 34. Kurulus Yildonumu", event Invitation by a London-based Kurdish activist whose 
Facebook profile name is “Kurdish Centre”, 27 November 2012 
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This caution is also related to global policy changes towards the concept of 
"terrorism" that also influenced the UK. After the 2001 Terrorism Act in the UK, 
the PKK was listed as a terrorist organisation by the British authorities. King et al. 
state that “Kurds from Turkey who claim asylum in the UK stating persecution 
due to their membership of, or association with, the PKK, could risk 
imprisonment under the Terrorism Act. At the same time the Kurdish television 
station MED-TV, which broadcasts from the UK, was closed down by the British 
government due to breaches of impartiality and claims that it incited people to 
commit criminal acts”.238  According to that study, all these events are indicators 
of “how diaspora politics and the struggle for Kurdish national recognition have 
the potential to escalate into a sensitive political issue between the UK and 
Turkey.”239 When I asked my interviewees and informants what they thought 
about the stance of the British authorities towards the Kurds from Turkey, they 
all responded in a similar manner, complaining about the political, national, 
interests-based relations the UK has established with Turkey, which in the end 
causes underrating of Kurdish political demands regarding the Kurdish issue in 
Turkey. Baser's findings from his 2010 fieldwork on the mobilisation of the 
Turkish and Kurdish diasporas in Germany and Sweden are echoed in  European  
countries  in  the concerns with "terrorism"  and  "being associating with crime" 
that I encountered in the UK. This restricts the radius of action and mobilisation 
of the Kurdish diaspora.240 Accordingly, the solution to the state-PKK conflict and 
the Kurdish Question in Turkey should be evaluated in relation to both local and 
global political developments. This is of great importance concerning the shape 
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of things to come in the lives not only of those who live in Turkey, but also of 
others who live in the diaspora. 
 
One of the strategies that the Kurds in London employ to survive as 
‘political Kurds’ is to attempt  to  build  indirectly mostly imaginary contacts with  
their  “homeland”  through diasporan political debate and activism. The debates 
mostly centre on the sending country (the countries that share the Kurdistan 
geography) and the ‘homeland within homeland”241 which refers to the non-
recognised ‘Kurdish homeland’ within Turkey and even beyond its boundaries. In 
that respect, the recent developments in the Middle East which have been called 
“the Arab Spring” have had a certain influence on the hopes and expectations of the 
Kurdish diaspora in the UK. This can be observed in their use of daily phrases 
referring to different parts of “Kurdistan”. Before the Arab Spring the use of the 
geographical wording ‘Southern Kurdistan’ for the Kurdistan region in Iraq and 
'Northern Kurdistan' for East and South- East Anatolia regions in Turkey, was 
already common. Along with the already popular usages of north (bakur), south 
(başur) and to a certain extent east (rojhelat) Kurdistan, the increasing usage of 
Rojava (west), when referring to Syrian Kurdistan, and the focus on Rojava, are 
undoubtedly related to the period of the Arab Spring awakening. The public 
uprising in Syria against the Asad regime has enabled Syrian Kurds to hold 
                                                        
241 Tanıl Bora, ‘‘Milli Coğrafya’ya Bakmak” (Looking at the National Geography) Birikim Magazine, 26 
October 2006, accessed on 13 November 2013 via 
http://www.birikimdergisi.com/birikim/makale.aspx?mid=223 Tanıl Bora's use of the phrase 
"homeland within homeland" which he borrowed from İsmail Habib Sevük’s work Yurttan Yazılar 
(Writings from the Homeland) differs from the context in which I use the concept here. Bora uses 
"hometown within hometown" within the framework of Sevük's, as one of the nationalist writers of 
the republican regime, "building a national picturesque with geographic romanticism". "Vatan içinde 
vatan" (hometown within hometown), as how I used it in English for the first time in a 2012 migration 
conference without being aware of its previous usage by Sevük point to the Kurds' dual-nation 
perception, the indecision about their sense of belonging to a broad community and the dualism in 
their ongoing efforts in creating a collective identity.  
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power in northern towns of Syria and this is a source of inspiration for diasporan 
Kurds, as well as Kurds in Turkey. Many of my informants and diasporan friends on 
social media started using the word Rojava (West), whe n referring to Syria’s 
Kurdish- populated towns very frequently, and in an over-optimistic way, as if 
that region had already been recognised as part of a Greater Kurdistan like its Iraqi 
counterpart. The “victories of fellow Kurds in the Rojava Kurdistan” were always 
on the agenda among diasporan activists and media circles, and in 
cultural/national festivals. When we examine all this regional restructuring that 
effectively started reshaping Kurdish nationalism, along with the initially secretive 
but later (after Newroz 2013) public peace talks between the government and 
the imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, the whole affair becomes particularly 
tangled. As a case in point we see the Turkish state's indecisive and confused 
politics against the growing possibility of the Syrian Kurdish administration 
gaining a status similar to that of the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq. This 
new situation developing in the lead of the Syrian Kurdish movement's Partiya 
Yekîtiya Demokrat (PYD; The Democratic Union Party), which is the closest 
relative and companion of the PKK-leaning Kurdish movement in Turkey in terms 
of ideology, institutions, linguistics and culture, condemns the Turkish state, which 
is preparing to make peace with the PKK, to an indecisive historical reflex.242  The 
de facto recognition, at least to a certain extent, of Iraqi Kurdistan, which was 
previously ignored by being referred to as "Northern Iraq" instead of "Iraqi 
Kurdistan", and whose legal political actors were belittled as tribe leaders, followed 
its increasing importance in the aftermath of the US invasion of Iraq, as well as the 
establishment of good commercial and political relations yet to be implemented in 
                                                        
242 Cengiz Çandar, “Kürtler İçin Yeni Dönem- ‘Devlet’ İçin Rojava Dersi” (New Era for the Kurds- Rojava 
Lesson for the 'State'), Radikal, 24 July 2013. 
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the case of Syrian Kurdistan. However, when peace with Kurds in Turkey is on the 
agenda, and when the aforementioned characteristics of the Syrian Kurds with 
regard to Kurds from Turkey, as well as their global and regional conjuncture 
being considered of vital importance, a reasonable approach to the Rojava (West 
Syria) problem becomes apparent. As has been frequently stated recently, the 
Kurdish Question, beyond being a local issue that its four parts face separately, 
now contains the attributes a broader Kurdistanism and macro-regional 
internationalism and transnationalism. This is why we must search for the 
solution in a new transnational vision. 
 
 
 
C) Predominance and Unity in the Prioritisation of Leadership: Apoism 
 
Kurdish diaspora politics in the UK is carried out by various organisations run 
mostly by Kurds and some groups consisting of Kurds and Turks of leftist 
background as well (for instance, the DayMer Turkish and Kurdish Community 
Centre run by socialists and the Kurdish Advice Centre close to the Kurdistan 
Socialist Party PSK). The majority of the activists and lay members are of Kurdish 
origin. The DayMer Turkish and Kurdish Community Centre in particular is a good 
example of this hybridisation. Furthermore, in addition to the compatriot 
associations and the London Cemevi (Djemevi) founded by those who came from 
towns populated by Alevi Kurds, we can also see non-governmental organisations 
concerned with issues and/or subjects such as women, environment, social justice 
and participation, which also provide substantial support in relation to aspects of 
the Kurdish Question on the diaspora platform. Among all the Kurdish diasporan 
associations, the two that are prominent in terms of both members and capacity to 
mobilize the Kurds, the Kurdish Community Centre and Halkevi. What makes these 
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two organisations relatively more influential can be traced to their sympathy and 
support for the PKK cause among quite sizeable numbers of Kurds from 
Turkey during its deepening struggle for nearly three decades. 
In parallel with the movement dominating the politics of the Kurds from 
Turkey, being a PKK-leaning Kurdish movement, the prioritised position of the 
strong "leadership" in this movement is also evident in the diaspora. In other 
Kurdish movements, it is evident that the growing popularity of, for example, 
Kemal Burkay at Komkar or historical or contemporary  political figures from Iraqi 
Kurdistan, leads to  their  acceptance as charismatic  leaders able  to  evoke  in  the  
public  strong  feelings  of excitement and admiration. However, the reasons for 
what makes the PKK-leaning Kurdish movement different in this regard are: the 
prioritising of the "leadership" idea in both theory and practice; the formulating of 
an ideology around this idea; and the acceptance of this ideology for the most 
part by the movement's grassroots. 
We can see in the diaspora the reflections of the processes taking place in the 
homeland in varying shapes and at different scales. At this point, it is noticeable that 
the leadership of the PKK embodied in Abdullah Ocalan, aka Apo, functions almost 
as a spiritual motive for the political mobilisation of diasporan Kurds from 
Turkey.  Therefore, many diasporan activists use their tools of publicity and 
participation with strong and direct references to Ocalan himself as a ‘national 
leader’. In the Facebook invitations to any event, including festivals, protests, 
panels and outreaches, two items are inevitably used: the colours green, red and 
yellow (kesk-u-sor-u-zer) symbolising ‘Kurdish nationhood,’ and Ocalan’s picture as 
the complementary element to the ‘national unity’ and ‘solidarity’ around the 
personality and ideals of the leader. This, in addition to the PKK flags implying 
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serhildan (revolutionary uprising). Naturally, in this picture, it should also be 
acknowledged that there is a case beyond revering Ocalan as a cult figure, to look 
to his identity and his ideals as a leader. This case can be attributed to the need for 
a father figure in order to rid the nation of a sense of sorrow, empowering them to 
believe they can play an effective role in overcoming their condition of being a 
"stateless nation". For this reason, it is important to note that Ocalan's being a 
priceless figure for the grassroots of the Kurdish movements cannot be explained 
as a mystic as cult or an obsession; instead, at the very most, it resides in the PKK's 
being perceived to be the leading, nation-building party, or simply the Kurdish 
"vanguard party"243. 
               
Photo 9: “Youth Branch of the Kurdish Community Centre greets the Olympic 
Torch for the 2012 London Olympic Games in Wood Green, London holding a 
banner saying “Freedom for Ocalan, Status for Kurdistan”244 
 
 
 
 
As  a  case  in  point,  in  most  of  the  posters  used  in  Kurdish diaspora  events 
                                                        
243 Ali Balci, The PKK-Kurdistan Workers' Party's Regional Politics: During and After the Cold War 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2017): 126. 
244 Photo taken by a London-based Kurdish activist whose facebook profile name is “Kurdish Centre”, 
Wood Green, London, 25 July 2012 
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Ocalan’s  (or  other prominent PKK figures) pictures are complemented by PKK 
flags which have become, as mentioned above, a symbol of national 
revolutionary uprising. Therefore, the fact that diasporan politics usually 
operates through "transnational"245 means and mechanisms is also apparent in 
the primary position attributed to, and major motivation deriving from the 
‘leader’ of the major Kurdish movement. As Demir suggests, Kurds’ ‘battle with 
their 'memleket’246 (their sending country which has sovereignty over the 
Kurdish hometown) [and in my view all the memlekets including other parts of 
Kurdistan in Iraq, Iran and Syria as well] are ‘contingent upon the 
developments’ taking place in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. In this vein, 
significant developments in Turkish politics and those of the Middle East, and 
more generally Kurdish activisms emerging proactively or in an oppositional 
manner in Turkey, also affect diasporan activists and thus the nature of their 
activities. The increase in the velocity and pace of the activism and the struggle 
within the homeland also gives momentum to diaspora activism. This activism 
that I call upbeat political activism, apart from its organising aspects, can be 
thought of as drawing its motivational power from the idea of leadership and 
the legitimacy that comes with it. From this perspective, in diasporan circles, 
we can see that the leader is positioned in such a way as to have the best 
interests of his or her people rather than his or her own. For instance, 
politically motivated hunger strikes started on 12th September 2012 by Kurdish 
prisoners, many of whom are BDP members and are accused of ties to the PKK. 
These were a very telling example of this activism. Protests have taken place 
in various central sites in London, i.e. Trafalgar Square, the Prime Minister’s 
                                                        
245 Wahlbeck (2002); Bruinessen (2000). 
246 Demir (2012). 
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Office, the Foreign Office, the Turkish Embassy, and Wood Green Station. They 
draw the attention of the public to the situation of solitary confinement of the 
PKK leader, who has been g i v e n  a  life sentence and banished since his arrest 
in 1999 to a  small island near Istanbul called Imrali. These protests highlight 
the fact that Ocalan has not been able to, or (according to Turkish authorities) 
h a s  not accepted to see his advocates. Once approximately 700 political 
prisoners accused of PKK links started a hunger strike on 12th September 
2012, Kurdish activists started to publicise this immediately on social media 
and through personal communication means, including phone texting and 
news-making on the weekly Telgraf released by Halkevi, the Kurdish Turkish 
Community Centre. In the later phases of the hunger strike in the Turkish 
prisons, when it reached 40 days, several Kurdish activists in London started 
a four-day hunger strike in solidarity with  their comrades in Turkish 
prisons.247 Other demands voiced by the hunger strikers and the diasporans 
included the Kurdish language rights in education, courts and other public 
spaces in Turkey. Yet the main focus and emphasis has been on the release from 
solitary confinement of Ocalan, and, for some, “freedom for Ocalan”.248    This 
motto had been repeated on several other occasions where the diasporan 
activists marched for - in their own words - “the rights of the Kurdish people,” 
which are usually summarised in their slogan “Freedom for Ocalan, 
Status/Peace for Kurdistan.” The diasporan activists in London who were on 
hunger strikes in solidarity with those in Turkey were wearing T-shirts with 
                                                        
247 Peter Marshall, "Kurds go on Hunger Strike inLondon," Demotix , 25 October 2012, accessed on 1 
November 2012, via http://www.demotix.com/news/1548345/kurds-go-hunger-strike-
london#media-1548335. 
248 "London:  Hundreds  protest   in   solidarity  with   Kurdish   hunger  strikers", The Exeter Daily, 20 
October 2012, accessed on 1 November 2012 via http://theexeterdaily.co.uk/news/uk-news/london-
hundreds-protest- solidarity-kurdish-hunger-strikers. 
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various slogans on them: “The peace envoy is at Imrali” refers to the PKK 
leader at Imrali prison, which implies, firstly, that they expect the Turkish 
state to genuinely involve Ocalan in a peace process in the ongoing Kurdish 
conflict, and, secondly, that they regard Ocalan as ‘serok’ (the leader of the 
Kurdish people).249 When observed at the time of the 2013 Newroz, the latest 
peace period, it is evident that these demands previously seen as "wishful" or 
"dreaming" had in actual fact already started to be taken seriously and to be 
responded to by the Turkish state. It is  also  evident  that  the  Turkish  public  
can  now  respond  to  this  sensitive  issue  with  a relatively less hostile 
reaction. 
 
 
                                                        
249 For critical analyses of ‘leadership’ in the Kurdish movement and the PKK from two different 
stances see 
Alice Marcus, Blood and Belief, the PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence (New York: New York 
University Press, 2007) 
Ali Kemal Ozcan, Turkey’s Kurds; A Theoretical Analysis of the PKK and Abdullah Ocalan (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2006) 
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Photo 10: “Commemoration of Martyrs: in the Memory of  
PKK Comrade Agir” of the Kurdish Cause at the Kurdish  
Community Centre250 
 
 
 
D) Civic Participation as a Defensive Strategy in a Securitised Europe 
 
My informants, most of whom actively take part in the struggle for the Kurdish 
cause, reflect a common concern and plight that they have been experiencing in 
a securitised post-9/11 world. In other words, they avoid being labelled as 
‘terror’ sympathisers by supporting the Kurdish cause and seeing the PKK as a 
freedom movement rather than merely a guerrilla group, let alone a “terrorist 
organisation”, in spite of the strict US, EU and Turkish labelling on it as such.  
This post-9/11 conceptualisation of terror as a broader framework has 
                                                        
250 Photo taken by a London-based Kurdish activist whose facebook profile name is “Kurdish Centre”, 
Kurdish Community Centre, Haringey, London, 14 October 2012. This commemoration ceremony was 
also covered in transnational, pro-PKK, pro-Kurdish newspaper Yeni Ozgur Politika, published in 
Germany and distributed all over Europe. The news coverage was appraising the sacrifices this 
guerrilla fighter made, starting from his joining the PKK as a university student from Europe in 1993 
and then fighting until he died in 1998. As the martyred Comrade Agir's immediate family lives in 
London in the diaspora, they attend the ceremony alongside some 600 diasporan Kurds, gathered at 
Kurdish Community Centre in Haringey.  Yeni Ozgur Politika, accessed on 20 January 2015 via 
http://www.yeniozgurpolitika.org/index.php?rupel=nuce&id=13995  
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intimidated not only the PKK movement itself, but also various levels and 
manifestations of the Kurdish movements asking for further rights and political 
demands for the Kurdish people. Experiences of several diaspora activists I 
have talked to reflected this quite clearly, especially when I asked questions 
about the status and political links of their community centres and diaspora 
associations in London. In general, my informants strove to detach  their  
associations  from  almost  any  form  of  “political”  activity. They rather 
preferred to highlight the community services and cultural affairs aspects of 
their centres: 
N: Who come and go... Of course it comes to mind when you say a 
community centre. For example they come to make use of the services; they 
have expectations like this. Services, what are these? English courses for 
example. Many people come here and register for our English course. 
Activities, and what are these, let me tell you again; culture, arts, 
education...251 
 
 
 
The reasons behind this oversimplification of the role of Kurdish diaspora 
associations can be best observed in Nursel's words, when she mentions the 
obstacles she encountered as a Kurdish folk dance teacher at Halkevi: 
 
 
N: As a folkloric dance instructor I can say that I had many troubles.  
 
S: Such as? 
 
N: Umm.. For there to be students, for them to have continuity. Some used to 
say "I have exams. My family gets angry with me because of it. They say I 
should pay attention to my exams more than I do my folkloric dance 
practice. That is why they do not want me to go". First. Second, they want to 
keep their children away because this is a political association. 
 
S: How do they put that into words? 
 
N: “You cannot go there. They brainwash you…” 
 
                                                        
251 Nursel (pseudonym), interview by the author, tape recording, London, UK, 10 September 2013 
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S: But the people who come here, that is the Kurds, are mostly Alevi Kurds. 
There is an evident exclusion of them from the society, and are these not 
people who were oppressed precisely for those "political reasons" they are 
fearful of? Is this not an odd situation? 
 
N: Exactly exactly.. But there is also this. You say, "This is not an issue. 
Even if you come to the class you will not teach in two hours". I came 
across parents who say "You  are  not  doing  anything  worthwhile,  you  do  
not  need  to  go!"  There were parents I argued with face-to-face. "You are 
doing something wrong", or "We should keep our children away from these 
things", they said. We already live in a foreign country. We can at least see 
each other, hold onto each other by engaging with these activities, doing 
things together. Sustain our culture. 
 
S: When you say these things (she interrupts) 
 
N: It can elicit the opposite reaction 
sometimes. 
 
S: Are the families concerned for their children's participation due to political 
reasons close to the Kurdish movement? 
 
N: Sometimes I have children from among them like this: children from 
families who did not say they were Kurdish, Turkish or Alevi or who 
identified as Sunni Turks despite being Kurdish. Or I had many other 
students who attended my classes. This caused me a lot of of problems. The 
parents would phone me and one family in particular phoned me and spoke 
in a very threatening manner... Like, "I do not want my child to go there. We 
are not Kurdish, we are this, we are that" etc. there were families like this 
among them. But sometimes I think I battled very well to be honest. And I 
had students among them who continued for five-six years despite having 
these problems.  And  I  took  them  to  cultural  arts  festivals  in  
Germany,  in  different countries. 252 
 
 
 
 
Nursel's experiences as the folk dance teacher of the Halkevi are full of 
descriptions of handicaps and resistance from the parents of the Kurdish children 
in London to. This reveals another aspect of political imports from the homeland 
politics. The citizens of Turkey, including the Kurds even in a greater scale and 
deeper fashion due to harsh ethno-national oppression, w e r e  already politico-
phobic in their homelands. Now in London, these people, who were already 
                                                        
252 Nursel (pseudonym), interview by the author, tape recording, London, UK, 10 September 2013 
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frightened to partake in any form of political activity, still avoid talking of politics 
and showing their political hats. However, they have found other means and 
strategies to survive as homo-politicus. In this case, the London diaspora 
activists use softer terminologies and conceptions of diaspora politics that would 
not sound as ‘political’, as hardline political activity. In other words, they do 
politics, yet they attempt to sound as least political as possible, especially in the 
sense of high politics and institutional political bodies, such as the PKK, or illegal 
actors relating to it. That seems to be the very reason why the activists 
overemphasise the community centre civic participation aspect of their 
associations, while they are conducting a great amount of hardcore and upbeat 
political activism relating to issues of high politics, such as the civil war in Syria and 
Iraq, the danger of radical Islamism, the armed  struggle  of  the  Kurdish  people  in  
all  parts  of  Kurdistan,  global  imperialism  and invasions, racism, and the like. 
When I asked him the ideological differences, if any, between Halkevi and 
the KCC, and if they are both ideologically in the same line as the PKK, Mahsum 
answered: “We aren’t on the same line as any political part”, which was a completely 
diplomatic yet rhetorical expression that did not convince me at all. 
 
S: Well, how is the relationship between these two associations – the KCC 
and the Halkevi? 
 
M: Halkevi, in the end, is an association founded by a community of people 
from Turkey and Kurdistan. An association very close to us. But we are two 
independent associations because we are both separate associations. 
 
S: Are they not both in line with the PKK? 
 
M: We, as associations, do not do nothing [sic] ourselves according to the 
ideological, political line of thought of any political movement. For us, if 
[they] are Kurdish, [if they] came from Kurdistan, we must be sensitive 
towards that geography and prioritise the freedom of our community. We 
see ourselves as responsible, sensitive like this. We try to fulfil the 
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responsibilities that we have for the Kurdish public to live justly, equally, 
freely. Halkevi is also a sensitive association on these issues, as am I. But in 
the end [they are] two separate associations, independent from each other. 
We, I repeat, do not represent a political party ideologically, politically. We 
are not an ideological, political representative of any party. We do not 
operate on their behalf. We do not have the right to act in their name 
anyway.253 
 
 
When I asked this very same question to Sinem, one of my informants from t h e  
Halkevi, she even refused to answer my question and asked me about my own 
ideological thoughts. 
 
S.K: Well, what are the political preferences of this association? Why do 
you think these preferences are important?  
 
S: I have never been asked about political preferences before. You tell me 
what your political preference is so that I can understand the question. 
 
S.K: It would not be right for me to say because I am doing the interview. 
 
S: I got it, Okay. Then let us skip this question because I did not understand 
what you mean by political preference. 
 
Then, she gradually softened her tone about my asking this question to her in my 
capacity as a researcher and gave indirect answers: 
 
S.K: Let us say the principles of the association, 
ideologically? 
 
S: First of all, of course to serve Kurdish society. This is our, Halkevi as 
well as Kurdish Community Centre's principle. To serve the Kurdish society, 
err, to develop the society. Of course... 
 
S.K: These correspond more to practical needs, although ideal things, serving 
the society and all... 
 
S: to hold the community 
together.. 
 
S.K: A little background, that is. With "What was your preference?" I did 
not mean conservative, nationalist etc. 
 
S: Two associations serving socialist thought, socialist 
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ideology... 
 
S.K: What are your principles? For example, you are not conservative 
nationalist as an association. Or are you, why am I influencing? Maybe it is a 
conservative association, I do not know. 
 
S: My own identity err..No no not a conservative association, not nationalist 
either. But of course [it is important] not to forget your own society, for 
example socialist, err, protecting your Kurdish identity. Err, like living in the 
diaspora, and not forgetting who you are, that is.254 
 
In a similar fashion to that of Mahsum's answers, Sinem attempted to portray the 
Halkevi as more  of  a  community  centre  that  gives  by  and  large  civic  
community  services  like educational and cultural trainings to the Kurds in the 
UK to integrate them i n to British society. By emphasising that they are not 
political/ideological representatives of any party, the Kurdish diaspora  activists  
are  in  a  way  trying  to  broaden  their  space  of  manoeuvre  in  an ever 
securitised European space, unlike that of the Middle East, where 'hard' power 
through arms and physical human power are the main variable and legitimising 
tools for order building. 
 
On t h e  one hand, the ever- securitising environment of the post-9/11 
conjuncture imposes a harsh self-censorship on the pro-PKK diaspora discourse; 
on the other hand, there seems to be a gradual diversification of ideological 
streams within the pro-PKK Kurdish circles in London. For instance, there used to 
be only Abdullah Ocalan’s portrait hanging on the wall of the performing stage of 
the KCC building in Haringey. However, in a recent visit to the KCC for a 
fundraising event for Kobane, I realised that the portrait has been modified at the 
performing stage of the main hall, by adding the portraits of several other figures 
of Kurdish leaders who have led the Kurdish liberation movements in other parts 
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of Kurdistan, with different political/ideological stances, including Shex Seid, Qazi 
Muhammed and Melle Mustafa Barzani. Nevertheless, I should note that none of 
the Kurdish national movements figures who are alive, such as Mesud Barzani, 
Jalal Talabani, Kemal Burkay etc. are included, except Ocalan, the jailed PKK leader. 
Here, the significance of the emphasis on the unity of the leadership within the 
Kurdish nation and its competing leaders can be very clearly observed, as I 
mentioned in earlier sections of the thesis. Still, this is an interesting sort of pan-
Kurdish tendency, re-embraced on by the major pro-Kurdish diaspora association 
in the UK, and it can hardly be considered independent from the new phase of the 
ongoing Kurdish struggle in the Middle East, particularly against the ISIS 
aggression in Rojava, (Syrian Kurdistan) and Iraq. 
 
M: We sometimes invite representatives of all the parties that have a place in 
Kurdish politics. They come and join the meetings and conferences here. 
This is only the Turkish Kurdistan [association]... For example, you see more 
often [references to] the PKK with regard to Turkish Kurdistan. But the PKK 
has a big influence on the other parts. Both in Southern Kurdistan and in 
Western Kurdistan for instance. The PKK is present in Eastern Kurdistan too. 
In Iran for example... The PKK has a big influence and force of attraction. The 
power to influence and attract people. And we invite people in those parts 
also to our conferences, events. And we also invite representatives of 
revolutionary, democratic Turkish associations, institutions in Turkey. For 
example, for this Zilan Festival we invited all the representatives of Turkish 
revolutionary democratic associations currently existing here. They also 
came and some made speeches. The same way, for example, when Sebahat 
Tuncel came, the deputy chair of EMEP came with her. They came again. 
There were those who came before. I cannot remember each name at the 
moment but we have receptions for them and they often attend. From 
the Syrian Kurds, for instance, our friends come and do things [sic] not 
just from a single party but, as I said, from many parties. For example a 
festival, a Kurdish Language Festival, was organised here. Many activists 
from around the world attended that festival, using social media. Not all of 
them were people supporting the PKK.255 
 
 
While Mahsum was trying to show that the KCC is inclusive of all different 
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political groups among the Kurds in the diaspora, he stresses the impact of the PKK 
in the other three parts of Kurdistan, in addition to Northern Kurdistan (Turkish 
Kurdistan). However, his answer itself reveals the fact that they are still mostly in 
touch with groups of people that are either under the direct influence of the PKK, 
or somewhat sympathising with it. The turnouts of the events at the KCC in London 
and the overall human capital visible there verify this fact. 
It seems from my informants’ answers and the actual events that I attended 
during my field experience in the pro-PKK Kurdish associations, that they have 
been relatively willing to include people from various ideological stances from 
other parts of Kurdistan. However, they appear to narrow down their focus on the 
pro-PKK movement, especially the Turkish Kurdistan stream of that movement. 
They do not seem to include other oppositional Kurdish movements from Turkish 
Kurdistan which, it can be argued, do not reinforce and reproduce the hegemonic 
leadership and organisation of the pro-PKK movement in the politics of Turkish 
Kurdistan.256 In this vein, the Kurdish movements from neither right nor left of the 
ideological spectrum, for instance, federalist socialists gathering around KOMKAR 
of Kemal Burkay and conservative Islamic Kurdish groups like those aligning with 
Huda-Par (Kurdish Hizbullah), the pro-independence Islamic Azadi  
movement, are invited by the mainstream hegemonic Kurdish associations in the 
diaspora. Nevertheless, it would be very significant to note that the pro-PKK 
movement, in a similar manner to its politics at home, is quite eager in its diaspora 
political activism to be so inclusive as to welcome and encourage the Turkish 
leftists, socialists, democrats, seculars and feminists to join their circles, not just as 
                                                        
256 For the hegemonic power of the PKK and the pro-PKK movement in the diaspora see; Baser (2011): 
17-18. 
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a PR campaign, but also to work together in actual everyday politics. The Kurdish 
diaspora activists are opening up to all those different non-Kurdish (mostly left 
wing Turkish) groups with full pride and systematic planning. What the 
mainstream Kurdish political movement in Turkey calls the “Turkey-fication 
project”257 (Turkiyelilesme Projesi) is the theoretical and motivational source of 
this policy in the diaspora. While the PKK and the pro-Kurdish legal actors such 
as the DTP/BDP, then HDP, DTK etc., pursued policies embracing the entire society 
of Turkey in coordination with leftist, feminist and democrat segments of the 
Turkish public figures and groups and proactively named it the project of 
Turkey-fication, the mainstream Kurdish diaspora institutions and figures also 
followed this path and strove to include the above-mentioned groups in their 
circles. Several works illustrate various aspects of this intra-Turkey inter-
communal (Kurdish and Turkish) political solidarity taking place in the diasporic 
space as well.258  
As already mentioned, these sort of super-inclusive alliances have strong 
implications for homeland politics that in a way prevails over that of the hostland, 
namely diaspora politics. The PKK-oriented political actors, constituting the 
hegemonic core of Kurdish politics in Turkish Kurdistan, have seemed to be more 
eager to have direct and indirect alliances with the Turkish socialist actors in 
Turkey, rather than Kurdish actors with different political stances, especially with 
                                                        
257 Kavak (2012a): 157. When I interviewed major MPs and co-chairs of the pro-Kurdish parties 
DTP/BDP such as Ahmet Turk, Sebahat Tuncel, Sirri Sakik, as well as the party grassroots officials of all 
levels, during my fieldwork for my master's thesis, I heard about the “Turkeyfication Project” very 
often in a consistent way from almost all of my interviewees. Hence, it was quite in paralel to the offical 
documents of the pro-Kurdish parties, as well as illegal yet dominant actors, such as the PKK and its 
leader and theoretician Abdullah Ocalan. 
 
258 Demir (2012); also, Bahar Baser, Inherited Conflicts: Spaces of contention between second-
generation Turkish and Kurdish diasporas in Sweden and Germany, Unpublished PhD Thesis, 
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political tendencies contesting those of the PKK, that can potentially threaten the 
status of the PKK movement as the vanguard party259  of Kurdistan’s revolution.  
In relation to this, pro-Barzani groups originating from Turkish Kurdistan and their 
currently fragmented followers in the legal political arena may constitute a 
threat to the already strong status quo in the power balance within Turkish 
Kurdistan, as they can be seen as external or at least temporary power holders, 
just as centre-left, centre-right and Islamist parties respectively CHP/DSP, 
DP/DYP and RP/AKP are. Therefore, one cannot read this alliance of pro-PKK 
Kurdish and left-wing Turkish groups’ politics, exported from homeland to the 
diaspora, independently from the impact of the Turkey-fication experiences of 
Kurdish actors, especially in the last two decades, in Turkey and Turkish Kurdistan. 
The influences of the vanguardist ideology of the PKK can be observed on its 
followers in the diaspora. This is how Mahsum defines their responsibility to 
“educate their people” and  “give  them  a  true  consciousness”  as  a  
movement/diaspora  association’s  mission towards their people: 
We have missions that we are responsible for, on the one hand, to 
educate the society about the issues occurring in his/her own country, to 
raise awareness and on the other to help them integrate into this country. 
These are responsibilities we are an association. We try to do these.260 
 
 
This vanguardist leadership approach of the Kurdish movement towards Kurdish 
people reminds us of the positivist modernist project of the Republican elites of 
early Turkey, who founded the People’s Houses (Halkevleri) as a means to 
                                                        
259 Vanguard party is a political/ideological term coined by Lenin. V. I. Lenin, What is to be done 
(Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1973). “We shall have occasion further on to deal with the political 
and organisational duties which the task of emancipating the whole people from the yoke of autocracy 
imposes upon us. At this point, we wish to state only that the role of vanguard fighter can be fulfilled 
only by a party that is guided by the most advanced theory. (p.29). 
 
260 Mahsum (pseudonym), interview by the author, tape recording, London, UK, 1 September 2013 
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“educate the Turkish people, especially in the countryside, and give them a firm 
“consciousness” and belief in the Turkish republican revolution founded after the 
collapse of the Ottoman monarchy. The Halkevleri of t h e  1930s-1940s in Turkey 
had a left Kemalist/socialist fusion ideology that supported the ruling Republican 
People’s Party (CHP) and pioneered a left-wing positivist modernism to the un-
enlightened masses of Turkey. 261  After t h e  1980 military coup Halkevi 
(People’s House) associations have been operating as community centres 
promoting civic engagement of the people, especially from lower classes; providing 
them free or very cheap courses on arts and sciences and supporting human rights 
and other democratic pillars of our time. They still keep  their socialist, anti-
imperialist discourse alive, up to the present. This Turkish-style socialist 
community centre system has been another example of the export of homeland 
politics to the diaspora, together with its original institutions and methods. The 
migrants coming from Turkey in the 1970s and in bigger numbers in the 1980s 
gave birth to the establishment of a Halkevi (People’s House) in east London to 
deal with the problems of Turkish migrants settled in the UK. Especially in t h e  
late 1980s, and well through the 1990s, Kurdish refugees outnumbered Turks and 
the Halkevi association then started to be seen more as a Kurdish diaspora 
association with socialist leanings inclusive of Kurds and Turks in the diaspora, to 
solve their immediate problems, as new settlers first, and then to help them to 
become voluntarily integrated into the socio-economic system of the UK and to 
be “conscientious” citizens and pro-human rights Kurds and Turks. Despite 
certain parallels to the origins of the Halkevis, the post-1980 Halkevis in the 
diaspora had a broke away from  the  Kemalist  Turkish  ideological  hardline  by  
                                                        
261 Halkevleri Website, accessed on 13 January 2015 via http://www.halkevleri.org.tr/hakkimizda  
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embracing  the Kurdish reality and naming themselves the “ Halkevi Kurdish and 
Turkish Community Centre ”. 
The genealogy of this left-wing Kurdo-Turkish alliance in the diaspora can be 
traced back to the 1960s and 1970s, when the early generations of Turks and 
Kurds settled in European cities, constituting a lower social class made up of 
labour migrants. Then the Turks and Kurds in those countries had to gather 
together for such issues as workers’ rights, migration- related deprivations and 
other daily life obstacles faced by minority communities. The migrants’ pursuit of 
justice and betterment of life qualities motivated the Kurds and Turks from 
Turkey to work hand in hand in certain migrant institutions and associations. The 
Halkevi Kurdish and Turkish Community Centre was the first of its kind of 
association, founded in London in 1984.262 It started off as more of a Turkish 
socialist association in its infancy, but gradually evolved into a Turkish-Kurdish 
common ground where migrants from Turkey gathered in pursuit of their social, 
economic and political rights and demands in the UK. However, since the politically 
lively years of the 1990s, especially since the Kurdish population from Turkey 
poured into the UK in larger numbers than Turkish labour migrants, alongside the 
post-coup political refugees of the previous decade, the Halkevi has ended up being 
a Kurdish diaspora association attended mostly by Kurds from Turkey and 
Alevis of both Kurdish and Turkish background. Some of the associations of the 
Turkey-originated diaspora have had similar experiences as that of the Halkevi, 
such as the Day-Mer. The fact that the Day-Mer was founded in 1989, which was 
                                                        
262 Alessio D’Angelo, “Kurdish Community Organisations in London: a Social Network Analysis” 
(Middlesex 
University School of Health and Social Sciences, Social Policy Research Centre, Working Paper, n.2 
(2008): 40. 
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quite a few years after t h e  Halkevi’s establishment, at a time when the Kurdish 
migration to Europe and hence to the UK was accelerating, has meant that the Day-
Mer has focused on both Turkish and Kurdish communities. 
Since its establishment, the DAY-MER has concentrated and put on the 
emphasis in its work especially on issues that  the Turkish and Kurdish 
people encounter as people who live and work in London. In the early 
period of its establishment, when the largest influx of Turkish and Kurdish 
people to Britain was taking place, the DAY-MER concentrated on the 
problems of Turkish and Kurdish people regarding immigration, settlement 
and formation as an ethnic community.263 
 
 
From the festivals, events and community services that the Day-Mer provides, one 
can tell they represent a bilingual, bi-communal and bi-cultural vision, recognising 
Turks and Kurds as separate, distinct groups, yet at the time in perfect solidarity. 
Their left-wing, mostly socialist, worldview feeds this solidarity strongly as it bases 
itself on universalist themes of freedom and equality of individuals and peoples. In 
this respect, rather naming the Day-Mer a Turkish or Kurdish diaspora association 
per se, I would coin the term socialist solidarity diaspora to describe the type of 
diaspora category the Day-Mer fits into best. Several informants I have talked to 
that have attended and been activist in Day-Mer circles have expressed their left 
(usually socialist), feminist or democrat identities rather than their ethnic 
(Turkish or Kurdish) or religious identity (Alevi, Sunni or atheist). Nevertheless, it is 
ultimately ethnic (Turkish and Kurdish). 
Another factor in the Kurdish alliance with Turkish leftists in the diaspora is 
hidden in the hostland circumstances, in which both groups are, at best, minority 
groups, if not foreigners. Therefore, both Turks and Kurds in the diaspora feel that 
they need to gather together to form a strong and viable front against certain 
                                                        
263 Day-Mer Turkish and Kurdish Community Centre Website, accessed on 10 January 2015 via 
http://www.daymer.org/content/about-daymer  
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deprivations, for example, economic (the ethnic economy and its market appeals 
mostly to Turks and Kurds in the UK), political, social and cultural. 
A final factor is related to the sectarian relations within Turkish society. 
The Alevi- Sunni relations among Turkish-speaking communities are thought to 
be much easier when the sides are more secular or left- wing. An Alevi Turkish 
citizen is usually politically in touch with secular and/or left-wing groups in 
Turkey. In a similar manner, the Kurdish diasporans of the UK, a large part of 
whom are known to be of t h e  Alevi faith, naturally ally with Turks of socialist, 
secular, democrat or social democrat tendencies, rather than with conservative or 
Islamist Kurds, although they both come from the same ethnic background. The 
Alevi factor, unlike other parts of the Kurdish diaspora in Europe, is much more 
visible in the UK, considering the fact that the Alevi districts and villages are first 
senders of Kurds from Turkey, i.e. Elbistan, Pazarcik, Sariz, Nurhak, Dersim etc. 
Some of those Kurdish Alevis in the diaspora do not even prioritise their Kurdish 
identity, but wear their Alevi hat first, as they feel that they are discriminated 
against even more, as their mazhab (sect) is part of Islamic heterodoxy vis- a-vis 
the Sunni orthodoxy that is more common both among Turks and Kurds in the 
homeland. 
The excessive security concerns of Kurdish activists have certain productive 
and destructive consequences for Kurds in the diaspora. The main negative 
outcome is the existing fear of politics prevalent also in Turkish society, to such a 
great extent that it includes the Kurds, seemingly the most politicised segment of 
society since the 1980 military coup. On the other hand, the extreme pressure of 
order-building through legal political activity and civic engagement has pushed 
the Kurds to demand their rights in various aspects of th eir  life that were 
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conventionally seen as part of ' low' politics, or issues of secondary importance 
vis-a-vis t h e  national liberation. This includes gender politics, ecological issues, 
social security and welfare issues, education and socialisation problems and 
cultural development issues, rather than 'high politics', such as the PKK’s status, 
disarmament, political recognition and local autonomy. 
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CHAPTER VIII: CONCLUSION  
 
This thesis has attempted to reflect on the overall picture of Kurdish diaspora 
politics with particular focus on community politics taking place in London. In so 
doing, the political activities by the Kurds from Turkey have been contextualised 
within the scope of a transnational politics of diasporas as non-state actors, moved 
by their strong physical and psycho-social ties to their homeland, even as they now 
live in a ‘new homeland’. Only a few major themes relating to political activism have 
been discussed here, whereas several others have been left for further 
investigation, due to the constraints of scope and the context of this research. The 
diasporic experiences of political refugees from a  socialist background, of both 
Turkish and Kurdish ethnicity, and o f  Alevis as a religious minority group 
comprising both Turks and Kurds, are explored in comparison with the plight of 
Kurds from Turkey. Finally, the self-positioning(s) and juxtaposition of the Kurdish 
diaspora communities from all four parts of the ‘Kurdish homeland’ can be 
compared, while touching upon the diasporan politics of the groups migrating from 
Turkey, which is a sophisticated example of a ‘bridge function’ based on 
Turkey's position as officially being a Western ally, on the one hand, and politically 
and culturally a blend of Southeast Europe and the Middle East on the other. 
This work has examined the political expectations and practices of diasporan 
Kurds; however, due to the boundaries of this study, I could not touch enough on 
the  points of differentiation and interaction concerning  different  Kurdish  
diaspora groups. The demand for a democratic regime where "the rights of the 
Kurds" are recognised in the broadest sense has emerged as the most essential 
point of commonality. A period of ceasefire and a "democratic solution" that can 
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lay the foundations of this new era is supported by virtually all of the groups in the 
diaspora. I t  should not be forgotten, however, that the optimism is located within 
an uncertain environment. Just as in the homeland, the wider masses observe the 
hope for peace (which I can say was received much more enthusiastically by 
women) with a critical eye and without separating it from the "realpolitik", these 
sentiments are also present in the diaspora. At the various discussion platforms 
that I attended, in different diasporan circles, I can say that there was serious 
criticism regarding the principles, that the t h e n  p r e s e n t  p e a c e  p r o c e s s  is 
based upon, demanding they be more lasting, just, realistic and transparent; and 
this criticism was expressed in a more open way compared to the level of 
discussions in Turkey. I would also like to emphasise particularly that I came 
across diasporan individuals who, in spite of their trust in the leader, nevertheless 
demanded at the level of public debate that this "leadership" be more transparent 
and accountable in this latest peace period. 
Apart f r o m   the  Turkish  Kurdish  diaspora  group,  it  should  be  noted  
that  there  is  a considerable diasporan activism from other parts of Kurdistan, 
Iraqi Kurdistan in particular. However, the cooperation of these groups with 
the Kurds from Turkey seems to be very limited. The socio-political and 
ideological stance of the diaspora of the  Kurds  from  Turkey  plays  a  role  in  this  
low  level  of  cooperation  between  the  two groups.264 It is noticeable that for an 
ethno-nationalist diaspora, Kurds from Turkey residing in the UK are in much 
closer contact and cooperation with ethnic Turks who migrated to the UK, instead 
of connecting with the Kurds from Iraq more. Over the course of the "Turkey-
                                                        
264 Ipek Demir and Welat Zeydanlioglu, ‘On the Representation of ‘Others’ at Europe’s Borders: The 
Case of Iraqi Kurds’, Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18, no. 1 (2010): 7-23. 
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fication" (Turkiyelilesme) process which has accelerated in the past decade, the 
influence of the modifications of the homeland Kurdish politics concerning 
"ethnic politics" and ethnic party formation on diaspora politics may explain this 
peculiarity. Nonetheless, when we look at the political superstructure that 
experiences the Turkification process and claims to carry out such a "project" 
voluntarily, as well as its ethnic grassroots which criticises but continues to 
support this structure, the other half of this new political identification can be seen 
more clearly. The Kurds from Turkey, having been "integrated" and "Turkey-fied" 
for a relatively long time also started to experience the Kurdistan-ification 
(Kurdistanilesme) process more openly, in the past few years in particular. We 
cannot separate this new Kurdistanification that has been into Turkey's politics in 
pragmatic ways of deliberate eclecticism including "democratic-national unity", 
"democratic autonomy" and "democratic confederalism", from the dynamic 
reshaping of the Middle East and from the strategic neighbourhood relations. 
Trans-border regional actors of Kurdistan occasionally vary and they even 
sometimes take opposite sides. However, we can predict that this pragmatism will 
appear more as the main political instrument of the new- age Kurdish politics 
and its actors. While the discussion on a just and  permanent solution for the 
century-long Kurdish Question continues, as has often be en stated lately, 
beyond the allegedly disconnected local issues of the four different parts of 
Kurdistan, now it is necessary to employ broader Kurdistani, macro-regional 
international and transnational perspectives as well. 
 
Therefore, we must seek wisdom in a new sort of transnational perspective, if we 
aim to bring a long-lasting solution to the Kurdish question. In this vein, it is 
 
 
178 
necessary for the Turkish state and society to encourage participation and multi-
actor politics, and to speed up their implementation, more than ever, if they want to 
survive with minimum "damage" after the reshaping and meeting the status demands 
arising from Kurdistan, as well as the broader Middle East. In the case of Kurdish 
peace, it can be argued that a wide-scale consensus has been formed by actors 
ranging from diaspora to homeland; from regional dynamics to influential global 
powers. Consequently, it is crucial to discuss how to implement a system based on 
the distinctive properties of post-peace Kurdistan(s) via realistic models to ensure 
pluralist, participatory and decentralised governance. 
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